Opinion
No. CV00-0083208 S
December 22, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This proceeding arises out of the exercise of the state's right of eminent domain which condemned a portion of the property of the defendant Clifford St. John and Sons for the purpose of improving U.S. Routes 7 and 202 in New Milford. This partial taking consisted of 13,455 square feet and is more fully described in the corresponding Notice of Taking appended hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit 1. The Commissioner assessed damages at $6,725 for this the "First" Taking.
On January 25, 2002, the Commissioner condemned another portion of the same plan in connection with the same project. That taking consisted of an easement for a temporary work area of approximately 5.5 acres for the purpose of excavation and removal of 3,900 cubic meters of material within the New Milford Stream Channel Encroachment Line ("SCEL") as part of the same highway improvement project. That second taking is more fully described in the corresponding Notice of Taking appended hereto as Exhibit 2. On that taking the Commissioner assessed damages to the owner in the amount of $24,000. On January 8, 2004, the Commissioner modified the second Notice of Taking, reciting that the temporary easement would terminate upon the completion of the highway construction and no later than May 1, 2005. The construction related to the temporary taking was not completed by that date, and the project manager testified that all construction connected with this second taking would conclude approximately two months after his testimony or on or before September 5, 2005. That, too, was wishful thinking.
The right of eminent domain finds its genesis in the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as made applicable to the states though the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article first, § 11, of the Connecticut Constitution, each of which provide that "the property of no person shall be taken for public use, without just compensation therefor . . . The paramount law intends that the condemnee shall be put in as good a condition pecuniarily by just compensation as he would have been in had the property not been taken." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Northeast CT. Economic Alliance, Inc. v. ATC Partnership, 256 Conn. 813, 828-29 (2001).
In Pine Street Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner of Transportation, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, docket no. 336736 (February 23, 1999, Belinkie, J.) the following utterance is purported to have originated: "Until some appellate court says otherwise, the market value of real estate in eminent domain is what the referee says it is!"
As for the effect of the two takings, the first reduced the land area but did not damage the remainder of the property. The second taking materially damaged the use of the remainder of the property for its highest and best use which the owner asserts was for a par three nine-hole golf course, which under the municipal zoning ordinance is a permitted but regulated activity on the subject property. The impact of the first taking upon the subject property which consists of the twenty-five acres on the easterly side of U.S. Route 7 at the junction of Route 67 and Route 202 in New Milford was negligible. The entire parcel is a level vacant tract literally on the Housatonic River and it is inside the Department of Environment Protection (DEP) channel encroachment line. The Commissioner, contrary to the owner's position, asserts that the highest and best use of the unimproved subject property is as a vacant or "non-intensive recreational use." The court at this point tends to agree that the Commissioner's opinion of the highest and best use is more persuasive than the owner's. The first taking was directed toward a twenty-five acre parcel more or less. While the second did affect the tract, it did not diminish the number of acres in the piece. On September 12, 2002, the owners purchased a piece of property abutting their property to the north referred to as the Whitlock property. This acquisition added six acres for an aggregate of thirty-one acres more or less for the entire parcel as it then existed. It added those six acres and it also included an upland acre where a building outside the flood plain could be constructed with necessary parking facilities. The town had previously approved the construction of a building and parking lot, which permit and the site plan approval is valid until January 28, 2008. As a result thereof, as of this time there is little doubt that the Handy plan, so-called, is financially feasible and capable of being constructed as a regulated but permitted activity on the subject property. The owners talk about the additional six acres as an extremely valuable addition to the basic parcel. But for purposes of determining value it must be remembered that this purchase occurred approximately nine months after the second taking and approximately twenty-five after the first. As such, this court cannot accept it as establishing a value or contributing to a new value in terms of the amount of acreage available for this project. Prior to the takings there was no effort expended by anyone with respect to constructing a golf course.
"[T]he visual observations made by the trier on a visit to the property are as much evidence as the evidence presented for his consideration by the witnesses under oath. They are in fact supplemental evidence." Birnbaum v. Ives, 163 Conn. 12, 20 (1972). The court's reference to its site visit may well be evident throughout this opinion by direct approbation or by inference.
