Opinion
Civil Action 2:23-01169-RMG-MGB
08-15-2023
Robbie Collins, Plaintiff, v. Lt. Taylor, et. al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants failed to protect Plaintiff from an attack by other inmates and failed to take necessary action thereafter. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 5.) Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.(Dkt. No. 17.) For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's motion be denied.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge.
STANDARD
“The substantive standard for granting either a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction is the same.” Dyke v. Staphen, No. 6:18-cv-402-TMC-KFM, 2018 WL 2144551, at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 19, 2018), adopted by, 2018 WL 2136062 (D.S.C. May 9, 2018); see also Virginia v. Kelly, 29 F.3d 145, 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (showing that the standard for a temporary restraining order is the same as that applied to motions for preliminary injunction). To obtain a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, a party must make a “clear showing” that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 21 (2008); see also, Smith v Ozmint, 444 F.Supp.2d 502, 504 (D.S.C. 2006). All four requirements must be satisfied in order for relief to be granted. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089 (2010).
Because Plaintiff is representing himself, this standard must be applied while liberally construing his filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
In his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Plaintiff complains that he is being discriminated against and that he was denied food and a shower after returning from a medical run on June 12, 2023. (Id.) He states he “will commit suicide if the Court's do not intervene.” (Id. at 2.) In a separate letter to the Court, Plaintiff claims he is being denied sneakers, and that he needs these sneakers to support his feet for medical reasons. (Dkt. No. 24.) Plaintiff further claims he is being wrongly held in a certain dorm “for behavioral reasons.” (Dkt. No. 24.)
On August 3, 2023, Defendants submitted affidavits from Defendants Lt. Rhodesia Taylor and Warden John Palmer. (Dkt. Nos. 23-2; 23-3.) In her affidavit, Defendant Lt. Taylor avers that Plaintiff is assigned to her dorm, “which is a step down dorm for inmates released from the Restricted Housing Unit.” (Dkt. No. 23-2 at 1.) Taylor avers that when Plaintiff returned from his outside medical run on June 12, 2023, she told Plaintiff he could shower, but she would not be here long enough for Plaintiff to cook food. (Id.) Taylor avers that Plaintiff then became angry and refused to go into his room. The “G Team” then responded, “along with the Warden, Associate Warden and Major.” (Id.) Plaintiff was placed back in his room. (Id.) Taylor further avers, “Inmate Collins states that he has not had the opportunity to go to canteen because I have refused to sign an ID replacement form. Inmate Collins has never requested an ID replacement from me. I frequently issue those forms to any inmate who requests one.” (Id. at 2.)
In his affidavit, Defendant Warden Palmer avers that after learning Plaintiff threatened suicide, he passed this information “to a mental health officer.” (Dkt. No. 23-3 at 1.) “QMHP Smith spoke with Inmate Collins on July 28, 2023,” and Plaintiff “is being monitored by mental health staff.” (Id.) With respect to the June 12, 2023 incident, Palmer avers that “[t]here is no procedure or policy that states inmates are entitled to cook food or shower when returning from a medical run. Inmate Collins returned after the designated instructional lock down time and refused directives to report directly to his cell.” (Id.) Palmer avers that he responded to Lt. Taylor's call for assistance.
According to Palmer,
Inmate Collins was belligerent and refused directives to return to his cell. He stated several times that he wanted to be taken to RHU. As a result and for staff safety, Associate Warden Robertson gave Inmate Collins a directive to be restrained and he complied. He was then escorted and secured inside of his cell. Force was not used.
(Id. at 2.) Palmer avers that Plaintiff was placed on 72 hour cell restriction for his behavior. While Plaintiff claims he was denied food and a shower for three days, Palmer avers Plaintiff would “have been provided a food tray for each meal.” (Id.) Palmer further avers that Plaintiff's “placement is appropriate in that dorm and mental health does not have the authority to dictate housing assignments.” (Id.) Palmer denies that any mental health professional has recommended that Plaintiff be moved. (Id.)
Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to make the required showing under Winter. First, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims for injunctive relief. With respect to Lt. Taylor's alleged conduct, the record indicates Plaintiff cannot establish any deliberate indifference to his conditions of confinement. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (To proceed with a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) objectively, the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted was “sufficiently serious,” and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind”). Plaintiff's allegations on this issue are not verified, and they do not indicate a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
As for Plaintiff's complaints about his housing, “[i]nmates have no constitutional right to be housed in any particular prison or jail or in a confinement facility of any particular security level.” Moore v. O'Brien, No. 7:08-cv-00417, 2008 WL 2944556, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 29, 2008). Finally, the alleged denial of sneakers does not establish any deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. To establish deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to his person. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “Deliberate indifference is a very high standard-a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.” Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976); see also Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that “[d]isagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care” are not sufficient to raise an Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to § 1983). Here, Plaintiff's unverified allegations about his medical need for sneakers fails to indicate a constitutional violation. In sum, the undersigned cannot find Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of any constitutional claims arising from Plaintiff's allegations concerning his housing, access to food and shower, and sneakers where the record contains no compelling evidence on these issues.
Next, Plaintiff has failed to make a clear showing that he will suffer irreparable harm absent the injunctive relief. To the extent Plaintiff remains suicidal, Defendant Palmer has ensured that Plaintiff is being monitored by a mental health professional. Finally, Plaintiff has failed to establish that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and he has failed to show that an injunction is in the public interest. As the Fourth Circuit explained in Wetzel v. Edwards:
The realities of running a penal institution are complex and unique to the prison environment. Federal courts have traditionally been reluctant to interfere in the problems of prison administration. Indeed, the decisions made by prison administrators in their informed discretion have been accorded “wide-ranging deference” by the federal courts.... Furthermore, federal courts have an additional reason to show deference to the decisions of prison authorities, where a state penal institution is involved. Procunier v. Martinez, [416 U.S. 396 (1974)]. The possible injury to the defendant-appellants if the preliminary injunction stands is potentially grave. The informed discretion of these penological experts could be radically limited with respect to inmate transfers specifically and, more importantly, with respect to prison discipline in general.635 F.2d 283, 288 (4th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
As Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits or more than a possibility of irreparable harm, and because the balance of the equities and the public interest involved do not warrant the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief, Plaintiff's Motion should be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. No. 17) be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.