Rather, the panel concluded that the testimony was admissible so long as the defense was given the opportunity to probe the potential motives and self-interests of the witnesses. In Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa. Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602 (1987), the defendant was convicted of sexual offenses against three juvenile males. The defense desired to cross-examine two of the juvenile victims who testified on behalf of the prosecution to show their bias or self-interest in testifying in a manner favorable to the prosecution.

SeeUnited States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (A statute imposing criminal penalties must be " strictly construed" in favor of the accused.); Boatner v. State, 754 So.2d 1184, 1189 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000); see alsoCommonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa.Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602, 606-07 (1987) (Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.). Thus, in applying section 97-5-33 as codified in 2006 to this case, as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the indicted offense of child exploitation, we fail to find any relief for the State's burden to prove evidence of some involvement by a child.

When an appellant attempts to tack on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel without presenting them in the statement of questions presented, the ineffective assistance claims are waived. Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa. Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602 (1987), alloc. denied, 521 Pa. 601, 555 A.2d 112 (1989); Commonwealth v. Duden, 326 Pa. Super. 73, 473 A.2d 614 (1984). Presently, appellant is tacking his ineffective assistance of counsel claim onto his issue three although he fails to present the ineffective assistance claim in his statement of questions.

Camitsch v. Risley, 705 F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1983). The rule of Davis has been applied in cases involving witnesses who are awaiting trial, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa. Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602, 606 (1987); on probation, see, e.g., Davis; and on parole, see, e.g., Patterson v. McCarthy, 581 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1978). Further, Davis has been applied to witnesses facing deferred prosecution.

suppression court only if the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa. Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602 (1987). Also seeCommonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 555 A.2d 1264 (1989).

See Commonwealthv. Cauto, 369 Pa. Super. 381, 393-94, 535 A.2d 602, 608-09 (1987) (this Court may reverse the suppression court only if its legal conclusions, drawn from the facts in the record, are erroneous). Cf. Commonwealth v. Fromal, 392 Pa. Super. 100, 111-12, 572 A.2d 711, 717 (1990).

Moreover, when the evidence viewed in this manner supports the factual finding of the suppression court this Honorable Court can reverse only if there is an error in the legal conclusion drawn from those factual findings. Reddix, 355 Pa.Super. at 518, 513 A.2d at 1042; Commonwealth v.Cauto, 369 Pa. Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602 (1987) (this Court may reverse the suppression court only if its legal conclusions, drawn from the facts in the record, are erroneous). The instant case represents a somewhat novel situation, and case law dealing with voice identification from a tape recorded message is sparse.

When reviewing a suppression claim, we are bound by the facts found in the record and in determining the matter, we consider only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses and may reverse the suppression court only if the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa. Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602 (1987). Also see Commonwealth v.Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 555 A.2d 1264 (1989).