While the owners contend that the golf course was one of the considerations that they utilized in terms of attempting to determine appropriate use of the property, their actual first effort involved meeting with a developer of a golf club in Norwalk concerning the feasibility of it. It was fairly well established that the site was level and well drained with the exception of one wet area. Between the first and second takings, efforts to develop the site of the par three nine-hole golf course really began. Significantly, a director of parks and recreation with the city of Bridgeport, who happened to be a landscape architect, managed two major golf courses and had experience in developing golf courses, was engaged to draw preliminary plans. To provide a building to service the golf course the owners explored the purchase of abutting parcels including the Bryant Glass property, then owned by Bryant Glass, immediately to the north on the wetland property previously mentioned. The time of this "exploration" was never firmly established. They asserted that the feasibility of developing the subject property as a golf course is undoubted, or so they said. The golf course architect reviewed preliminary plans with the wetlands enforcement officer of the town and consulted as well with a hydrologist familiar with the golf course development. It was his opinion, after conducting a hydrogeologic assessment of the feasibility of a golf course concluded that the development of the subject property in accordance with the architect's plans before and after was feasible, one that could be granted with the necessary permits.
The owners also consulted an environmentalist experienced in developing golf courses who was of the opinion that a golf course would have no adverse effects on the wetlands and the property could be developed consistent with the local and state wetlands regulations and consistent with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers permitting requirements if applicable to the subject property. They, together with town officials, offered that a golf course is a permitted but regulated use and if the regulations are followed local agencies would approve of the plans. Each of the town officials reviewed the preliminary plans with the owner's team as did one representative of the Department of Environmental Protection who saw no impediment to the plan and encouraged the filing of more detailed plans. The expert concludes that as a result of all these happenings there is no doubt that the architect's plan is financially feasible and capable of being constructed as a regulated but permitted activity on the subject property.
It must be remembered that this testimony was offered by the owner's witnesses and the thoughts expressed by town officials are merely thoughts which are not the equivalent of approvals, licenses or permits.
The defendant in this appeal claims to be aggrieved by the award as assessed by the state, and seeks an award in the amount of the difference between the Commissioner's value and the defendant's own value. "Aggrievement is established if `there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected.' " State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 203 Conn. 295, 300 (1987). Being an owner of property establishes that said owner has "a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision." Huck v. Inland Wetlands Watercourses Agency, 203 Conn. 525, 530 (1987); see Bossert Corporation v. City of Norwalk, 157 Conn. 279, 285 (1968). There can be no serious dispute over the fact that Clifford St. John and Sons as the record owner of the property in issue is indeed aggrieved by the actions of the Commissioner and has standing to pursue this appeal.
In order to arrive at the amount that constitutes just compensation, we determine the market value of the condemned property when put to its highest and best use at the time of taking. "In determining market value, it is proper to consider all those elements which an owner or a prospective purchaser could reasonably urge as affecting the fair price of the land . . . The fair market value is the price that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller based on the highest and best possible use of the land assuming, of course, that a market exists for such optimum use." (Citations omitted; emphasis provided.) Northeast CT Economic Alliance, Inc. v. ATC Partnership, supra, 828. "The `highest and best use' concept, chiefly employed as a starting point in estimating the value of real estate by appraisers, has to do with the use which will most likely produce the highest market value, greatest financial return, or the most profit from the use of a particular piece of real estate." State National Bank v. Planning Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 99, 101 (1968). Highest and best use has been defined as "`that reasonably probable and legal use of vacant land or an improved property, which is physically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and that results in the highest value.'" Peter Rock Associates v. North Haven, 46 Conn.Sup. 458, 470 (2000); South Farms Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Burns, 35 Conn.App. 9 (1994); see 7 P. Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 4.04[4][4](a), pp. 457-59.
The appraisers disagree on the highest and best use of the property. The owner's appraiser declares that the development as a Par Three Golf Course which he claims was initiated in 2000 and is continuing. According to the Commissioner's appraiser, the highest and best use of the unimproved subject property is as vacant or for "non-intensive recreational use." As previously stated, the court is inclined to accept the position of the state on this issue.
