Here, despite the fact that the Commonwealth presented extensive evidence regarding the specific formal training Deputy Johnstonbaugh received, both the common pleas court and the Commonwealth Court held that unless Deputy Johnstonbaugh received the exact training municipal police officers receive pursuant to Act 120, i.e., unless Deputy Johnstonbaugh was certified pursuant to Act 120, he was without the authority to enforce the Vehicle Code. Both courts determined that our holding in Leet required such a conclusion. Additionally, both courts relied on the Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Roose, 690 A.2d 268 (Pa.Super. 1997), wherein the court stated that "only certification under the Municipal Police Officers Education and Training Act, 53 P. S. § 740 et seq. is sufficient to comply with [the] requirement of Leet." Common pleas court decision at 3, citing, Roose, 690 A.2d at 271 n. 4; See also Commonwealth v. Leet, 641 A.2d 299, 912 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1998) (holding that successful completion of the entire course of instruction formerly known as Act 120 instruction is required in order for an officer to have the authority to enforce the Vehicle Code).

They are not paid a salary by any municipal subdivision but rather are independent contractors whose pay is on a per job basis.” Commonwealth v. Roose, 456 Pa.Super. 238, 690 A.2d 268, 269 (1997). Although the decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding upon this Court, they may serve as persuasive authority.

Neither constables nor deputy constables are, however, included in this definition. Roose, 690 A.2d 268, 269-70 (Pa.Super. 1997) (cleaned up).

The Department argued that this training was sufficient, under the Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Leet, 537 Pa. 89, 641 A.2d 299 (1994), to authorize Deputy Johnstonbaugh to enforce the Vehicle Code. Licensee maintained that completion of training as governed by the Municipal Police Officers Training Act (Act 120) was required in order for authority to enforce the Vehicle Code to be conferred upon an officer. Relying on Commonwealth v. Roose, 456 Pa. Super. 238, 690 A.2d 268 (1997), the trial court agreed. Because Deputy Johnstonbaugh had not completed Act 120 training, the trial court held that he did not have the authority to arrest Licensee and sustained her appeal.

"Under Pennsylvania Law, constables are considered to be independent contractors." Swinehart v. McAndrews, 69 F. App'x 60, 62 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing In re Act 147 of 1990, 598 A.2d 985, 986 (Pa. 1991); Commonwealth v. Roose, 690 A.2d 268, 269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) ("No one supervises constables in the way a police chief supervises police officers or a sheriff supervises deputies. No municipality is responsible for their actions in the way a city, borough, or township is responsible for its police or a county is responsible for its sheriff's office.")).

The court agrees with plaintiff that section 7158 is not applicable to the instant matter as defendant is not a constable of a borough. See Commonwealth v. Roose, 690 A.2d 268, 271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (relying on 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 45, now 44 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7158). It should be noted, however, that section 7158 became effective on December 8, 2009.

Defendant appealed. The Superior Court, 456 Pa. Super. 238, 690 A.2d 268, reversed. Commonwealth appealed.

Allocatur Disposition Lower Court Docket and Appeal Docket or Title Date Number Docket Citation _____________________ _________ _________ ___________ ____________________ Com. v. Roose ...... 7/29/97 160 Granted 456 Pa.Super. W.D. (0058 238, (1997) W.D. 690 A.2d 268 1997) Com. v. Russo ...... 8/5/97 113 Denied Pa.Super., M.D. 698 A.2d 111 (1997) Com. v. Ryan ....... 7/14/97 0017 Denied Pa.Super., E.D. 697 A.2d 278 (1997) Com. v. Simpkins ... 8/11/97 200 Denied Pa.Super., M.D. 694 A.2d 1121 (1997)

No municipality is responsible for their actions in the way a city, borough, or township is responsible for its police or a county is responsible for its sheriff's office." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Roose, 690 A.2d 268, 269 (Pa. Super. 1997), aff'd, 710 A.2d 1129 (1998)); see also Ward v. Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 65 A.3d 1078, 1082 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (holding that constables are not government or quasi-governmental entities under the Vehicle Code). A constable's duties are limited by statute and include actions such as preserving the peace at election sites, service of process, collection of taxes and arrests for breach of the peace.

A constable is an independent contractor and is not an employee of the Commonwealth, the judiciary, the township, or the county in which he works. See In re Act 147 of 1990, 598 A.2d 985 (Pa. 1991); Rosenwald v. Barbieri, 462 A.2d 644 (Pa. 1983); Commonwealth v. Roose, 690 A.2d 268 (Pa. Super. 1997). See also Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 81 A.3d 103 (Pa. Super. 2013) (because Pennsylvania constables are not employees of Commonwealth, defendant-constable's private vehicle, driven in capacity as independent contractor, did not qualify as exempt governmental vehicle under section 4524(e)(2)(i) of the Vehicle Code).