Opinion
Submitted October 2, 1950.
November 13, 1950.
Motor vehicles — Licenses — Suspension — Appeals — Findings of fact by court — Necessity — Appellate review — Competency of driver — Fault in accident — Vehicle Code.
1. On appeal by a motor vehicle operator from an order of the Secretary of Revenue, acting under authority conferred upon him by §§ 608 (f) and 615 (b) of The Vehicle Code of May 1, 1929, P. L. 905, as amended, suspending the operator's license, the court must make specific findings of fact whereon an ultimate conclusion with respect to the operator's competency to drive an automobile can logically be based. [2]
2. In such case, the driver's competency to drive an automobile is the pertinent inquiry and not whether he was at fault in the particular collision in which he was involved. [2]
Mr. Justice CHIDSEY did not participate in the consideration or decision in this case.
Before DREW, C. J., STERN, STEARNE, JONES and LADNER, JJ.
Appeal, No. 51, March T., 1950, from order of Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County, Aug. T., 1948, No. 92, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. D. E. Smail. Order reversed.
Appeal by licensee from order of Secretary of Revenue suspending motor vehicle operating privileges. Before MYERS, P.J.
Appeal sustained and order of suspension reversed. Commonwealth appealed.
H. Ray Pope, Jr., Randolph C. Ryder, Deputy Attorney General, and T. McKeen Chidsey, Attorney General, for appellant.
A. A. Geary and W. P. Geary, for appellee.
Following a collision between an automobile driven by the appellee and another automotive vehicle, the Secretary of Revenue, acting pursuant to authority conferred upon him by Sections 608(f) and 615(b) of The Vehicle Code of 1929, as amended, suspended indefinitely the appellee's operator's license. Upon the latter's appeal under Sec. 616, the learned judge of the court below, after a hearing, entered an order reinstating the license. The court did not, however, make any findings from the evidence but merely concluded that the petitioner was a competent automobile driver. The cause must, therefore, be remanded for specific findings of fact whereon an ultimate conclusion with respect to the petitioner's competency to drive an automobile can logically be based: Commonwealth v. Eisenmenger, 365 Pa. 127, 74 A.2d 173. Such is the pertinent inquiry and not whether the particular collision was the appellee's fault to which much of the Commonwealth's proofs were mistakenly directed. The procedure and evidentiary tests, relevant to the issue (see Commonwealth v. Eisenmenger, supra), should be observed and followed.
Order reversed and record remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion; costs to abide the final result.