Opinion
J.S45033/15 No. 1969 MDA 2014
08-05-2015
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. CEDRIC LAMONT DANIELS, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order October 23, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
Criminal Division No(s).: CP-21-CR-0001420-2013 CP-21-CR-0001430-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, WECHT, and FITZGERALD, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Pro se Appellant, Cedric Lamont Daniels, appeals from the order entered in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas denying his first Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") petition. Appellant claims his constitutional rights were violated, the search was invalid, trial counsel was ineffective, and exculpatory evidence exists. Because Appellant has an outstanding notice of appeal from his judgment of sentence, we quash this appeal, vacate the trial court's orders entered after Appellant's initial notice of appeal, and remand for further proceedings.
As noted below, Appellant's trial counsel has not withdrawn.
The facts and procedural history are unnecessary for our review. On June 17, 2014, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence of sixty-three to 132 months' imprisonment. On June 22, 2014, Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal from his judgment of sentence, which the court docketed on June 25, 2014, and forwarded to his trial counsel pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(A)(4).
Meanwhile, on June 20, 2014, the court docketed Appellant's pro se PCRA petition. Although trial counsel had not withdrawn, the court appointed PCRA counsel for Appellant on June 25, 2014—the same day the court docketed Appellant's notice of appeal. On September 22, 2014, PCRA counsel filed a Turner/Finley petition to withdraw. On September 24, 2014, the court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice and also granted PCRA counsel's petition to withdraw. On October 23, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant's PCRA petition. Four days later, the court docketed Appellant's pro se response to the Rule 907 notice. On November 10, 2014, the PCRA court, after reviewing Appellant's response, again dismissed his PCRA petition; the order was also mailed the same day.
The record did not indicate when Appellant mailed the petition. See generally Commonwealth v. Wilson , 911 A.2d 942, 944 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2006) (discussing prisoner mailbox rule). Interestingly, the certified record includes several of Appellant's envelopes, albeit only the left halves reflecting his prison address and not the right halves, which would contain the critical postmarks.
The docket reflects no notice of withdrawal.
Commonwealth v. Turner , 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley , 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
The Turner/Finley letter did not acknowledge Appellant's outstanding notice of appeal and the absence of trial counsel's withdrawal from representation.
That same day, November 10, 2014, Appellant filed a second, pro se notice of appeal. The notice of appeal did not state Appellant was appealing from the October 23rd or November 10th orders. Appellant timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
This date reflects the signature date. See generally Wilson , supra.
Because the PCRA court mailed its November 10, 2014 order that same day, it appears unlikely Appellant received notice of the order that day.
Instantly, we address the procedural quagmire that resulted after the trial court overlooked Appellant's pro se June 22, 2014 notice of appeal and the absence of an order permitting Appellant's trial counsel to withdraw. In Commonwealth v. Cooper , 27 A.3d 994 (Pa. 2011), our Supreme Court resolved a similarly vexing procedural posture involving a premature pro se notice of appeal and a subsequent, counseled post-sentence motion. Id. at 996. The posture was further complicated by the trial court's failure to forward the pro se notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(A)(4), the court's denial of the counseled post-sentence motion, and a timely counseled notice of appeal. Id. at 1006-07. The Cooper Court solved the conundrum by, inter alia, holding that a pro se notice of appeal filed by a defendant represented by counsel is not a legal nullity and was perfected after the trial court denied the subsequent, counseled post-sentence motion. See generally id. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1701 also addresses the effect of a notice of appeal: "Except as otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other government unit may no longer proceed further in the matter." Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a).
In this case, somewhat akin to the defendant in Cooper , Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal while represented by counsel. Cf. Cooper , 27 A.3d at 1006-07. The trial court, although forwarding Appellant's notice of appeal to trial counsel per Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(A)(4), inexplicably proceeded on Appellant's PCRA petition. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a); cf. Cooper , 27 A.3d at 1006-07. The court should not have appointed PCRA counsel, who should have discovered the procedural deficiencies set forth above. Given the complexity of the instant procedural posture and the Cooper Court's admonition that "criminal rules are intended to provide for just determination of every proceeding, and should be construed to secure simplicity, fairness and elimination of delay," Cooper , 27 A.3d at 1003, we deem it appropriate to quash this appeal as the trial court's orders and actions subsequent to Appellant's June 22, 2014 notice of appeal were legal nullities. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). Accordingly, as the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act upon Appellant's PCRA petition, we quash the appeal.
Given the pendency of Appellant's direct appeal, the instant PCRA petition was premature.
Appeal quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/5/2015