The scope of Bomar, however, has been a subject of recent discussion in the cases. See Commonwealth v. Liston, 602 Pa. 10, 20-31, 977 A.2d 1089, 1095-1101 (2009); Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 320 n. 22, 961 A.2d 119, 148 n. 22 (2008). I support the majority's decision to consider the claims of deficient stewardship presented here, at least in the first instance, solely on account of this Court's pre-Gmnt order remanding the case for that specific purpose.

FN10. See Commonwealth v. Liston, 941 A.2d 1279 (Pa.Super.2008) ( en banc ), overruled, 602 Pa. 10, 28, 977 A.2d 1089, 1100 (2009). Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Liston, 602 Pa. 10, 28, 977 A.2d 1089, 1100 (2009), the Supreme Court overruled this Court's en banc opinion in which we concluded that a PCRA court's order reinstating direct appeal rights must also reinstate the right to file post-sentence motions so that a defendant can raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims and have them reviewed on direct appeal.

Former Chief Justice Cappy and Justices Nigro and Newman did not take part in the decision. Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Listen, 602 Pa. 10, 28, 977 A.2d 1089, 1100 (2009), the Supreme Court overruled this Court's en banc opinion in which we concluded that a PCRA court's order reinstating direct appeal rights must also reinstate the right to file post-sentence motions so that a defendant can raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims and have them reviewed on direct appeal. Justice Green-span, writing for the Court, stated that the Superior Court's decision in Liston was "capable of undermining the very purpose and policy underlying Grant."

This exception follows from the suggestions of prior Court majorities respecting review of prolix claims, if accompanied by a waiver of PCRA review. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 961 A.2d 119, 148 n. 22 (2008); Commonwealth v. Liston, 602 Pa. 10, 977 A.2d 1089, 1095–1101 (2009) (Castille, C.J., concurring, joined by Saylor and Eakin, JJ.). Unitary review describes the defendant's ability to pursue both preserved direct review claims and collateral claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness on post-sentence motions and direct appeal, and could aptly describe both exceptions we recognize today.

Although Bomar was decided after our Supreme Court's decision in Grant, it involved ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in postverdict motions prior to the Grant decision. See Commonwealth v. Barnett, 25 A.3d 371, 373 (Pa.Super.2011) ( en banc ); see also Commonwealth v. Liston, 602 Pa. 10, 22, 977 A.2d 1089, 1096 (2009) (Castille, C.J., concurring). In two subsequent cases, our Supreme Court eliminated the Bomar-exception to the prohibition against reviewing ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal.

She further argues that the continued viability of the Bomar exception to this general rule has been called into question by this Court and was not a reliable option to obtain review of her ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal; therefore, she cannot be faulted for failing to avail herself of Bomar. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Liston, 602 Pa. 10, 977 A.2d 1089 (2009), Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 604 Pa. 386, 986 A.2d 84 (2009); Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 961 A.2d 119 (2008). Petitioner also argues that, contrary to the Commonwealth's assertion, she was under no obligation to raise her PCRA claims any sooner than she did.

In Commonwealth v. Reaves, 592 Pa. 134, 148-50, 923 A.2d 1119, 1128-29 (2007), our Supreme Court explained that while there are some limited situations in which prejudice may be presumed by counsel's inaction, the failure to file post-sentence motions is not one of them. Notwithstanding, in reaffirming this holding in Commonwealth v. Liston, 602 Pa. 10, 977 A.2d 1089 (2009), our Supreme Court further provided that "[p]resumably, since post-sentence motions are optional ... rarely will counsel be deemed to have been ineffective for failing to file them except, for example, when the claim involves the discretionary aspects of sentence or a challenge to a verdict on weight of the evidence grounds, claims which must be raised in the trial court to be preserved for purposes of appellate review." Liston, 602 Pa. at 33 n.9, 977 A.2d at 1094 n.9 (citation omitted).

While we have cautioned lower courts against creating exceptions to Grant' s general deferral rule, there is no impediment to this Court establishing a change in procedure where, as here, it serves the interests of justice. SeeGrant , 813 A.2d at 738 n. 14 (reserving in this Court the authority to create an exception to the general rule of deferral); Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 584 Pa. 11, 880 A.2d 597, 602 (2005) (same); Commonwealth v. Liston , 602 Pa. 10, 977 A.2d 1089, 1094 (2009) (same). We reach this conclusion in recognition that Grant' s general deferral rule was motivated in large part by an intent to enhance a defendant's ability to effectuate his constitutional right to competent representation at trial, and not to restrict that opportunity.

Thus, a petitioner bears the burden of pleading and proving that counsel's failure to file a post-sentence motion prejudiced him. Commonwealth v. Liston, 602 Pa. 10, 977 A.2d 1089 (2009).

Thus, a petitioner bears the burden of pleading and proving that trial counsel's failure to file a post-sentence motion prejudiced him. Commonwealth v. Liston, 602 Pa. 10, 977 A.2d 1089 (2009).