Opinion
15-P-792 15-P-801
04-22-2016
COMMONWEALTH v. EDWARD F. RODRIGUEZ (and a companion case).
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The Commonwealth appeals from a District Court judge's dismissal pursuant to G. L. c. 90C, § 2 (commonly called the "no-fix" law), of complaints charging negligent operation of a motor vehicle against Edward F. Rodriguez and Scott F. Ducharme in connection with a fatal accident. We reverse.
Neither defendant has filed a brief in connection with this appeal. We are unaware of any material differences in the positions of the defendants as they relate to this appeal.
Background. This case arises from a succession of two motor vehicle collisions on August 31, 2013, in Dudley, that resulted in the death of seventy-seven year old Julie McCabe on September 2, 2013. The motion judge allowed the defendants' pretrial motions to dismiss pursuant to the no-fix law following an evidentiary hearing at which Dudley police Officer Chandler Boyd (the lead investigator), Cynthia Merchant (McCabe's daughter who had been driving the car in which McCabe was a passenger), and Ducharme testified. In addition, the Commonwealth introduced, inter alia, photos of the accident scene and McCabe's autopsy report and death certificate. We summarize the judge's findings, which, for context only, we supplement with relevant undisputed testimony and evidence from the hearing.
Merchant was travelling westbound on Route 197 when her car was struck by Rodriguez's van as he attempted a left turn from the opposite (eastbound) lane of travel. That collision left Merchant's car disabled in the westbound travel lane. Merchant's disabled car was then struck by Ducharme's vehicle as he was travelling in the westbound lane and as some of Merchant's passengers were beginning to exit her vehicle and assist one another. There were numerous injuries to a number of occupants of the various vehicles involved, including McCabe. According to the medical examiner, McCabe died from complications of blunt force injuries to her torso.
Both defendants remained at the scene and cooperated with the police, and neither was cited at the time for any motor vehicle violations. On May 13, 2014, the Dudley police department issued citations to the defendants for negligent operation of a motor vehicle in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a). The citations were not mailed to the defendants until June 5, 2014.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaints for failure to comply with G. L. c. 90C, § 2, asserting that the police failed to issue the citations in a timely manner and failed to timely file the citations with the clerk magistrate of the District Court. The motion judge allowed the motions on the basis that the ten-month delay in issuing citations to the defendants violated G. L. c. 90C, § 2.
Discussion. As relevant here, G. L. c. 90C, § 2, as appearing in St. 1991, c. 138, § 160, provides as follows:
"A failure to give a copy of the citation to the violator at the time and place of the violation shall constitute a defense in any court proceeding for such violation, except where the violator could not have been stopped or where additional time was reasonably necessary to determine the nature of the violation or the identity of the violator, or where the court finds that a circumstance, not inconsistent with the purpose of this section to create a uniform, simplified and non-criminal method for disposing of automobile law violations, justifies the failure. In such case the violation shall be recorded upon a citation as soon as possible after such violation and the citation shall be delivered to the violator or mailed to him at his residential or mail address or to the address appearing on his license or registration as appearing in registry of motor vehicles records. The provisions of the first sentence of this paragraph shall not apply to any complaint or indictment charging a violation of section twenty-four, twenty-four G or twenty-four L of chapter ninety, providing such complaint or indictment relates to a violation of automobile law which resulted in one or more deaths."
The motion judge construed this provision to require the Commonwealth to charge a crime that had as an element of the offense the death of another human being in order to benefit from the exemption in the final sentence. Noting that the Commonwealth had charged negligent operation of a motor vehicle, the judge opined that, "[h]ad the Commonwealth chosen to charge these [d]efendants with a crime resulting in the death of another human being by way of a motor vehicle crime, then the court would be required to deny the [d]efendants' motions."
The final sentence of the quoted section of the "no-fix" statute was added in 1986. See St. 1986, c. 620, § 18; Commonwealth v. Cameron, 416 Mass. 314, 315 n.1 & 317 (1993). "This statutory language is unambiguous, and we attribute to it its plain meaning." Smith v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 31, 32 (2006). See Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 633 (2013).
