Opinion
15-P-1004
07-10-2017
COMMONWEALTH v. Christopher J. CLAUDIO.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Following a jury trial in the District Court, the defendant, Christopher J. Claudio, was convicted of assault and battery in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13A(a ). On appeal, he claims that the trial judge abused his discretion by permitting the victim to testify that the defendant had physically abused her on a prior occasion. He also claims that certain comments by the prosecutor, describing the "violent [and] controlling" nature of the defendant's relationship with the victim, exceeded the bounds of proper closing argument. We affirm.
Background. On June 10, 2014, the defendant and the victim, who were in a romantic relationship and were living together, had an argument. As the argument escalated, the defendant punched the victim in the head and upper body and then attempted to strangle her. The victim escaped and ran to the house of a neighbor who telephoned the police.
New Bedford police Officer Donald Williams responded to the call. When he arrived, Williams observed that the victim was "visibly upset." Williams saw that the victim's neck and chest were red, and it appeared to him that she had been physically assaulted. Williams searched the couple's apartment for the defendant, but did not find him. Soon after Williams left, the defendant, who had been hiding in a back stairwell, emerged and told the victim that he would kill her if she telephoned the police again. The victim did not obtain a restraining order against the defendant and, although she testified that the relationship was over at that point, the victim permitted the defendant to remain with her at the apartment for about one more week.
Before trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence that the defendant had struck the victim on February 14, 2013, because he believed she was flirting with a male friend. The judge initially denied the motion; however, after Williams testified, the judge reconsidered his decision and ruled, over the defendant's objection, that evidence of the prior assault was admissible to show the hostile relationship between the parties. The victim then testified that, on Valentine's Day of 2013, the defendant became upset and punched her in the mouth, knocking out one of her canine teeth. The judge overruled defense counsel's objection to this remark, told the prosecutor to "move on from this experience," and gave a limiting instruction to the jury. The prosecutor then elicited from the victim additional details about the incident, including that (1) the police took the defendant away, (2) the defendant was charged, and (3) the defendant forced the victim to write a letter to the judge for that case stating that the incident never happened.
The judge instructed the jury as follows: "Ladies and gentlemen, the evidence that you just heard of [an] earlier incident is only admissible so you would understand the past relationship between the parties. It's not something in and of itself that you should take for any other reason other than that to understand the past relationship of the parties."
Discussion. 1. Prior bad acts. The defendant contends that the judge abused his discretion in allowing the victim to testify in detail about the prior assault. See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 794 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011). As the defendant acknowledges, evidence of conduct similar to that charged may be admissible to show the hostile nature of the parties' relationship and to give the jury a view of the entire relationship between the victim and the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 128-129 (2006) ; Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 54–55 (2009). The defendant claims, however, that the probative value of the prior bad act evidence was outweighed by the risk of prejudice because the victim's testimony included details relating to the investigation and the prosecution of that case. The defendant further contends that the judge's limiting instruction did not mitigate the risk of prejudice.
Although we agree with the defendant that the victim's testimony included extraneous information, the judge did not abuse his discretion. This is not a case where the victim's testimony about prior bad acts "overwhelmed" the case. Commonwealth v. Dwyer, supra at 128. Moreover, contrary to the defendant's assertion, the judge's limiting instruction (to which there was no objection) was sufficient to cure any prejudice. Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410, 421 (2014). Finally, while it would have been better if the judge had repeated the limiting instruction during his final charge, the defendant did not ask him to do so. Where, as here, the evidence against the defendant was strong, we see no error that would have influenced the jury or "substantially swayed" the judgment. Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994).
The victim's testimony regarding the defendant's behavior on June 10, 2014, was corroborated by Williams, who observed the victim's demeanor and injuries almost immediately after the assault.
2. Closing argument. The defendant contends that the prosecutor impermissibly relied on the prior bad act evidence to argue in closing that the defendant has a bad character. However, the evidence supported an inference, which the prosecutor asked the jury to draw, that the defendant had a violent and controlling relationship with the victim. Evidence of the prior assault was indicative of the defendant's motive and state of mind on June 10, 2014, and it provided plausible explanations for the victim's (1) failure to obtain a restraining order, and (2) decision to allow the defendant to remain in their apartment for one week after the assault. The comments were not improper, and even if the prosecutor did engage in some hyperbole, there was no error that would have influenced the jury. See ibid. The judge instructed the jury numerous times that closing arguments are not evidence, see Commonwealth v. Lugo, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 234 (2016), and we presume that the jury followed those instructions. Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 465 Mass. 672, 681 (2013).
The defendant claims that the following comments by the prosecutor went beyond the scope of permissible argument: (1) "Specifically, and as you heard, about the nature of that violent, controlling relationship. When that man punched her in the mouth on Valentine's Day"; (2) "The nature of their relationship was a violent one. One where the Defendant controlled her"; and (3) "That that man sitting at that table, who controlled his girlfriend for so long in this relationship."
Defense counsel asked to be seen at sidebar at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's closing argument. While major portions of the exchange were inaudible, it is clear that the defendant objected to the Commonwealth's argument and requested a mistrial. We therefore treat his claim of error as preserved. See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556, 563 (1967).
Given our conclusion, we reject the defendant's argument that the judge should have declared a mistrial.
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Judgment affirmed.