Opinion
707 WDA 2020 708 WDA 2020 709 WDA 2020 710 WDA 2020 J-S11007-21
09-30-2021
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. WILLIAM CALEB CLAYTON Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. WILLIAM CALEB CLAYTON Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. WILLIAM CALEB CLAYTON Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. WILLIAM CALEB CLAYTON Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 28, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County Criminal Division at No: CP-61- CR-0000640-2019, CP-61- CR-0000641-2019, CP-61- CR-0000600-2019, CP-61- CR-0000636-2019
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J. [*]
MEMORANDUM
STABILE, J.
Appellant, William Caleb Clayton, appeals from the May 28, 2020 judgments of sentence imposing an aggregate 5½ to 30 years of incarceration for unlawful contact with a minor-sexual abuse, indecent assault of a person less than thirteen years of age, and related offenses. We affirm.
Appellant filed a separate notice of appeal at each docket.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§6318(a)(1) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7).
The four victims were girls aged fifteen, twelve (two victims), and eleven. N.T. Sentencing, 5/8/20, at 18-20. Appellant, via social media, provided the victims sexually explicit photos of himself and solicited nude photos of the victims. Id. During a video chat with one of the twelve-year-old victims, he persuaded her to remove her clothing while he masturbated to completion in front of her. Id. at 20. Appellant was eighteen going on nineteen at the time of the offenses. Id. at 19.
Appellant entered guilty pleas on January 10, 2020. After imposition of sentence, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion. The trial court denied that motion on June 17, 2020. This timely appeal followed. Appellant raises a single issue:
Whether the sentence [sic] court erred or abused its discretion in that the court imposed a sentence without giving consideration to all the relevant factors under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), including but not limited to [Appellant's] character and rehabilitative needs, and the sentence is contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process and guidelines.Appellant's Brief at 5.
Appellant preserved this issue in a post-sentence motion and timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In accord with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), Appellant claims his sentencing challenge presents a substantial question because it implicates the trial court's adherence to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing code. See, Commonwealth v. Cannon, 954 A.22d 1222, 1229 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that a substantial question exists where the appellant shows "actions by the sentencing court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process"), appeal denied, 964 A.2d 893 (Pa. 2009). We disagree. In Cannon, the defendant's assertion that the sentencing court failed to consider, among other things, his age, rehabilitative needs, and lack of a prior record, did not raise a substantial question. Id. at 1228-29.
Even if Appellant raised a substantial question, we would find no abuse of discretion.
[T]he proper standard of review when considering whether to affirm the sentencing court's determination is an abuse of discretion. ...[A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. In more expansive terms, our Court recently offered: An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.
The rationale behind such broad discretion and the concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the sentencing court is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances before it.Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 169-70 (Pa. Super. 2010). Where, as here, the sentence falls within the sentencing guidelines, this Court will reverse if we find the application of the guidelines to be "clearly unreasonable." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2).
The record reflects that the trial court received the pre-sentence investigation report and confirmed with defense counsel that there were no corrections to be made. N.T. Sentencing, 5/8/20, at 14-15. The trial court also received and read victim impact statements. Id. at 17-18. Appellant testified that he completed his high school diploma and one thousand hours of community service while incarcerated in county prison awaiting sentencing. Id. at 27. He accepted responsibility for his actions and expressed remorse. Id. at 26-27. Appellant's mother testified that he suffers from bipolar disorder. Id. at 31.
The district attorney requested an aggregate 82 months to 48 years of incarceration, noting the impact on the victims and their desire to see long-term consequences for Appellant. Id. at 21. Defense counsel argued for a county sentence, noting Appellant's young age and his need for treatment. Id. at 23-26. The trial court imposed the sentence set forth above, noting its disagreement with the severity of the Commonwealth's recommended sentence. Id. at 41-42. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences for each victim. Id. at 41. The court explained that a lesser sentence would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offenses. Id. at 47.
In summary, the record reflects that the trial court was aware of Appellant's mental health and his need for treatment, and aware of the progress Appellant made while in prison awaiting sentencing. The court's sentence fell at the low end of the standard guideline range and was considerably less severe than the sentence the Commonwealth requested. The record does not support Appellant's contention that the trial court failed to account for his rehabilitative needs. Rather, the court's express statement at the conclusion of sentencing reflected its belief that it imposed the lowest sentence it could without diminishing the seriousness of the offenses.
Appellant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Parlante, 823 A.2d 927 (Pa. Super. 2003), is misplaced. The Parlante Court held that a trial court's failure to consider all relevant factors may constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. at 930. As we have explained, the sentence imposed in this case reflects the court's careful consideration of all relevant factors and its effort to impose the lowest sentence consistent therewith. We discern no abuse of discretion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Colins joins the memorandum.
Judge Kunselman files a concurring memorandum in which Judge Colins joins.
Judgment Entered.
