Opinion
J-S86017-16 No. 269 WDA 2016
03-27-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. SEAN CASTAPHENY Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 28, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0001309-2015 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Sean Castapheny appeals from the January 28, 2016 judgment of sentence entered in the Cambria County Court of Common Pleas following his conviction for firearms not to be carried without a license. We affirm.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).
The trial court set forth the factual and procedural history of this matter in its Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) Opinion, which we adopt and incorporate herein. See Background, Opinion in Support of Order Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), 4/13/16, at 1-3 ("1925(a) Op.").
Castapheny raises the following issues on appeal:
Whether the pretrial court erred in denying [Castapheny's] Motion to Suppress evidence? Specifically,
Castapheny's Br. at 6.a) Where the defendant had a protected, Fourth Amendment, reasonable expectation of privacy in a bedroom used exclusively by him;
b) Where the initial warrantless entry into the bedroom was unlawful and the product of unlawful consent by a third party;
c) Where no exigent circumstances justified the officer's warrantless intrusion through the kitchen to the rear bedroom in pursuit of the defendant;
d) Where the officer's warrantless search by opening a book bag in the rear bedroom was beyond the scope of any consent and the contraband nature of a book bag is not apparent.
In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we must determine
whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.Commonwealth v. Jones , 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further, "[a] defendant moving to suppress evidence has the preliminary burden of establishing standing and a legitimate expectation of privacy." Commonwealth v. Burton , 973 A.2d 428, 435 (Pa.Super. 2009). "[A] defendant accused of a possessory crime who seeks to challenge a search and seizure . . . has automatic standing . . . to maintain that challenge." Commonwealth v. Sell , 470 A.2d 457, 468 (Pa. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, to prevail on a motion to suppress, the defendant must still separately demonstrate that he had a personal privacy interest in the area searched or effects seized, "and that such interest was 'actual, societally sanctioned as reasonable, and justifiable.' Such a legitimate expectation of privacy is absent where an owner or possessor meaningfully abdicates his control, ownership or possessory interest." Commonwealth v. Black , 758 A.2d 1253, 1257 (Pa.Super. 2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hawkins , 718 A.2d 265, 267 (Pa. 1998)) (internal citation and emphasis omitted).
In his first three issues, Castapheny challenges the search of the rear bedroom. The trial court, applying the appropriate legal standard to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, found that Castapheny did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room and denied his motion to suppress on that ground. We agree with and adopt the trial court's reasoning, including that Castapheny was no more than a casual visitor to the apartment who, despite staying there occasionally, had no right to exclude others from the room in question. 1925(a) Op. at 4-7. Because Castapheny has failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rear bedroom, we need not address his remaining contentions stemming from the police entry into that room.
Because Castapheny was charged with possessory offenses, he has automatic standing to challenge the search and seizure at issue in this matter.
We also agree with and adopt the trial court's conclusion that the named tenant on the lease had the authority to and did consent to a search of the apartment. 1925(a) Op. at 9-10.
In his last issue, Castapheny argues that the police officer's search of a book bag located in the rear bedroom was unlawful "for (1) lack of reasonable suspicion or probable cause to follow Mr. Castapheny through the kitchen into the rear bedroom in the first instance and (2) as beyond the scope of the consent given by the lessor of the premises." Castapheny's Br. at 17. He also argues that the contraband nature of the book bag, which was later found to contain a firearm, was not apparent at the time of the search.
We decline to address Castapheny's argument that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to follow him into the bedroom because, as discussed above, Castapheny did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. --------
As the trial court correctly observed, "a criminal defendant has no privacy expectation in property that he has abandoned." Commonwealth v. Barnette , 760 A.2d 1166, 1170 (Pa.Super. 2000). This Court has held:
Abandonment is primarily a question of intent, and intent may be inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts. All relevant circumstances existing at the time of the alleged abandonment should be considered. The issue is not abandonment in the strict property-right sense but whether the person prejudiced by the search had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search.Id. at 1170-71 (emphasis in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Clark , 746 A.2d 1128, 1133-34 (Pa.Super. 2000)).
At the suppression hearing, Officer William Slisz, who conducted the search, testified as follows:
Q. Okay. And during that search did you find a bookbag?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you open the bookbag?
A. Yes.
Q. Before you opened it did you ask whether it belonged to anybody?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ask Mr. Castapheny whether it belonged to him?
A. Originally when he came out of the back room he didn't have that black bookbag on anymore, so I asked if that was his bookbag in there, and he said no.
Q. I'm sorry. So when you asked him if it was his bookbag or not that was prior to the consent search?
A. Yes.N.T., 10/14/15, at 41-42. Because Castapheny specifically denied ownership of the book bag, and thus abandoned it, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the bag during the search. Commonwealth v. Dowds , 761 A.2d 1125, 1131 (Pa. 2000) ("Where, as here, an individual's disclaimer of ownership is not the product of improper police conduct and clearly indicates [his] intention, we can perceive no basis for treating it differently than an act from which an intention to abandon may be inferred.").
Q. But to be clear, he said the bookbag was not his?
A. Yes.
Q. And then did you search the bookbag?
A. Yes.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Castapheny's motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 3/27/2017
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