Just compensation is the market value of the condemned property when put to its highest and best use at the time of taking. It is proper to consider all those elements which an owner or a prospective purchaser could personally urge as affecting the fair price of the land. Northeast CT. Economic Alliance v. ATC Partnership, 256 Conn. 813, 822-29 (2001). In these cases the burden of production and persuasion on the issue of evaluation falls upon the property owner. See Edwin Moss Sons, Inc. v. Argraves, 148 Conn. 734, 735 (1961); Levine v. Stamford, 174 Conn. 234, 235 (1978). Interestingly, a municipality is not required to produce evidence of the property's value. See Merrell v. Southington, 42 Conn.App. 292, 298 (1996), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 918, 682 A.2d 1003 (1996). Zoning is an important factor to be considered when placing value upon land. The market value of a property is determined as of the date of the taking and under the zoning existing at the time of the taking. Peter Rock Assoc. v. North Haven, supra, 472-76.
The dates of the two condemnations are these, the first of which was on August 25, 2000 and the second took place on January 22, 2002. Subsequent to both dates, Clifford St. John and Sons purchased the Whitlock property, which is adjacent to its land, on September 12, 2002. This increased the total acreage numerically from twenty-five acres to thirty-one acres.
The chronology of the use of the property under the St. John ownership is less than remarkable. It appears from the documentation which found its way to the file that it was purchased by the owners in the 1960s, probably in 1961. From that time until the first taking there was no activity in terms of the use of the property by anyone or anything. There were no statutory or local ordinance changes which significantly affected the property. The first instance of activity is set forth in the owner's brief with the recitation that: "Long prior to the first taking, the family met with William Warner, the developer of the Silvermine Golf Club in Norwalk concerning the feasibility of a golf course. All of the witnesses familiar with the property testified that except for one wet area within a treeline, as shown on the maps, the site was a level, well drained site." The appraisal report recites that this meeting was held at the St. John home in Norwalk. Whether this was a mixed social and professional meeting is not clear nor is there any indication that Warner was ever paid for this "consult," if indeed it was such a "consult." He did not testify and there was no work product of any description submitted under his name. Shortly after the first condemnation, the owners began to pursue this concept and utilized the services of professionals in that pursuit. There is reference to the opinion of the wetlands enforcement officer with respect to a permit but certainly no commitment to the issuance of such a commitment. In fact, no application for a permit, a permit itself, or any action on any type of documentation which might be necessary to establish that permits were sought, were ever introduced. The Whitlock purchase is made relevant at this time as the site of a clubhouse, which was certainly necessary, and parking. The concepts of assemblage is suggested but certainly not established. There is no evidence of negotiations with Whitlock to purchase this parcel and nothing other than the fact that it was indeed purchased on September 12, 2002. The owner of that property prior to its sale had obtained a permit from the town for the construction of a building and a parking lot, which permit and site plan is valid until January 28, 2008, it being extended by the town to the St. Johns for several additional years. It is interesting to note that Mr. Brennan, the owner's appraiser, said it was reasonably probable that as of the date of the first taking, that the Whitlock property "would be purchased." This is a naked assertion without any support whatsoever other than apparently a good guess. It, a "good guess," does not remove the Brennan opinion from being found to be speculation.
Once the first condemnation occurred, the owners reacted quickly and with all the indicia of an intent to pursue this project by the utilization of the experts that they retained for various aspects of the project. The representation that the DEP and the town of New Milford approved the concept of a golf course development on the property with the exception of it being considered a permitted but regulated use under the zoning regulations. There is nothing in the record to show that the owner or any of his agents like the Whitlock acquisition, presented or discussed the concept plan with local, state or federal officials between the dates of the first and second taking, or purchase itself. In addition, there is no evidence in the record that the owner ever filed a permit application with any local, state or federal agency for development of such design on the subject property. The golf course architect has no knowledge of the amount of acreage of federal wetlands on the subject property as is evident from his testimony. The Commissioner offered evidence from his soil scientist that a permit from the DEP based on Section 401 of the Clean Water Act ("401 permit") and a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers based on Section 404 of the same Act ("404 permit") prior to developing a golf course on the property. He testified that the owner would face significant challenges in its attempt to obtain a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers whether its plan was developed before or after the taking dates due to the size of the impact of the proposed golf course on the wetland area. And he also recited that it would not be very likely that the owner could obtain a permit for such a development from the DEP "because of the degree or the severity of the impact to the federal wetlands resources" on the proposed site.
