Extrinsic minimization pertains to the efforts employed by investigators to limit the total number and duration of the intercepted communications. Commonwealth v. Doty, 345 Pa.Super. 374, 498 A.2d 870, 883 (1985). Intrinsic minimization refers to the techniques used by the monitors to abate the intrusion into the participants' privacy while in the process of intercepting a particular communication.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5721.1(b)(3), (e). "[T]he Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that suppression of evidence is an inappropriate remedy except where suppression is necessary to protect fundamental constitutional rights." Commonwealth v. Doty, 498 A.2d 870, 886 (Pa. Super. 1985) (citations omitted). In other words, "grounds for suppression based on nonconstitutional violations of the Wiretap Act are limited to incriminating evidence resulting from a wiretap based on an interception which was unlawful or otherwise conducted in contravention of the judicial order, or because the judicial order was insufficient on its face."

The standard for determining whether probable cause existed for an order authorizing interception of telephone communications is the same as that used to determine probable cause for search warrants. Commonwealth v. Doty, 345 Pa. Super. 374, 397, 498 A.2d 870, 881-82 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853, 107 S.Ct. 185, 93 L.Ed.2d 119 (1986). In determining probable cause for search warrants, Pennsylvania has adopted the "totality of the circumstances" test set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and followed in Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921 (1985).

We find no merit in this contention. The applicable law governing probable cause to support an order authorizing a telephone intercept was set forth in Commonwealth v. Doty, 345 Pa. Super. 374, 498 A.2d 870 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853, 107 S.Ct. 185, 93 L.Ed.2d 119 (1986) as follows: An application for an order authorizing interceptions of telephone communications must contain, inter alia, the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense under investigation and whose communications are to be intercepted.

Again, we disagree with appellant and affirm the trial court's rejection of this issue. In Commonwealth v. Doty, 345 Pa. Super. 374, 498 A.2d 870 (1985), this court considered the applicable standards in determining the existence of probable cause supporting an application for an order authorizing a wiretap. An application for an order authorizing interceptions of telephone communications must contain, inter alia, the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense under investigation and whose communications are to be intercepted.

Our Beauford opinion, in finding the use of pen registers subject to the warrant requirement, also relied on the great caution with which this State has always regarded intrusions on privacy accomplished through electronic surveillance. 327 Pa.Super. at 267-68, 475 A.2d at 790-91; see, e.g.,Commonwealth v. Papszycki, 442 Pa. 234, 275 A.2d 28 (1971); Murray, 423 Pa. at 50-51, 223 A.2d at 109-10 (plurality opinion) (eavesdropping on telephone conversation with one party's consent intruded on privacy rights guaranteed by Pa. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 8); see also Commonwealth v. Doty, 345 Pa. Super. 374, 392, 498 A.2d 870, 879 (1985); Pa. House Legislative Journal 3147 (1978) (statement of Rep. Rhodes). Thus, the recent trend of decisions in Pennsylvania shows a marked refusal by our courts to accept the United States Supreme Court's premise that one gives up all constitutional rights to privacy in certain matters merely by disclosing them to selected other persons.

. . .' 18 P. S. § § 5710(a)(3)." Commonwealth v. Doty, 345 Pa. Super. 374, 395, 498 A.2d 870, 880 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853, 107 S.Ct. 185, 93 L.Ed.2d 119 (1986). "[This] requirement also suggests that a wiretap should not be employed as the initial step in a police investigation.

In cases involving the transportation of birds in interstate commerce to a state which allows cockfighting, the Pennsylvania animal cruelty statute may not be used to interfere with their movement, as the federal statute does allow the use of commerce for this limited purpose. See Commonwealth v. Doty, 345 Pa. Super. 374, 389, 498 A.2d 870, 877 (1985), appeal denied,cert. denied 479 U.S. 853, 107 S.Ct. 185, 93 L.Ed.2d 119 (1986) (where some provisions of a statute are preempted by a federal statute, "the remaining provisions are not affected thereby unless the invalid provisions are so essentially and inseparably connected with the valid provisions that they cannot be executed in accordance with the legislative intent."). There are no allegations in the instant case that the roosters discovered in appellant's basement were intended for use in a state where cockfighting is legal.

In essence, the two statute sections, taken together, seem to indicate that upon termination of a wiretap operation, a final report listing both participants and evidence of offenses discovered, including those crimes not mentioned in the original application, must be filed with the judge supervising the wiretap operation. But Commonwealth v. Doty, 345 Pa. Super. 374, 498 A.2d 870 (1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 185, 93 L.Ed.2d 119 (1986), which is the only case previously interpreting the final report requirement of the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, more liberally construed the timing aspect of the final report. Noting that neither the federal wiretap statute nor the wiretap law of any other state has a final report requirement, the Court stated:

Mastro, DeStefano and DiJoseph. The matter of probable cause was considered by this Court in Commonwealth v. Doty, 345 Pa. Super. 374, 498 A.2d 870 (1985). There we said: