As aptly noted therein, “[t]he best indication of legislative intent is the language used in the statute.” Id. (quoting Pa. Office of Admin. v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 591 Pa. 176, 916 A.2d 541, 547–48 (2007)). And where that language is clear and unambiguous, that intent must be derived from the text of the statute and judicial inquiry is at an end.

We look beyond the language employed by the General Assembly only when the words are not explicit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Office of Administration v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 591 Pa. 176, 916 A.2d 541, 547-48 (2007). In determining legislative intent, we must read all sections of a statute "together and in conjunction with each other," construing them "with reference to the entire statute" and giving effect to all the statutory provisions.

In any event, it explained that an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute carries little weight when that interpretation is inconsistent with the statute itself. See, e.g., Office of Admin. v. PLRB, 591 Pa. 176, 190 n.11, 916 A.2d 541, 549 n.11 (2007). With respect to the presumption that the public interest is to be favored over any private ones, Insurer asserted that the analysis "is not as simple as the private financial interest of [Insurer] versus that of providing services to autistic children," since Insurer is a nonprofit corporation.

The State Commission argues that its interpretation of the PHRA is entitled to deference as the agency charged with implementing the statute. Id. at 6-7 (citing Office of Admin. v. Pa. Labor Rels. Bd., 591 Pa. 176 , 916 A.2d 541 , 549 (2007)). American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania (ACLU) and the Mazzoni Center Legal Services (Mazzoni Center) filed a joint Amicus brief.

The State Commission argues that its interpretation of the PHRA is entitled to deference as the agency charged with implementing the statute. Id. at 6-7 (citing Office of Admin. v. Pa. Labor Rels. Bd., 916 A.2d 541, 549 (Pa. 2007)). American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania (ACLU) and the Mazzoni Center Legal Services (Mazzoni Center) filed a joint Amicus brief. They reiterate the provisions of the PHRA allowing local ordinances to provide concurrent and greater enforcement.

the New York statute], Weingarten does not support a holding that [the statute] creates a Weingarten right”). See, e.g., City of Clearwater v. Lewis, 404 So.2d 1156, 1161–63 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (applying Weingarten and holding that Florida statute granting public employees the right to engage in concerted activities for “mutual aid or protection,” contained language “similar” to NLRA § 7); Town of Hudson v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 69 Mass.App.Ct. 549, 870 N.E.2d 618, 620–21 & n. 4 (2007) (applying Weingarten to Massachusetts statute that granted employees the right to “engage in lawful, concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual aid or protection”); Wayne–Westland Educ. Ass'n v. Wayne–Westland Community Schools, 176 Mich.App. 361, 439 N.W.2d 372, 373 (1989) (affirming state labor commission's application of Weingarten right under Michigan statute granting public employees the right to engage in “lawful concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual aid and protection”); Office of Admin. v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 591 Pa. 176, 916 A.2d 541, 548–49 (2007) (holding that Pennsylvania statute authorizing “lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection” granted the Weingarten right). I am perplexed by the Court's conclusion that “Section 7 [of the NLRA] does not expressly confer the Weingarten right, and the Supreme Court recognized that.”

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized, with approval, the Board’s adoption of the Weingarten rule as applicable to PERA cases. Pa. Off. of Admin. v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd., 591 Pa. 176, 916 A.2d 541, 547, 551 (2007).

Moreover, DOL's Regulations declare that "[s]tates may not enforce the FMLA." 29 C.F.R. § 825.701(a). Further, although "[w]hen considering an agency's interpretation of a statute [] it is charged with implementing and enforcing, [courts] afford substantial deference to that interpretation[,]"Off. ofAdmin. v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd., 916 A.2d 541, 550 n.11 (Pa. 2007), a state agency's interpretation of a federal statute is not entitled to such deference. See Nw. Youth Servs., Inc. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 66 A.3d 301 (Pa. 2013) (Commonwealth agency interpretation of a law it is not charged with administering or enforcing is not entitled to deference); see also Twp. of Bordentown N.J. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm'n, 903 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2018); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 2001).

In general, "[w]hen considering an agency's interpretation of a statute that it is charged with implementing and enforcing, we afford substantial deference to that interpretation." Office of Administration v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board , 591 Pa. 176, 916 A.2d 541, 550 n.11 (2007) ; see Winslow-Quattlebaum v. Maryland Insurance Group , 561 Pa. 629, 752 A.2d 878, 881 (2000) ("It is well settled that when the courts of this Commonwealth are faced with interpreting statutory language, they afford great deference to the interpretation rendered by the administrative agency overseeing the implementation of such legislation."). However, "[w]hen an administrative agency's interpretation ... is inconsistent with the statute itself, or when the statute's meaning is unambiguous, such an administrative interpretation carries little weight."

The term [of a contract bar for future contracts] is not defined in the PLRA and the [application] of the [three-year contract bar] is an issue of first impression. However, because the PLRA is patterned after the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), [29 U.S.C. §§ 151 –169,] Kerr v. Butler, [Bldg. ] Trades Council, AFL–CIO, 288 A.2d 525, 528 (1972), in interpreting the PLRA our Courts have ‘not hesitated to consider, and to follow, federal interpretation of the NLRA[.] ’ Office of Admin. v. [Pa.] Labor Relations [Bd., 591 Pa. 176] , 916 A.2d 541, 550 (2007).Id. at 221 (footnote omitted; emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 826 A.2d 932, 934 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (“When there are no Pennsylvania cases on point, we have been encouraged by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to follow the NLRB cases interpreting provisions of the NLRA similar to the PERA.”).