Examples of such behavior make the distinction clear. In Commonwealth v. Daniels, 467 Pa. 35, 354 A.2d 538 (1976), appellant had fired a gun into a crowd; in Commonwealth v. Laing, 310 Pa. Super. 105, 456 A.2d 204 (1983), appellant drove his car into a crowd, after having aimed it at an individual; in Scofield, the appellant drove at a pedestrian. See also, Commonwealthv.

Appellant next contends that the verdict of the court was against the weight of the evidence. As this court stated in Commonwealth v. Laing, 310 Pa. Super. 105, 456 A.2d 204 (1983): Appellant's second claim is that a new trial should have been awarded because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

A new trial will be granted on this basis only where the record shows that the verdict was so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and make a new trial imperative in the interests of obtaining justice. See: Commonwealth v. Laing, 310 Pa. Super. 105, 110, 456 A.2d 204, 207 (1983); Commonwealth v. Miller, 303 Pa. Super. 504, 507, 450 A.2d 40, 42 (1982); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 290 Pa. Super. 182, 185, 434 A.2d 191, 192 (1981). In order to justify a finding of withdrawal or abandonment, which is set forth in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(f)(3)(i) and (ii), the actor must have abandoned the scheme appreciably before the homicide occurs, and he must have communicated his intention to his co-conspirator so that he also had an opportunity to abandon the scheme.

These circumstances conform to the kinds of cases in which Pennsylvania courts have found that defendants had the state of mind required to be guilty of aggravated assault. See Commonwealth v. Matthew, 909 A.2d 1254, 1259 (Pa. 2006) ("Regarding the attempt element, there was sufficient evidence for the fact-finder to conclude appellant took a substantial step towards inflicting serious bodily injury since he pushed a loaded gun against Wachter's throat . . . ."); see also Commonwealth v. Daniels, 354 A.2d 538 (Pa. 1976) (defendant fired a gun into crowd killing one man and injuring another); Commonwealth v. Laing, 456 A.2d 204 (Pa. Super. 1983) (defendant drove car into a crowd after having aimed it at one individual and then hit two people). Evidence presented at trial was also sufficient to sustain Texidor's conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against Pribish and Winkler.

The O'Hanlon court discussed a number of cases in which defendants had the state of mind required under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. Section(s) 2702(a)(1) to be guilty of aggravated assault. See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 354 A.2d 538 (Pa. 1976) (defendant fired a gun into crowd killing one man and injuring another); Commonwealth v. Laing, 456 A.2d 204 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (defendant drove car into a crowd after having aimed it at one individual and then hit two people). Most similar to this case is Commonwealth v. Scofield, 521 A.2d 40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).

A defendant is entitled to a new trial on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence only where the verdict shocks one's sense of justice. See Commonwealth v. Laing, 456 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1983); Commonwealth v. Bellini, 482 A.2d 997 (Pa.Super. 1984). The same evidence that compels my finding of sufficient evidence to support the burglary conviction in this case prevents the verdict from shocking one's sense of justice.

Id. In O'Hanlon, we noted that examples of recklessness in which life threatening injury is essentially certain to occur include firing a gun into a crowd, Commonwealth v. Daniels, 467 Pa. 35, 354 A.2d 538 (1976), or driving a vehicle into a crowd after having aimed the vehicle at a particular individual, Commonwealth v. Laing, 310 Pa. Super. 105, 456 A.2d 204 (1983). Applying the aforementioned law to the facts of this case, we find that the Commonwealth did not establish that Appellant possessed the state of mind equivalent to that which seeks to cause injury.

Inasmuch as Appellant contends the trial court erred in convicting him of multiple offenses arising from the same episode, this claim "is patently frivolous." Commonwealth v. Laing, 456 A.2d 204, 207 (Pa. Super. 1983) It is well-established that an individual "may be charged, tried and found guilty of several offenses for but one criminal act." Id.

Preliminarily, we note that our courts have previously held that Section 308 is a constitutionally sound codification of established law. Commonwealth v. Laing, 456 A.2d 204, 207 (Pa. Super. 1983); see Commonwealth v. Bridge, 435 A.2d 151, 153-54 (Pa. 1981) ("[V]oluntary intoxication neither exonerates nor excuses criminal conduct."); see also Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 596 (Pa. Super. 2021) (reiterating that counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to anticipate a change in the law).

However, there is ample evidence to the contrary, including both Reedy and other children and families, and the fact that the jury chose to give that testimony more weight is not to be disturbed on review. See Widmer, 744 A.2d at 754; see also Commonwealth v. Laing, 456 A.2d 204, 207 (Pa. Super. 1983) (finding verdict for REAP not against weight of evidence where defendant drove van towards man and then towards group of people on sidewalk, knocking down some and causing others to jump out of the way). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding McDonell's weight clam meritless.