Opinion
15-P-1461
03-17-2017
COMMONWEALTH v. Stephen M. CAMARA.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant Stephen M. Camara was convicted by a jury in District Court of operating under the influence, G. L. c. 90, § 24(1)(a )(1). He argues that the judge erred in admitting a statement he made during the booking process. We affirm.
The defendant was also charged with riding his vehicle on a railroad track, G. L. c. 160, § 218, but the charge was dismissed prior to trial. He was found not responsible on a charge of possession of an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 24I.
The jury could have found the following facts: the defendant was stopped by a police officer after speeding off a road and over railroad tracks. While speaking to the defendant, the officer noticed several signs indicating that the defendant might be under the influence of alcohol. The defendant admitted to having two beers and consented to a search of the vehicle that resulted in the discovery of four empty liquor bottles.
The officer smelled alcohol emanating from the defendant's breath and clothing, the defendant spoke with slurred speech that was difficult to understand, and the defendant's eyes were glossy.
The officer arrested the defendant for operating under the influence. At the police station, the defendant became belligerent and started ranting at police officers. After the officer notified the defendant of his rights under Miranda, the defendant stated that he was going to get off on a "technicality just like last time."
Prior to trial, the defendant attempted to exclude his statement regarding the technicality. The judge admitted the first half of the statement, striking the phrase "just like last time." Accordingly, during trial, the officer testified that the defendant stated he would "get off on a technicality" and the judge overruled defense counsel's objection. This was the sole reference to the defendant's statement during trial. On appeal, the defendant argues the judge should have excluded the statement in its entirety as it was more prejudicial than probative.
There was no reference to the statement during the Commonwealth's opening or closing; the judge did not reference the statement in his instructions.
We review a judge's determination that the probative value of evidence outweighs any improper prejudicial effect for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Rosario , 444 Mass. 550, 557 (2005). The statements at issue were described at trial as part of a description of the defendant's belligerent diatribe at the station house that included cursing and insults denigrating the officers. The defendant argues that the use of the word "technicality" is highly and unfairly prejudicial because the jury would interpret it as an admission to the underlying offense. The judge reasoned that the statement was probative of the fact that the defendant was mentally and physically impaired by alcohol. See Commonwealth v. Sudderth , 37 Mass. App. Ct. 317, 321 (1994) (belligerence is a "factor[ ] that may support an inference of diminished capacity to operate safely due to intoxication").
The defendant's statements included informing the police that they were "idiots" and "didn't know what they were doing."
By excluding the part of the statement that suggested the defendant had previous experience in utilizing a technicality to avoid a conviction, the judge reduced the prejudicial effect of the statement so that it did not substantially outweigh its probative value. The judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding part of the statement, and allowing the remainder.
The defendant's reliance on United States v. Condon , 720 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2013), is unavailing as the statement made in that case referred to a conversation with defense counsel about a legitimate defense strategy, and was not made during a drunken tirade.
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Judgment affirmed .