Opinion
No. 15–P–943.
12-13-2016
COMMONWEALTH v. Keith J. CARNUTE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant, Keith J. Carnute, appeals from his conviction of assault by means of a dangerous weapon, in violation of G.L. c. 265, § 15B(b). The defendant argues that the judge erred in failing to question each prospective juror as required under Commonwealth v. Seguin, 421 Mass. 243, 249 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1180 (1996). We affirm.
Background. We briefly summarize the facts "in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for our analysis of the issue[ ] raised on appeal." Commonwealth v. Bishop, 461 Mass. 586, 588 (2012).
On September 28, 2011, Investigator Timothy Sorrell of the Lanesborough police department responded to a call about a man lying face down on a dirt road. When he arrived at the scene, Investigator Sorrell saw the defendant, Keith J. Carnute, sitting up in the road. As he exited his cruiser and approached the defendant, Investigator Sorrell noticed a double-edged knife on the defendant's left side. He asked the defendant "what was wrong, [and] if he was okay." The defendant responded, "They're trying to get me; they're trying to kill me." Investigator Sorrell inquired as to whom the defendant was referring, and the defendant began to reach for the knife. Despite Investigator Sorrell's command "to leave the knife alone," the defendant immediately grabbed it.
Investigator Sorrell took two steps backwards, drew his service weapon, and ordered the defendant to drop the knife. The defendant, however, stepped toward Investigator Sorrell with the knife raised in his hand. Investigator Sorrell activated a laser on his weapon, which illuminated on the defendant's chest. The defendant looked down at the laser and told Investigator Sorrel to kill him. Investigator Sorrell again commanded the defendant to drop the knife. The defendant responded, "I'm going to fucking kill ya." He then took a step toward Investigator Sorrell. At this time, Investigator Sorrell discharged his weapon and shot the defendant in the chest.
Investigator Sorrell testified that he told the defendant to drop the knife several times and that the defendant responded by either saying "shoot me" or threatening Investigator Sorrell that he was going to kill him.
The defendant told Sergeant Christopher Meiklejohn that his memory of the incident was "fuzzy" because he had taken a greater amount of Valium than prescribed for his depression. The defendant recalled having suicidal thoughts on the day of the incident and that, when the police officers arrived, he had raised the knife to his throat to attempt to cut himself.
Prior to his encounter with Investigator Sorrell, the defendant called his cousin, Theresa Carnute, and expressed to her that he had suicidal thoughts. The defendant told Sergeant Meiklejohn that when he called his cousin, he told her that "the trees came alive with police officers."
At trial, Dr. Roger Goldin, a forensic psychologist for the Department of Mental Health, testified that the defendant was suffering from a major depressive disorder at the time of the incident. In his opinion, the defendant was depressed due to several stresses in his life, including the loss of his brother and aunt, the foreclosure of his home, and the theft of some gold rings that he had purchased. The defendant told Dr. Goldin that he had taken Valium to "block out the pain and get calm" in addition to drinking alcohol. Dr. Goldin opined that on the day of the incident, the defendant was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his behavior, and therefore was not criminally responsible.
Dr. Goldin considered standards such as "whether at the time of the commission of a crime, by reason of mental illness or mental defect, a person lacks substantial capacity to either appreciate wrongfulness or criminality, or conform his conduct to the requirements of law." Dr. Goldin considered the defendant's "history ... thoughts, feelings and behavior."
Discussion. The defendant argues that the judge erred in failing to sufficiently question whether each juror "had any opinion that would prevent him or her from returning a verdict of not guilty due to lack of criminal responsibility." The defendant did not object to the judge's inquiry during voir dire and thus, the issue is not preserved and we review for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
Upon a defendant's request, "the judge shall inquire individually of each potential juror, in some manner, whether the juror has any opinion that would prevent him or her from returning a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, if the Commonwealth fails in its burden to prove the defendant criminally responsible" (emphasis supplied). Seguin, 429 Mass. at 249. "It will be in the judge's discretion whether to ask more detailed questions concerning a juror's views of the defense of insanity." Ibid.
Here, it is undisputed that the defendant made a proper request under Seguin. The defendant, however, contends that in carrying out his request, the judge "did not go far enough in ferreting out any possible bias against [the defendant's] reliance on the claim of lack of criminal responsibility."
Here, the judge carefully conducted an individual voir dire of each potential juror on the issue of the insanity defense. See ibid. During his inquiry, the judge reiterated to each juror the information that he had stated to the venire en masse: that the defendant intended to raise the defense of lack of criminal responsibility and that the Commonwealth maintained the burden to prove that the defendant was criminally responsible at the time of the alleged conduct. The judge questioned each juror individually as to whether he or she had any personal thoughts, beliefs, or prejudices about the insanity defense. Further, the judge asked whether each juror could "decide the facts of this case from the evidence and solely from the evidence presented during the course of the trial."
We refer to lack of criminal responsibility as "insanity defense" for shorthand. See Seguin, 421 Mass. at 244 n. 1.
The judge's inquiry as to this question was conducted in different variations of words, but was substantively the same.
The judge also asked the jurors whether they would be able to determine the credibility of the testimony of psychiatrists or psychologists in the same manner as other witnesses.
Despite the defendant's contentions, the rule announced in Seguin does not require the judge to use any particular formulation of words in conducting his inquiry. Instead, the judge is required to inquire into the topic "in some manner." Seguin, supra. Here, the judge complied with Seguin and sufficiently explored the issue of whether each prospective juror was impartial with regard to the defendant's claim of lack of criminal responsibility. See Commonwealth v. Lo, 428 Mass. 45, 49 (1998) ; Bishop, 461 Mass. at 593. Moreover, if a juror demonstrated a misunderstanding when answering any of the judge's questions, the judge properly pursued the question further. See Seguin, supra. But see Commonwealth v. Auguste, 414 Mass. 51, 57–58 (1992) (judge avoiding issue of impartiality). In this case, the judge's questioning of potential jurors "adequately produced a jury unbiased against [the defendant's] reliance on an insanity defense."Seguin, supra at 245. Therefore, we are satisfied that the method by which the judge conducted individual voir dire did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
Judgment affirmed.