Opinion
No. 15–P–986.
11-16-2016
COMMONWEALTH v. Frank G. ELDRIDGE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant, Frank G. Eldridge, appeals from an order dated January 30, 2015, denying his motion for a new trial, and an order dated April 10, 2015, denying his subsequent motion for reconsideration. We affirm.
Background. On March 31, 1992, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of rape of a child, seven counts of indecent assault and battery on a child, two counts of threatening to commit a crime, and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He was sentenced to six to ten years in State prison. More than two decades later, on October 17, 2013, the defendant filed the instant motion to withdraw his pleas, arguing that they were not intelligent and voluntary because he has cognitive limitations. Supporting his motion were affidavits, including those of his current counsel, his original trial counsel, and the original prosecutor, as well as documentary evidence. After a nonevidentiary hearing, the motion judge (who was not the plea judge) denied the motion in a thorough, fifteen-page memorandum of decision.
Discussion. Motions to withdraw guilty pleas are treated as motions for a new trial. See Mass.R.Crim.P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001); Commonwealth v. Pingaro, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 41, 48 (1997). Such motions are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court judge, whose ruling will not be reversed unless "shown to be an abuse of discretion that produces a manifestly unjust result." Pingaro, supra. We discern no such abuse here.
The Commonwealth argues that we should consider the defendant's arguments waived, because he filed a prior new trial motion that did not include his current claims. Passing the issue of waiver, we conclude that there is no merit to his arguments.
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Whether a plea is intelligently and voluntarily made is confirmed in the ordinary course by the plea judge during the required colloquy. See Commonwealth v. Correa, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 714, 716–717 (1997). As the motion judge recognized, where, as here, colloquy records are no longer available due to the defendant's delay in bringing his motion, a presumption of regularity attaches. Commonwealth v. Hoyle, 67 Mass.App.Ct. 10, 14–15 (2006). The defendant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by credible and persuasive evidence; if the defendant is successful, an evidentiary hearing may be warranted, and the burden shifts to the Commonwealth to show that the plea proceedings were conducted in a way that protected the defendant's constitutional rights. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 426 Mass. 657, 664–666 (1998).
Here, the defendant contends that he met his threshold burden by offering evidence that he had cognitive limitations at the time of the pleas, as well as evidence that neither his attorney nor the plea judge was aware of his limitations, and, hence, no special care would have been taken to ensure that he understood the proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Colantoni, 396 Mass. 672, 678 n. 3 (1986) ("patient care" is called for when accepting plea from defendant with "limited ... mental resources" [quotation omitted] ). The motion judge acknowledged the defendant's evidence of his cognitive limitations and his evidence that his attorney and the plea judge were unaware of his limitations. However, the motion judge determined that these facts, alone, did not lead to the conclusion that the plea colloquy was inadequate. As he correctly reasoned, intellectual impairment does not necessarily equate with lack of competence to plead guilty. See Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 442 Mass. 341, 350 (2004) ("[A] defendant's competence [at a plea hearing] is not governed by the presence or absence of any particular psychiatric diagnosis").
Here, the record as a whole supports the motion judge's conclusion that the defendant failed to meet his burden. There was evidence that the plea judge customarily employed thorough colloquy practices. This evidence included a transcript of a colloquy in a different case before the plea judge, as well as the affidavit of the original prosecutor, who was familiar with the plea judge and closely monitored his colloquies.
Specific to the defendant, there was evidence that four years before the pleas at issue, in an unrelated case, the defendant had been found competent to waive his Miranda rights; in addition, there was evidence that the defendant was familiar with the criminal justice system, having been convicted by plea several times prior to the pleas at issue. The motion judge also had before him an affidavit from the defendant's original defense counsel stating that it was his practice to seek evaluations of clients when he suspected cognitive impairment. In the defendant's case, counsel did not perceive the defendant to have any difficulty understanding the proceedings, and, prior to the plea proceeding, he had counselled the defendant regarding the evidence against him and any potential defenses. In sum, the motion judge was entitled to credit the foregoing evidence and was not required to accept the defendant's self-serving allegations that he lacked understanding of the proceedings and felt coerced. There was no abuse of discretion.
Orders dated January 30, 2015, denying motion for new trial, and April 10, 2015, denying motion for reconsideration, affirmed.