Brennan's damages calculation for the second taking is based on the projected profits from the highest and best use of the land is radically different from its existing use five years after the second taking and seven years after the first taking. In Tandet v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 179 Conn. 293, 301 (1979), the court found that the projected profits from a building occupied by a retail tenant converted to an office building almost eight years from the taking date to be distant and inadmissible, reversing the trial court's finding. In the instant case, the distant cost of conversion and profit to be derived therefrom contained in Brennan's report is considered inherently unreliable by the court.
To add an additional complication to this exercise of eminent domain, the state planned to and did in fact establish a temporary easement which was part of the second condemnation. The purpose of this temporary easement was the use of 5.5 acres in the center of the 24.69112 remaining St. John acreage. The period of this particular encumbrance was to be from January 25, 2002 to May 1, 2005. The Commissioner's purpose for this temporary easement was the excavation of 5,100 cubic yards of loam which results in storing during flood conditions, an additional 1,030,074 gallons of water. What had been referred to throughout the hearings as a mitigation plan is actually a plan to compensate for raising the elevation of Route 7. The volume of 5,100 cubic yards of loam is equivalent to a volume of 1,030,074 gallons of water. Whether this concept constitutes wise or acceptable engineering practices is to be left for another day because this plan in the vernacular "doesn't work." The period of the temporary easement has long since passed. The projected life of that easement continues to exceed that limitation until this very day.
Because of the failure of the mitigation plan, the Commissioner, around August 20, 2004, issued a futile directive to construct a ditch to drain the property. It is significant to note that the same standing water condition continues to exist on the property again, to this date.
The Commissioner urges that the owner failed to establish that the commercial development of the subject property was financially feasible prior to either taking date. He continued by reciting that in determining its highest and best use, the trier must consider whether there is a reasonable probability that in the reasonably near future the subject property will be developed. He cites to Minicucci v. Commissioner of Transportation, 211 Conn. 382, 559 A.2d 216 (1989). The fact that the owners never seriously considered was whether commercial development of the 25 acres of unimproved raw land was economically feasible prior to the taking. There was no evidence submitted at the trial or prior thereto that the owner sought any financing or commitment letters from local lenders to support development of a golf course, that it conducted a market demand study for such development, determined the cost of excavation for such a development, or conducted boring tests to determine whether any significant rock impediments existed on the land that might affect the cost of commercial development. These facts throw a cloud over whether or not the owner really believed or had reason to believe that commercial development of the property was financially feasible prior to the taking date. And as a result of that situation the owner could not have demonstrated to a prudent investor at the time of either taking that there was a present ability for such development of the land in the reasonably near future. These considerations lend credence to the finding that the highest and best use of the land prior to the taking was for "non-intensive recreational use." To reiterate, trial testimony indicated that the owner never presented or discussed even a concept plan for development of a local golf course with any local state or federal officials prior to the first or second taking. A permit application with any local, state or federal agency seeking regulatory approval for such development in its forty years of ownership was never presented. In fact, the only legal argument based on fact or ordinance that would support the proposition that this concept was legally permissible is found in the zoning regulations and no other acts or indicia of facts to support the owner's premise was offered. The inland wetland regulations of the town permit golf course development in a regulated area provided that such use does "not disturb the natural and indigenous character of the wetlands or watercourses by . . . clear cutting." Clear cutting is defined as "the harvest of timber that in a fashion would substantially remove the existing trees that are two inches or greater in diameter at breast height." There was substantial evidence that the expert personally observed a large predominance of trees greater than two inches in diameter throughout the large area of the proposed golf course primarily on holes three and seven.
