Opinion
16–P–413
03-22-2017
COMMONWEALTH v. Jeffrey P. CANHA.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Background . The defendant, Jeffrey P. Canha, was arraigned on three cases from March of 1982 to October of 1991. The first case, docket number 8235CR2066 (docket one), charged him with operating while under the influence of liquor, see G. L. c. 90, § 24, and operating to endanger lives and safety, see G. L. c. 90, § 24(2). The second case, docket number 8835CR0171 (docket two), charged him with operating while under the influence of liquor, see G. L. c. 90, § 24, and operating a motor vehicle without a license, see G. L. c. 90, § 10. The third case, docket number 9135CR0925 (docket three), charged him with operating while under the influence of liquor, see G. L. c. 90, § 24, and failure to keep within marked lanes, see G. L. c. 89, § 4A.
In 1983, the defendant admitted to sufficient facts on both charges in docket one, and the case was continued without a finding. In 1988, the defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of operating while under the influence on docket two, and in 1991, the defendant pleaded guilty to the same charge on docket three.
The defendant paid a fine for the second charge on docket two. The second charge on docket three was dismissed by the Commonwealth.
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In 2011, the defendant filed motions for a new trial on all three dockets, on the basis that he never received a colloquy with the plea judge before pleading guilty. A motion judge allowed the motions. In 2012, pursuant to an agreement with the Commonwealth, the defendant moved to have the orders allowing his motions for a new trial vacated with regard to dockets two and three, i.e., the motions would be "denied with prejudice" and the original dispositions reinstated. In exchange, the Commonwealth dismissed the charges on docket one. At the motion hearing, the defense counsel stated that "the whole point of [the 2012 agreement was] to get [docket one] dismissed," and that "[a]s long as the dismissal [of docket one] goes in on the Mass–Courts, [the defendant] should be fine with the Registry [of Motor Vehicles]." This was apparently because the record of the charges from dockets two and three had been sealed. The agreement was allowed and accepted by a second judge.
Three years later, in June of 2015, the defendant again filed motions for a new trial on dockets two and three, reiterating his initial claim of deficient plea colloquy, and alleging that he should also have received a colloquy in 2012 when the second judge vacated the orders allowing his motions for a new trial. The 2015 motions were denied by a third judge, and the defendant now appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Discussion . A motion for a new trial is "addressed to the sound discretion of the motion judge," and "[t]he judge's disposition of the motion will not be reversed unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion that produces a manifestly unjust result." Commonwealth v. Pingaro , 44 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 48 (1997).
The defendant was represented by counsel when he moved to have the orders allowing his motions for a new trial vacated as to dockets two and three. Counsel achieved exactly the favorable disposition the defendant requested, which explains why there was no appeal of that decision nor an express argument in the instant case that counsel was ineffective. In these circumstances, we discern no abuse of discretion in denying the 2015 motions for a new trial. The result sought and achieved was not manifestly unjust. Rather it appears to have been highly effective strategic advocacy. Counsel's attempt to revisit decades-old guilty pleas for the third time was therefore properly denied.
Orders denying motions for new trial affirmed .