Opinion
CIVIL NO. 06-2131 (JAG).
February 19, 2010
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Frito Lay Quaker Puerto Rico's ("Frito Lay") Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 46). For the reasons set forth below Defendants' Motion is GRANTED.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 13, 2006, Jesus Colon-Anabitarte ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint asserting a termination of employment claim for violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter "ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq., and the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (hereinafter "ADA") which incorporates by reference section 706(f)(1) of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1991, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (hereinafter "Title VII"); retaliation claims under the ADEA and the ADA; and hostile work environment under the ADEA and the ADA. Colón has requested this Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over claims brought under Puerto Rico Law No. 100 of June 30th, 1959, 29 L.P.R.A. § 146 et seq., Puerto Rico Law No. 80 of May 30th, 1976, 29 L.P.R.A. § 185a et. seq., Puerto Rico Law No. 115 of December 20th, 1991, 29 L.P.R.A. § 194(a), Puerto Rico Law No. 44 of June 2nd, 1985, as amended, 1 L.P.R.A. § 501 et. seq., and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141.On January 30 2009, Frito Lay filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 46). On April 4, 2009, Plaintiff replied. (Docket No. 59). Said Motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Justo Arenas. (Docket No. 63). On October 13, 2009, Magistrate Judge Arenas issued a Report and Recommendation which found that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to any of Plaintiff's claims against Frito Law. (Docket No. 79). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and that Colon's ADA, ADEA, retaliation and hostile work environment claims be dismissed with prejudice. Furthermore, he recommends that any supplemental claims under Puerto Rico law be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff objected to the Report and Recommendation (Docket No. 84), and Defendants replied to said objections. (Docket No. 88).
DISCUSSION
Defendants claim in their response to the objections to the Report and Recommendation that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Upon performing a de novo review of the record, this Court finds that Defendant is correct. The Magistrate Judge did not examine this claim in its Report and Recommendation, but this Court will do so.
In Frito Lay's Statement of Uncontested Material Facts ("SUMF"), it contends that "Colón never considered taking an action outside Frito Lay like in the EEOC or the Anti-Discrimination Unit even though Colón was aware of his right to go and file a complaint before these agencies." (Docket No. 45, ex. 1, p. 109). Frito Lay points to Plaintiff's deposition where he admits that he did not take any action or give notice to the EEOC prior to commencing this action. (Docket No. 45, ex. 11, p. 132, l. 16-20). Moreover, Plaintiff, in its response to Frito Lay SUMF, admits that he did not seek any action with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or inform the Commission of the present action before commencing it. (Docket No. 57, ex. 1).
It is black letter law that "an employee alleging discrimination must file an administrative claim with the EEOC or with a parallel state agency before a civil action may be brought." Thornton v. UPS, Inc., 587 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2009). Before filing a Title VII claim, an employee must first exhaust administrative remedies, a process that begins with the filing of an administrative charge before the EEOC. Franceschi v. United States VA, 514 F.3d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 2008). After filing the administrative complaint, the employee may sue in federal court only if the EEOC dismisses the administrative charge or if it does not bring a civil suit or enter into a conciliation agreement within 180 days of the filing of the administrative charge. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). However, the employee must wait for what is known as a right-to-sue letter.Id. After receiving the right-to-sue letter, the employee has ninety (90) days to file a complaint in federal court. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)) (See also Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Inc., 194 F.3d 275, 277-78 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding "we hold that the ADA mandates compliance with the administrative procedures specified under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and that, absent special circumstances . . . such compliance must occur before a federal court may entertain a suit that seeks recovery for an alleged violation of Title I of the ADA."); Jorge v. Rumsfeld, 404 F.3d 556, 564 (1st Cir. 2005) ("The employee may commence a civil action against [his] employer if, and only if, the EEOC has dismissed the administrative complaint or has itself failed to begin a civil action within 180 days of the original EEOC filing. . . . [A] plaintiff's unexcused failure to exhaust administrative remedies effectively bars the courthouse door.");Alicea v. Ondeo de P.R., 389 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.P.R. 2005) (finding that the ADEA mandate[s] compliance with the administrative procedures specified in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e). Hence, Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to her ADEA, ADA and Title VII hostile work environment claim and retaliation claims. Consequently, this Court must dismiss Plaintiff's claims without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court ADOPTS in part the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. (Docket No. 115). Frito Lay's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.