"One of the purposes of . . . the 'no-fix' law[] 'is to afford prompt and definite notice of the nature of the alleged offense to the putative violator.' The objective is 'to prevent a situation in which a person cannot establish a defence due to his being charged with a violation long after it occurs.'" Cameron, supra at 316 (citations omitted).
The motion judge's reading of the statute is at odds with the text's plain meaning, which exempts from the scope of the "time and place" defense complaints for any violation of the automobile laws set out in G. L. c. 90, §§ 24, 24G, and 24L, that resulted in one or more deaths. Contrary to the judge's reasoning, the exemption turns on the presence of a fatality resulting from any of a number of offenses (both homicide and nonhomicide charges), not the Commonwealth's decision whether or not to ultimately charge a driver with an offense that reflects the resulting fatality.
Courts have repeatedly confirmed the plain meaning of the exemption, explaining that the "1986 amendment . . . added to § 2 a provision that eliminated as a defense the failure of an officer seasonably to have given a citation to an alleged violator of certain motor vehicle laws if the violation caused one or more deaths." Cameron, supra at 315. n.1. See Commonwealth v. Nadworny, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 912, 914 (1991); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 514, 521 n.6 (2002), quoting from Cameron, supra at 317 ("In 1986, the Legislature amended § 2, rendering the citation requirements inapplicable where the motor vehicle violation results in death, thereby 'show[ing] that, when the most serious of personal injuries is involved, the purposes of § 2 are made unimportant as against the public interest in the prosecution of such violators'").
That the motion judge's construction is error is evident from the fact that G. L. c. 90, § 24L, in which fatality-causing violations are not subject to the "time and place" defense, does not even contain a homicide charge or any offense that otherwise includes the death of another as one of its elements. See Nadworny, supra at 913 & n.2 ("[The 1986 amendment] takes the sting out of the statute where the offense is vehicular negligent homicide[,] . . . [and a]lso where death results from the commission of the motor vehicle offenses described in G. L. c. 90, §§ 24, 24L").
"A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result." Commonwealth v. Chamberlin, 473 Mass. 653, 660 (2016), quoting from Custody of Victoria, 473 Mass. 64, 73 (2015). There is nothing illogical about the resulting construction here. As the Nadworny court observed, 30 Mass. App. Ct. at 913-914, "the draftsmen [of the 1986 amendment] may have responded to the consideration that police investigations into matters as grave as homicide are and ought to be done with particular care. These inquiries may properly take time and should not be carried out under the pressure of urgent deadlines." The conclusion of such an investigation may result in a homicide charge, but it may also result in nonhomicide charges. Here, Officer Boyd testified that he had been in contact with the district attorney's office and was advised a short time after the accident not to take any action in relation to the case pending further notification. McCabe's autopsy report was apparently not finalized until April, 2014, even though the autopsy itself was commenced the preceding September. It therefore appears that the district attorney conducted an investigation into the death of an elderly woman in the aftermath of a motor vehicle accident and, once the autopsy report was completed, ultimately determined to pursue criminal, albeit nonhomicide, charges against the drivers believed to be responsible for the accident.
Although the judge relied on the provision of the no-fix statute addressing delivery of citations to violators, the provision relating to delivery of citations to District Court clerk-magistrates also removes noncompliance as a defense to complaints charging violations of the same sections of G. L. c. 90, that result in fatalities. See G. L. c. 90C, § 2 ("Failure to comply with the provisions of this paragraph shall not constitute a defense to any complaint or indictment charging a violation of section twenty-four, twenty-four G or twenty-four L of chapter ninety if such violation resulted in one or more deaths"). Thus, arguments based on this analogous provision are equally untenable.
Because the defendants in this case were charged with negligent operation of a motor vehicle pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a), a "violation of section twenty-four," and because the defendants' alleged negligent operation resulted in a death, the "time and place" defense of G. L. c. 90C, § 2, was not applicable and the motion judge erred in ordering dismissal of the complaints on that basis. The judge's order dismissing the complaints is accordingly vacated, the complaints are reinstated, and the cases are remanded for proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.
so ordered.
By the Court (Cypher, Katzmann & Massing, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
/s/
Clerk Entered: April 22, 2016.