Opinion
16-P-0249
03-31-2017
COMMONWEALTH v. Bryan D. FENNELLY.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant appeals from his conviction of operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24. He argues that his motion to suppress evidence should have been allowed and that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. We affirm.
1. The motion to suppress . We summarize the facts found by the motion judge after an evidentiary hearing at which two witnesses, State police Trooper Christopher Goodwin and the defendant, testified. On July 27, 2015, Trooper Goodwin was on patrol in a marked cruiser on I-95 near the border between Massachusetts and New Hampshire. He was accompanied by a training officer. At approximately 2:20 a.m., he passed a vehicle that was parked in the right-hand travel lane of the highway. None of the vehicle's lights were on. At the next exit, he turned around, returned to the car, and parked behind it. A man, later identified as the defendant, was asleep in the driver's seat. The defendant was alone and the keys were in the ignition. Trooper Goodwin knocked on the window several times, but the defendant did not wake up. Trooper Goodwin then yelled and pounded on the window. Eventually, the defendant awoke but could not open the window or the door as Trooper Goodwin instructed. Instead, the defendant tried to start the car. The engine turned over, twice, but did not engage. The defendant then opened door and the Trooper smelled the odor of alcohol and saw the defendant's eyes to be glassy and bloodshot. In response to Trooper Goodwin's questions, the defendant explained that he was returning from New Hampshire and had run out of gas. The defendant said he had not been drinking. Trooper Goodwin asked the defendant to get out of the car, and the defendant complied. The defendant was unsteady and closed the door of the vehicle, locking his keys and other belongings inside. The defendant agreed to perform field sobriety tests, after which Trooper Goodwin concluded the defendant was under the influence of alcohol and placed him under arrest.
The defendant testified to a different version of events, however the judge did not credit his testimony.
On the basis of these facts, all of which are supported by the record, the motion judge concluded that Trooper Goodwin's approach to the defendant's vehicle was a proper exercise of community caretaking duties. Thereafter, the odor of alcohol justified an exit order and request to perform field sobriety tests. The motion judge explicitly found, contrary to the defendant's testimony, that the defendant never indicated that he did not want to take the field sobriety tests. The motion to suppress was denied and Trooper Goodwin was permitted to testify as to his observations of the defendant at trial.
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, "we adopt the motion judge's factual findings absent clear error," and "independently determine whether the judge correctly applied constitutional principles to the facts as found." Commonwealth v. Isaiah, I ., 450 Mass. 818, 821 (2008). In this case, we agree with the judge's analysis in all respects and affirm the denial of the motion to suppress. As the Commonwealth notes in its brief, all of Trooper Goodwin's actions were justified under the community caretaking function. See Commonwealth v. Murdough , 428 Mass. 760, 764 (1999) ("[T]he officer's initial approach to the parked vehicle and the officer's knocking on the window raised no constitutional issue"); Commonwealth v. Mateo-German , 453 Mass. 838, 843 (2009). Moreover, it is well settled that once, as here, an officer has reasonable suspicion to believe a driver of an automobile is under the influence of alcohol, it is appropriate to have that person exit the vehicle to conduct field sobriety tests. See Commonwealth v. Blais , 428 Mass. 294, 298 (1998) ; Commonwealth v. Perachio , 61 Mass. App. Ct. 591, 593-594 (2004). The motion to suppress was properly denied.
Although we need not reach the issue, we further conclude that the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, namely impaired operation of an automobile.
--------
2. Sufficiency of the evidence . The evidence presented at trial was similar, if not identical, to that presented at the motion hearing and, therefore, we do not repeat it. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. Latimore , 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979), this evidence was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the defendant was sleeping in a vehicle parked in the right-travel lane of I-95 at 2:20 a.m. This fact alone demonstrates a significant impairment in judgment. Next, the defendant failed to follow Trooper Goodwin's instructions and attempted to start the car rather than roll down the window. The defendant's appearance, red bloodshot eyes, the smell of alcohol, and unsteady gait coupled with his failure to perform field sobriety tests provided an adequate basis for the jury to find him guilty.
Judgment affirmed .