The court is also troubled by the fact that the owner failed to establish or to offer evidence on the market demand or even general interest in the proposal for a nine-hole par three golf course in this area. To reiterate, there was no offer from any outside bidders for a development and if no market existed a proposal such as this would not produce the highest market value or the most profits because the premises would be vacant. See, e.g., Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency, 159 Conn. 407, 411 (1970). In Connecticut Printers, the court affirmed a finding that a building not previously used as a printing plant should be valued as such and damages awarded in the absence of market demand. In the absence of such a showing, such proposed use is "too remote" and speculative to show any legitimate affect upon evaluation. And one must remember that in a question of maximally productive, these projections are based upon 2007, 2008 expectations which strike this court as conjecture and speculation.
This court will accept the owner's claim of $61,000 for the 5,100 cubic yards of excavated material for the failed mitigation plan which remains flooded through this day. In addition, it accepts the premise that because the mitigation area remains flooded the property is useless to anyone at this point.
In order to cure this deficit, a field directive was issued on August 20, 2004 to construct a ditch to drain that property. There is no evidence and no likelihood is recognized by this court that this field directive is going to be any more effective than the failed mitigation plan. The owner's claim of a loss of rental value because the property is apparently useless to anyone including the owners brought forth an opinion of damages from the owner's appraiser of $187,703 which the court also accepts. These figures aggregate to $248,603. This amount is ordered paid over to the owner in addition to the $103,000 already paid.
The owner's appraiser does not state an after-taking value of the subject property as of the second taking date, but estimates the value of the property as of May 2007. This the owner claims flies in the face of Gontarz v. Berlin, 154 Conn. 695, 697 (1967). For the court to accept this premise and discredit the appraisal presents a truly Draconian posture as appraisal in the condition of the property for an "after value" is impossible due to the state of the parcel at this time. For that reason, the court will not disregard the owner's appraisal. See Commissioner of Transportation v. Smith, 2002 Conn. Super. Lexis 267 at 10, January 28, 2002 (Moraghan, J.). The owner relies on Andrews v. Cox, 127 Conn. 455, 459-60 (1941) and, again, in 129 Conn. 475, 478 (1942) with respect to the temporary easement which was found therein to be a temporary easement which hardly ended one projected in Andrews as in D'Addario (I) v. Commissioner of Transportation, 172 Conn. 182, 186 (1976), reciting that all damages which are "the foreseeable, necessary, natural and proximate result of the taking, . . ." must be considered. In accordance therewith, the court chose these cases as justification for the award of the rental nature of the easement.
The owner also claims to be entitled to reimbursement for the cost of its experts at preparing the appraisal. The court finds the sum of $30,020 to be reasonable and so awards.
The owner claims interest in the court's finding. The right to award interest in eminent domain actions does not depend upon statutory authority. See 3 Nichols Eminent Domain (3d Ed.) § 8.63. The determination of just compensation under the fifth Amendment is exclusively a judicial function. United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343-44, 3 S.Ct. 565, 67 L.Ed. 1014 (1923). In condemnation cases even in the absence of a provision for interest in a statute the Constitution requires just compensation and the court's ascertainment is a judicial function. Seaboard Air Line Railway v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304, 43 S.Ct. 354, 67 L.Ed. 664 (1923). The statutory rate of interest can, however, be applied to a claim for just compensation if that rate is deemed reasonable by the court. Miller v. United States, 620 F.2d 812, 837 (Ct.Cl. 1980); Leverty Hurley Co. v. Commissioner of Transportation, 192 Conn. 377, 380 (1984). Consequently, it is awarded interest on the finding of $248,603 at 7 percent. That interest figure computes to $17,402.21.
Judgment may enter in accordance with the foregoing.
EXHIBIT 1 NOTICE OF CONDEMNATION AND ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES
Pursuant to the provisions of Sections 13a-73(b) and 13a-73(e), of the General Statutes of Connecticut, as revised, the premises hereinafter described are found to be necessary for the layout, alteration, extension, widening, change of grade, drainage, reconstruction and improvement of the highway commonly known as U.S. Routes 7 202, Danbury Road, and the same are hereby taken and this assessment of damages resulting therefrom is hereby filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court in the Judicial District of Litchfield in which said premises are located.
