Commonwealth v. Abdul-Kareem

4 Citing cases

  1. Commonwealth v. Long

    454 Mass. 542 (Mass. 2009)   Cited 43 times

    Inquiry into whether the facts recited in an application for a warrant to conduct electronic surveillance amount to reasonable suspicion that organized crime may be afoot has heretofore focused on the extent to which the organization and discipline particular to organized crime may reasonably be inferred. See Commonwealth v. D'Amour, supra; Commonwealth v. Lykus, supra at 142; Commonwealth v. Thorpe, supra at 281; Commonwealth v. Abdul-Kareem, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 78, 80 (2002). While "the class of people subject to wiretaps includes more than 'full-time professional criminals,'" Commonwealth v. D'Amour, supra at 736, quoting Commonwealth v. Thorpe, supra at 278 n. 6, coordination of efforts among cohorts standing alone is insufficient.

  2. Commonwealth v. Mejia

    64 Mass. App. Ct. 238 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)   Cited 3 times

    See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 406 Mass. 135, 142 (1989) (nature of crimes, kidnapping and extortion, as well as note sent to father of kidnapping victim demanding money, stating awareness of fact that police had been notified, and using word "we" held sufficient to show police had "reasonable suspicion that a wiretap would lead to evidence of a kidnapping involving organized criminal activity"). See also Commonwealth v. D'Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 736-737 (1999); Commonwealth v. Zuluaga, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 629, 634 (1997); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Kareem, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 78, 79-80 (2002); Commonwealth v. Terzian, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 739, 743-746 (2004). These cases lead us to the conclusion that the police in the instant case had the requisite reasonable suspicion that electronic interception would disclose or lead to evidence of a kidnapping in connection with organized crime.

  3. Commonwealth v. Terzian

    61 Mass. App. Ct. 739 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004)   Cited 5 times

    To qualify for the one-party exception, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that (1) one party has consented to the interception of specific communications; (2) the investigation is of a "designated offense" as defined in G.L. c. 272, § 99 B 7; and (3) the designated offense is connected to organized crime. See id. at 551; Commonwealth v. Abdul-Kareem, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 78, 79 (2002). Organized crime has been defined as "a continuing conspiracy among highly organized and disciplined groups to engage in supplying illegal goods and services."

  4. Commonwealth v. Tibbs, No

    No. 01-10170 (Mass. Cmmw. Jan. 4, 2008)

    Indeed, various Massachusetts appellate cases have understood the holding in Blood to be limited to consensual recordings in private homes. See Commonwealth v. Penta, 423 Mass. at 552-553 ("In Blood, this court held that art. 14 protected conversants' reasonable subjective expectations of privacy and therefore, prohibited the warrantless surreptitious transmission and recording of conversations taking place in a private home."); Commonwealth v.Gonzalez, 426 Mass. 313, 317 (1997) ("Blood involved warrantless recordings by State officials in private homes"); Cacicio v.Secretary of Public Safety, 422 Mass. at 772 ("We have accorded art. 14 protection against secret electronic surveillance in a private home");Commonwealth v. Abdul-Kareen, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 78, 79 n. 1 (2002) ("As the interception did not take place in a private residence, it is doubtful that a warrant was required under Commonwealth v. Blood"); Commonwealth v. Remedor, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 694, 698 n. 3 (2001) ("The Blood overlay of a requirement to obtain a search warrant seems to have been limited by later cases to intercepts of conversations occurring entirely within a private home," citingCommonwealth v. Price, 408 Mass. 668, 674, (1990) (defendant lacked standing to challenge one-party recording of conversation made in a motel room) and Commonwealth v. Eason, 427 Mass. 595, 600 (1998) (noBlood warrant required for police to listen on a telephone extension, with one party consent, to a telephone call made to the defendant's residence)). Even if the Supreme Judicial Court were to apply art. 14 to consensually recorded conversations made outside a private home, this Court anticipates that it would only be applied to places where the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy would be