The district court gave no curative or limiting instruction to the jury regarding the DHS determination. Other courts have allowed testimony as to administrative findings with a curative or limiting instruction. See, e.g., United States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1207 (D.Mont.2006)(allowing evidence of EPA environmental risk assessment because the jury is capable of “[d]ifferentiating between the different standards” with the help of a limiting jury instruction); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 420 Pa.Super. 1, 615 A.2d 1337, 1341 (1992)(affirming conviction for sexual abuse of minor when trial court gave cautionary instruction “that only the jury was the factfinder ... and [that] it ‘must not and may not accept any standard adopted by DHS' ”). We do not believe it would have been proper in this case to allow testimony that the child abuse report was determined to be founded even with a limiting instruction.
Id. at 275 (citations omitted). The court analogized to Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 615 A.2d 1337 (Pa.Super. 1992), in which the Superior Court found that a pediatrician could testify "that the physical facts observed and reported by the treating physician were consistent with the allegation of anal sodomy." Id. at 1343.
A physician is permitted to testify that his or her findings following examination are consistent with a victim's allegations of abuse. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 615 A.2d 1337, 1343 (Pa.Super. 1992). See also, Commonwealth v. Minerd, 753 A.2d 225, 227 (Pa. 2000) (the Commonwealth may, as part of its case-in-chief in a sexual assault prosecution, offer the testimony of an expert that the absence of physical trauma is nevertheless consistent with alleged sexual abuse).
Further, the panel noted the Superior Court's own previous admonition that "the admissibility of expert testimony in child abuse cases must be evaluated cautiously in order to prevent encroachment upon the jury's function by the unfair enhancement of a child victim's credibility." Maconeghy, 2191 MDA 2014, slip op. at 7, 2015 WL 7078462, at *3 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 420 Pa.Super. 1, 8, 615 A.2d 1337, 1340 (1992) ). The panel also discussed the legislative enactment pertaining to expert testimony in various criminal proceedings involving sexual offenses, which now authorizes certain professionals to testify as to "specific types of victim responses and behaviors."
Even if we found the prosecutor elicited the statement, Ramos would still not be entitled to relief. See Commonwealth v. Hernandez , 420 Pa.Super. 1, 615 A.2d 1337 1341 (1992) (finding social worker explaining to jury that she found child abuse case was "indicated" based, in part, on interview with victim and victim's mother, did not unduly bolster credibility of victim). Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 229, 352 A.2d 30, 32 (1976). Conversely, expert testimony is not permitted on matters of common knowledge. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 420 Pa. Super. 1, 13, 615 A.2d 1337, 1343 (1992). Expert testimony may not be used to bolster the credibility of witnesses because witness credibility is solely within the province of the jury.
Jarman, supra; Paquette,supra. See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 420 Pa. Super. 1, 615 A.2d 1337 (1992) (testimony of victim, corroborated in part by his mother, was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for corruption of a minor); Commonwealth v. Bricker, 397 Pa. Super. 457, 580 A.2d 388, appeal denied, 527 Pa. 596, 589 A.2d 687 (1990) (verdict finding defendant guilty of corruption of a minor was supported by sufficient evidence of acts which would corrupt a minor, regardless of finding of not guilty of indecent assault or involuntary deviate sexual intercourse). Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Second, S.Z.'s statements were admissible under Rule 803(4) unless they were testimonial in nature, citing Commonwealth v. Allhouse, 604 Pa. 61, 985 A.2d 847 (2009), but her statements were not testimonial; they were instead given for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. (Id., ECF p. 8). Third, Dr. Taroli's testimony was not given to sustain S.Z.'s credibility but to show how a doctor conducts a medical examination, citing Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 420 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 615 A.2d 1337 (1992). (Id.).
In arguing to the contrary, [Beatty] refers to statements that must be considered in the context in which they were given; either to establish the witness's role in disclosure and/or investigation, the victim's competency, or to permit diagnosis. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 615 A.2d 1337, 1341 (concluding that the trial court's instructions correctly informed the jury that the witness, in performing her job, made certain evaluations and reached conclusions distinct from the jury's function as fact-finder). Commonwealth v. Loner, 609 A.2d 1376, 1377 (explaining that the Commonwealth may present evidence of child victim's prior consistent statement to corroborate the victim's testimony).
He submits that this Court has consistently prohibited such testimony on the basis that it "encroaches upon the province of the jury and improperly and unfairly enhances the credibility of the witness." Appellant’s Brief at 53 (citing Commonwealth v. Seese, 512 Pa. 439, 517 A.2d 920 (1986); Commonwealth v. Balodis, 560 Pa. 567, 747 A.2d 341 (2000); and Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 420 Pa.Super. 1, 615 A.2d 1337 (1992)). With respect to the Superior Court’s determination that, because Dr. Ross admitted he found no objective evidence to substantiate Bell’s claim that Lorenzen was strangled, his testimony did not impermissibly bolster Bell’s credibility, Appellant suggests that the court overlooked the fact that Dr. Ross admitted that he relied on Bell’s statements for his opinion that Lorenzen was, in fact, strangled.