Opinion
J-S49036-19 No. 92 EDA 2019
10-29-2019
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. KEITH CRAWLEY Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 5, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0229891-1987 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. JUDGMENT ORDER BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. --------
Appellant Keith Crawley filed this pro se appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying his petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546 as untimely filed. We affirm.
On February 26, 1988, a jury convicted Appellant of second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy. On the same day, the Honorable David N. Savitt, sentenced Appellant to a term of life imprisonment. On April 16, 1993, this Court affirmed Appellant's judgment of sentence. On October 1, 1993, our Supreme Court denied Appellant's petition for allowance of appeal.
On December 23, 1996, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition. Appointed counsel sought permission to withdraw by filing a Turner-Finley no-merit letter. See Commonwealth v. Turner , 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley , 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988). On December 10, 1997, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant's petition.
On August 24, 2012, Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA petition and sought to file an amended petition on March 15, 2016. On September 5, 2018, the PCRA court notified Appellant of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On September 24, 2018, Appellant filed a response to the Rule 907 notice. On December 5, 2018, the PCRA court denied the petition as untimely filed. This appeal followed.
As an initial matter, we must determine whether Appellant's PCRA petition is untimely. It is well-established that "the PCRA's timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed; courts may not address the merits of the issues raised in a petition if it is not timely filed." Commonwealth v. Leggett , 16 A.3d 1144, 1145 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citations omitted). Generally, a PCRA petition "including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking the review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely petition if the appellant can explicitly plead and prove one of the three exceptions enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii), which include: (1) the petitioner's inability to raise a claim as a result of governmental interference; (2) the discovery of previously unknown facts or evidence that would have supported a claim; or (3) a newly-recognized constitutional right that has been held to apply retroactively by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
As noted above, the trial court sentenced Appellant on February 26, 1988, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on April 16, 1993, and the Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on October 1, 1993. Appellant did not seek further review in the Supreme Court of the United States. As a result, Appellant's judgment of sentence became final on December 30, 1993, after the expiration of the ninety-day period in which he was allowed to seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court. See U.S. Sup.Ct. R. 13. As such, Appellant needed to file his PCRA petition by December 30, 1994. As Appellant filed the instant petition on August 24, 2012, nearly nineteen years after his judgment of sentence became final, this petition is facially untimely.
Appellant does not invoke a particular timeliness exception but argues that 1) Judge Savitt should have recused himself from ruling on Appellant's first PCRA petition as he was also Appellant's trial court judge, and 2) PCRA counsel and trial counsel were ineffective in failing to challenge a particular jury instruction. Neither claim satisfies one of the PCRA timeliness exceptions to entitle Appellant to review of his petition. To the extent Appellant suggests that the governmental interference exception applies, he has not argued that government interference prevented him from raising either of these claims.
As Appellant failed to plead and prove that a timeliness exception applies, we are without jurisdiction to review his claims. Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in denying Appellant's petition as untimely filed.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 10/29/19