Opinion
500 MDA 2023 J-S43015-23
02-06-2024
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. MILTON DARIUS CLARK
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered November 17, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0003151-2019
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J. [*]
MEMORANDUM
McLAUGHLIN, J.
The Commonwealth appeals the order granting Milton Darius Clark's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Commonwealth maintains that the court should have denied the motion because Clark raised a bare claim of innocence. We vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.
The Commonwealth charged Clark with third-degree murder and criminal homicide. Following a competency hearing, the trial court deemed Clark "incompetent to proceed with the prosecution of this matter and the court hearings related thereto[.]" Order, filed 7/2/20 at ¶ 1. The court stayed the case until Clark could be deemed competent. Id. at ¶ 6. After being deemed competent, Clark entered a plea of guilty but mentally ill to one count of third-degree murder. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 314(a), (b); N.T., 8/26/22, at 3, 14.
At an initial guilty plea hearing, the court informed Clark of the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, including his right to have a jury trial. When asked if he had any questions about his right to a jury trial, Clark asked:
N.T., 8/25/22, at 11. Clark's counsel explained to him on the record what would occur if he proceeded by way of a jury. After this explanation, Clark stated "But I know that, but still a couple months after that, I didn't have nothing to do with stabbing him. And I know it wasn't in his heart. But it was in his heart, he would have been died on April the 23rd of that month." Id. at 12. Counsel asked for a moment off the record to speak with Clark. Afterwards counsel stated "Mr. Clark and I had a discussion. He had indicated to me that he wants to proceed on the plea." Id. at 13. Clark agreed, stating "Yes. I'd like to plead guilty, guilty as charged on my case." Id. Clark also agreed that a factual basis existed to support the charge of third-degree murder. The court inquired again whether Clark had any questions concerning his right to a jury trial. Clark responded:I wonder if I do take it to jury trial, would I be able to say on May 6th, my nephew passed? He's my nephew. And on May 6th, I didn't have nothing to do with his death. And I did not stab him in his heart, Your Honor. And I'm hoping for you and the Court to help me on that behalf of a good -.
Well, I would like to take it to jury trial, but I'm not really sure 'cause I don't have no witness to prove that I stabbed him. I just wanted to try and get it over with. 'Cause I've been sitting too long in there, and I want to put on my say, you know. I want to [sic] by the time I get it over with and
Id. at 15-16. Counsel explained to Clark that if he wanted to proceed with a jury trial, that they could pick a jury the next day. Clark said "Well, I'd like to do that, pick a jury." Id. at 16-17. The court explained that since Clark was proceeding by way of a jury trial, the Commonwealth would proceed on the charge of first-degree murder and counsel explained that Clark understood such. Id. at 18. The court then scheduled for the case to proceed the next morning for a jury trial. Id.get back my freedom, if I could. So I plead guilty on account that I did stab him. I know I'm guilty of that, but it was in self-defense. And I just want to get it over with, and I'm tired of waiting.
The following day counsel stated that Clark wished to enter a plea of guilty but mentally ill. N.T., 8/26/22, at 3. The court reviewed Clark's written guilty plea colloquy which did not include an agreement regarding the sentence the court could impose. See id. at 10-12; Guilty Plea Colloquy, filed 8/26/22. The court asked Clark if he had any questions concerning his right to a jury trial or the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. Clark responded "No." N.T., 8/26/22, at 11. The Commonwealth read the factual basis for the plea and Clark agreed. Id. at 12-13.
On April 23rd, 2019, shortly after midnight, Milton Clark stabbed . . ., the victim, 17 years old, on the left side of his torso. Clark fled the scene, 97 Holland Street in Wilkes-Barre, and was later apprehended by the Wilkes-Barre Police Department in possession of a knife that had blood on it. The victim's mother, Lynn Williams, identified the knife as missing from her home. Forensic testing confirmed that Clark's DNA was found on the handle of the knife used to stab the victim whose blood was confirmed to be on the
blade. On May 6th, 2019 the victim became unresponsive and died at Geisinger South Wilkes-Barre.
Id. The Commonwealth also stated that there was no agreement as to the sentence the court could impose, and Clark agreed. The court accepted Clark's plea and concluded that he "knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently tendered his plea of guilty but mentally ill[.]" Id. at 14. The court scheduled sentencing for October 12.Toxicology tests confirmed that the victim had not ingested any medications, illegal substances, or any substance that would have contributed to his death. An autopsy was conducted by Dr. Gary Ross, forensic pathology, who determined that the cause and manner was homicide due to pericardial tamponade caused by a single stab wound to the heart from the incident on April 23, 2019.