CONCURRING MEMORANDUM
KUNSELMAN, J.
The Majority holds that William Caleb Clayton's Rule 2119(f) Statement does not raise a substantial question, but it would affirm the sentence in any event. See Majority Memorandum at 4, 7. Although I disagree on the issue of substantial question, I concur in the decision to affirm his sentence.
In his Rule 2119(f) Statement, Clayton contends that "the sentencing court did not adequately consider all of the relevant sentencing factors especially his rehabilitative needs." Appellant's Brief at 12. This Court has held that an averment that the trial court sentenced based solely on the seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors raises a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Notably, our determination of what raises "a substantial question in various cases has been less than a model of clarity and consistency, even in matters not involving excessive sentence claims." Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1272 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2013) (comparing different results from seemingly similar cases, some finding a substantial question and some not). Until we can provide more guidance to parties and attorneys on the requirements of a 2119(f) statement - unless it is obviously deficient - I would address the appellant's issue, especially where, as here, the appellant made a good faith attempt to comply with the rule, and the Commonwealth has not even filed an appellate brief.
I note my displeasure with the Commonwealth's failure to file an appellee brief, despite requesting and being granted two 60-day extensions to do so. The Commonwealth requested a sentence of 82 months to 48 years, based on its perception of the seriousness of the crimes, yet, inexplicably, filed no appellate brief.
In reviewing the substance of Clayton's appeal, based on the arguments as counsel has formed them, I find myself compelled to affirm. Although Clayton alleges that the sentence was unreasonable, his attorney fails to argue why, in these circumstances, the sentence that the trial court imposed was an abuse of discretion. Instead, Clayton merely proposes that an alternate sentence, in the county jail, would have been feasible, and allowed him to rehabilitate. Appellant's Brief p. 16. This may be true, but it is hardly relevant to the appellate issue at hand.
An abuse of discretion is "not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record." Commonwealth v. Santos, 176 A.3d 877, 882 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Had Clayton argued that a 30-year maximum sentence for the crimes involved was manifestly unreasonable, (an 18-year-old, high-school student who masturbated on social media before a 12-year-old and exchanged nude photos with four young girls), given his physical age, mental age, and lack of a prior record, he may have convinced me that the maximum sentence imposed here was too extreme and unduly harsh. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sarvey, 2020 WL 2764229 (Pa. Super. 2020) (finding 17-year sentence for attempting to pass one and one-half pills was "clearly unreasonable"). But Clayton does not contend - much less persuade me - that the sentence was manifestly unreasonable.
The record is sparse in this case, and the sentencing transcript does not detail many of the events that took place. It appears Clayton did meet with one of the twelve-year-old victims, kissed her, and the two touched each other's genitalia. For these physical actions, Clayton was convicted of indecent assault, which carried a sentence of three to twelve months, plus or minus six months.
I recognize that sentencing is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007). However, a trial court's discretion is not unrestricted. "[T]he deference paid to the trial court does not necessitate a rubber[-]stamped approval of the sentences imposed by the sentencing court." Commonwealth v. Robertson, 874 A.2d 1200, 1212 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Otherwise, "[a]ppellate review of sentencing matters would become a mockery and a sham if all sentences were routinely affirmed under the guise of the discretion of the trial court." Id.
Section 9781(c)(2) of the Sentencing Code provides that on appeal, this Court "shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds: . . . the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines[, ] but the case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable[.]" 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2). In determining whether a particular sentence is clearly unreasonable,
the appellate court must consider the defendant's background and characteristics as well as the particular circumstances of the offense involved, the trial court's opportunity to observe the defendant, the presentence investigation report, if any, the Sentencing Guidelines as promulgated by the Sentencing Commission, and the 'findings' upon which the trial court based its sentence.Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 147 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).
Turning to the circumstances of this case, I note that Clayton did not rape these young girls. Most of his crimes were committed via social media on Snapchat. He did not disseminate any of the photographs he obtained. He was a high school student when the crimes occurred. Testimony also indicated that although he was 18, his mental age was more of a 15 or 16- year-old. Had he been under 18, instead of 18, his crimes would have been handled in juvenile court. While he is not entitled to a volume discount for the crimes he committed, the aggregate, maximum sentence for these crimes under these circumstances causes me to question the appropriate length of his prison sentence.
The record indicates Clayton obtained his high-school diploma while incarcerated awaiting disposition of this matter. It is unclear whether he was attending high school at the time of the events in question.
Many of Clayton's crimes would have been handled as summary offenses under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6321(a).
Footnotes Not Avaliable.
However, we need not determine whether the sentence here was unduly harsh, as Clayton's lawyer has not effectively argued this issue on appeal by not conforming her argument to our deferential standard of review. Thus, I concur with the majority's decision to affirm Clayton's judgment of sentence.
Judge Colins joins this concurring memorandum. [*] Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.