Opinion
14-P-332
03-04-2015
COMMONWEALTH v. ANDREA V. WEEKS.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant, Andrea V. Weeks, appeals from her conviction of assault and battery, under G. L. c. 265, § 13A(a). She contends that the trial judge abused his discretion by limiting her (1) cross-examination of the victim, (2) cross-examination of Plainville police Sergeant Kyle Rockett, and (3) direct examination of an eyewitness. We affirm.
Victim's cross-examination. The defendant argues that the trial judge improperly limited her cross-examination of the victim when he precluded further inquiry into the victim's alleged drug use. Specifically, the defendant intended to elicit testimony from the victim establishing that the defendant intended to remove the victim's license plate out of concern regarding the victim's drug abuse. This explanation would serve to impeach the victim's testimony regarding the defendant's motivations for arriving unannounced at the victim's apartment.
"Although the defendant is entitled to a reasonable cross-examination of witnesses against [her], the scope of cross-examination rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial judge. We shall not overrule a trial judge's determination as to the proper scope of cross-examination unless the defendant demonstrates that the judge abused his discretion and that the defendant was prejudiced thereby." Commonwealth v. Miles, 420 Mass. 67, 71-72 (1995) (citations omitted). To determine whether the limitation was reasonable, "we weigh the materiality of the witness's direct testimony and the degree of the restriction." Id. at 72. We discern no abuse of discretion here.
The defendant properly preserved this issue. See Commonwealth v. Federico, 425 Mass. 844, 852 (1997).
First, this testimony was only marginally relevant and had the potential for undue prejudice. The defendant's motive for taking the victim's license plate is irrelevant to the defendant's involvement in the physical altercation once she arrived. The motive, however, would once again raise the issue of the victim's alleged drug use, creating a potential prejudicial bias against the victim. See Commonwealth v. Podkowka, 445 Mass. 692, 696 (2006) (recognizing evidence of witness's prior drug use as "nothing more than improper evidence of bad character"); Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482, 495 (2012) (characterizing evidence of defendant's drinking and smoking while pregnant as "evidence with minimal probative value but potentially high prejudicial effect").
Second, the defendant has not shown that the judge restricted cross-examination to an unreasonable degree. The defendant was permitted, but declined, to continue questioning the victim at trial regarding her memory of the encounter with the defendant, during which the victim's alleged drug use was raised. Moreover, the defendant has not demonstrated "a reasonable likelihood that, had the cross-examination been permitted to continue without interruption, testimony of more than minimal value to the defendant might have been forthcoming." Commonwealth v. Fordham, 417 Mass. 10, 19-20 (1994).
Third, the defendant, Sergeant Rockett, and the defendant's insurance agent were all permitted to testify that the defendant's actions were motivated by the victim's drug use. Thus, the defendant was not prevented from presenting her defense. See Commonwealth v. Podkowka, supra at 698 (defense not precluded by limiting cross-examination when offered through other witness testimony).
Other arguments. The defendant's remaining claims require little discussion. We need not consider the defendant's claim that the cross-examination of Sergeant Rockett and the direct examination of the eyewitness were improperly limited because both arguments are only mentioned in passing in the defendant's brief and are insufficiently argued. See Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975). See also Kellogg v. Board of Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 1001, 1003 (2011) (appellant failed to support claims of error with sufficient legal argument or factual detail and failed to cite sufficient supporting authority).
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Kafker, Meade & Maldonado, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: March 4, 2015.