On the day of his scheduled sentencing, Clark filed a motion to withdraw his plea. He claimed that he was "not guilty of the charges." Motion to Withdraw Guilty but Mentally Ill. Plea, filed 10/12/22 at ¶ 3. The court held a hearing on the motion where counsel asked that the court grant the motion and pointed out that Clark "has asserted that there is a possibility of innocence in his case from the initial colloquy, as well as in his PSI." N.T., Motions Hearing, 11/2/22, at 6. Counsel also stated that before the sentencing hearing, Clark informed her that he wished to withdraw his plea and that she told Clark "[they] would discuss it." Id. at 4
The Commonwealth argued that the court should deny the motion because Clark raised a bare assertion of innocence. Id. at 8. It also pointed out that Clark sent a letter to the court asking that the court "sentence him to a 5 to 10 year, 6 to 12 - year sentence[.]" Id. at 9. It further stated that the Pre-Sentence Investigation ("PSI") report recommended a sentence with a minimum of 18 years' incarceration. See id. Thus, the Commonwealth suggested that Clark's motivation for withdrawing his plea stemmed from "[m]erely regret or fear of what the [c]ourt's sentence might be that could be in excess of the sentence that he's requested from this [c]ourt[.]" Id. at 10. The court granted the motion and this timely appeal followed. See Order, 11/17/22.
The Commonwealth raises the following issue:
Commonwealth's Br. at 3.Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it granted [Clark's] motion to withdraw his guilty plea based only on a bare assertion of innocence, which occurred within 24 hours of sentencing when [Clark] wrote a letter to the trial [c]ourt requesting a lenient sentence prior to the formal motion to withdraw the guilty plea, when controlling case law requires [Clark] to raise a plausible claim of innocence?
The Commonwealth maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Clark's motion. It argues that Clark presented a bare assertion of self-defense in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Commonwealth states "there is nothing in the record" to support such a claim. Id. at 16. It further argues that we should consider the timing of Clark's request and that he did not claim self-defense when he asked the court for a sentence of five to ten years or six to 12 years.
We review the grant or denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Norton, 201 A.3d 112, 121 (Pa. 2019). An abuse of discretion exists "where the [trial] court has reached a conclusion which overrides or misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will." Id. at 120 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). When ruling on a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea, "a court's discretion . . . must be informed by the law, which, for example, requires courts to grant these motions liberally, . . ., and to make credibility determinations that are supported by the record[.]" Id. at 121.
"[T]here is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea[.]" Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284, 1291 (Pa. 2015). Rather, the trial court should consider "whether the accused has made some colorable demonstration, under the circumstances, such that permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and justice." Id. at 1292. The trial court should also consider whether the Commonwealth will suffer "substantial prejudice" from the withdrawal. See id. When asserting a claim of innocence as a reason for the withdrawal, the defendant's claim should "be at least plausible to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for presentence withdrawal of a plea." Id. A claim of innocence based on self-defense is not a fair and just reason for withdrawal where the defendant has not stated any basis, or pointed to any evidence or facts that would support such a claim. See Commonwealth v. Jamison, 284 A.3d 501, 505 (Pa.Super. 2022).
Here, the trial court determined that Clark "did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently" enter his guilty plea. See Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed 5/9/23, at 4. In support of this conclusion, the court reviewed the following:
- Guilty plea hearing transcripts;
- [Clark's] history of mental illness;
- The initial determination of incapacity based upon the pre-trial evaluations;
- A demonstrable weakened intellect as demonstrated in the record;
- Observations of [Clark] at every hearingId. The court also addressed Clark's claim of self-defense, stating that "it may very well be a viable defense because the record is devoid of any specifics regarding the physical confrontation between the deceased . . . and [Clark]." Id. at 8.
The trial court abused its discretion in granting Clark's motion. First, we note that the court raised a basis for the withdrawal that Clark did not claim, namely, that Clark's plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Clark made no such claim in either his motion to withdraw or at the hearing. Rather, Clark stated that he was "not guilty of the charges" and claimed self-defense. See Jamison, 284 A.3d at 506 ("a guilty plea may be withdrawn, . . . if the defendant shows that the plea was not voluntary and knowing") (emphasis added).
Second, though the court concluded that Clark's defense could be viable, the record is void of any evidence or proffer of evidence that would support the defense. Id. at 505; cf. Commonwealth v. Islas, 156 A.3d 1185, 1191 (Pa.Super. 2017) (reversing the denial of a motion to withdraw plea where defendant testified that he did not commit the acts charged; he had good character and no criminal record; he maintained his innocence when interviewed by police; if the acts had been committed, there would have been witnesses; the victim had a motive to lie; and the victim did not immediately report the alleged incident). Nor do the facts to which Clark pleaded guilty support a claim of self-defense. See N.T., 8/26/22, at 12, 13; Commonwealth v. Samuels, 2023 WL 6475171, at *7-*8 (Pa.Super. filed October 5, 2023) (unpublished mem.) (affirming denial of motion to withdraw plea where defendant claimed self-defense but defendant's assertions would not establish self-defense as a matter of law). We vacate the court's order and remand for further proceedings.
Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
[*] Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.