We note that the Superior Court has stated that the subsections of the driving under the influence statute are distinct offenses. See Commonwealth v. Slingerland, 358 Pa. Super. 531, 534, 518 A.2d 266, 268 (1986); Commonwealth v. Fry, 340 Pa. Super. 445, 447, 490 A.2d 862, 863 (1985). To the extent that these decisions are inconsistent with the holding in this case, we find them to be in error.
The fact that the offense may be established as a matter of law if the Commonwealth can produce the necessary chemical test does not constitute proof of a different offense, but merely represents an alternative basis for finding culpability. Commonwealth v. McCurdy, 558 Pa. 65, 73, 735 A.2d 681, 685-86 (1999) (internal citations omitted) (reversing Commonwealth v.Slingerland, 358 Pa.Super. 531, 518 A.2d 266 (1986) and Commonwealth v. Fry, 340 Pa.Super. 445, 490 A.2d 862 (1985), to the extent those decisions were inconsistent with McCurdy holding). In Commonwealth v. McMullen, 756 A.2d 58 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal denied, 565 Pa. 667, 775 A.2d 804 (2001), this Court held that 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a)(4)(ii), relating to underage DUI, was a separate and distinct offense from Section 3731(a)(1).
These offenses, we have held, are separate and distinct. See: Commonwealth v. Fry, 340 Pa. Super. 445, 490 A.2d 862 (1985). It remains to be determined, however, whether the two offenses are "cognate."