DESCRIPTION OF PREMISES
Said premises consist of that certain parcel of land situated in the Town of New Milford, County of Litchfield and State of Connecticut, on the northeasterly side of Present U.S. Route 7, Kent Road, containing 13,455 square feet, more or less, bounded and described as follows:
SOUTHWESTERLY — by Present U.S. Route 7, Kent Road, 136 feet, more or less;
SOUTHEASTERLY — by Present U.S. Route 7, Kent Road, 15.07 feet;
SOUTHWESTERLY — by Present U.S. Route 7, Kent Road, a total distance of 560.07 feet, more or less;
NORTHEASTERLY — by Owners' remaining land, a total distance of 691 feet, more or less, by a line designated, "TAKING LINE," as shown on said map.
Said premises are taken together with a right of entry under, over and across portions of Owners' remaining land to grade and to install sedimentation control system, as more particularly shown on said map. Said right shall terminate automatically upon completion of said work by the State.
Said premises are more particularly delineated on a map to be filed in the New Milford Town Clerk's office, entitled: "TOWN OF NEW MILFORD MAP SHOWING LAND ACQUIRED FROM CLIFFORD ST. JOHN AND SONS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ET AL BY THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RECONSRUCTION OF U.S ROUTES 7 202 (DANBURY ROAD) SEPT. 1999 JAMES F. BYRNES, JR., P.E. — TRANSPORTATION CHIEF ENGINEER BUREAU OF ENGINEERING AND HIGHWAY OPERATIONS." Revised 01/13/2000, Sheet 1 of 1 (95-220-20).
The above-described premises are taken subject to such rights and easements as appear of record.
The premises taken herein are portions of the premises contained in a Quit Claim Deed dated December 21, 1995 and recorded in Volume 528 at Page 29 of the New Milford Land Records.
Said premises stand on record in the names of Clifford St. John and Sons Limited Partnership and Clifford St. John.
Damages are assessed at $6,725.00.
James F. Sullivan
Commissioner of Transportation
James F. Byrnes, Jr., P.E.
Chief Engineer
Bureau of Engineering
and Highway Operations
Duly Authorized
EXHIBIT 2 NOTICE OF CONDEMNATION AND ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 13a-73(b) of the General Statutes of Connecticut, as revised, the easement hereinafter described is found to be necessary for the layout, alteration, extension, widening, change of grade and improvement of the highway commonly known as U.S. Routes 7 202, Danbury Road, and the same are hereby taken, and this assessment of damages resulting therefrom is hereby filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court in the Judicial District of Litchfield in which said premises are located.
Said easement is located upon land situated in the Town of New Milford, County of Litchfield and State of Connecticut, on the northerly side of Present Kent Road, Route 7, described as follows, and shown on the map hereinafter referred to:
An easement for temporary work area, within an area of 5.5± acres for the purpose of excavating material within the New Milford Stream Channel Encroachment Zone for the reconstruction of U.S. Route 7 202, located opposite and between approximate Stations 2+370 right and 2+740 right, base line Present Kent Road, Route 7, as more particularly shown on said map. Approximately 3,900±/cubic meters of material to be excavated. Said easement to automatically terminate upon completion of the reconstruction of U.S. Route 7 and 202 unless sooner released by the State. The temporary easement area taken under this paragraph will be restored by grading, planting and seeding.
Said premises are more particularly delineated on a map entitled: `TOWN OF NEW MILFORD MAP SHOWING EASEMENT ACQUIRED FROM CLIFFORD ST. JOHN SONS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ET AL BY THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RECONSTRUCTION OF U.S. ROUTES 7 202 (DANBURY ROAD) JULY 2001 JAMES F. BYRNES, JR., P.E. — TRANSPORTATION CHIEF ENGINEER BUREAU OF ENGINEERING AND HIGHWAY OPERATIONS." Revised 9/25/01, Sheet 1 of 1 (95-220-20A).
The premises taken herein are portions of the premises contained in a Quit Claim Deed dated December 21, 1995 and recorded in Volume 528 at Page 29 of the New Milford Land Records.
Said premises stand on record in the names of Clifford St. John and Sons Limited Partnership and M. Clifford St. John.
Damages are assessed at $24,000.00.
James F. Sullivan
Commissioner of Transportation
State of Connecticut
James F. Byrnes, Jr., P.E.
Chief Engineer
Bureau of Engineering
and Highway Operations
Duly Authorized