Opinion
Civil Action 2:23-01169-RMG-MGB
12-13-2023
Robbie Collins, Plaintiff, v. Lt. Taylor, et. al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 24, 2023. He alleges that while housed at McCormick Correctional Institution, Defendants Warden Palmer and Assistant Warden Robinson failed to protect Plaintiff from an attack by other inmates in February 2023. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges this attack occurred after Defendant Lt. Taylor called Plaintiff a snitch. (Id.) This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.(Dkt. No. 17.) For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's motion be denied.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge.
STANDARD
“The substantive standard for granting either a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction is the same.” Dyke v. Staphen, No. 6:18-cv-402-TMC-KFM, 2018 WL 2144551, at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 19, 2018), adopted by, 2018 WL 2136062 (D.S.C. May 9, 2018); see also Virginia v. Kelly, 29 F.3d 145, 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (showing that the standard for a temporary restraining order is the same as that applied to motions for preliminary injunction). To obtain a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, a party must make a “clear showing” that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 21 (2008); see also, Smith v Ozmint, 444 F.Supp.2d 502, 504 (D.S.C. 2006). All four requirements must be satisfied in order for relief to be granted. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089 (2010).
Because Plaintiff is representing himself, this standard must be applied while liberally construing his filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
In his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Plaintiff states that he was transferred to Lee Correctional Institution (“Lee”) on September 28, 2023. (Dkt. No. 52 at 1.) Plaintiff complains that upon being placed in “lock-up” on October 13, 2023, he has been denied “complete access to the law library” and he has been refused “a tablet to access Westlaw because I'm known for filing lawsuits against SCDC.” (Dkt. No. 52 at 1.) Plaintiff also claims that he has been placed in a cell with no lights, which limits his ability to “do law work at night.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff argues that this conduct violates prison policy, and it is “for the sole purpose of hindering [his] legal litigation with the Courts.” (Id.) He asks that the Court make “SCDC stop retaliating against me because I file lawsuits.” (Id.)
Defendants deny any retaliation and have submitted an affidavit from the Warden at Lee, Edward Tisdale, who avers that he is familiar with Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 54; 54-1.) Tisdale avers that Plaintiff was placed in the Restricted Housing Unit on October 13, 2023, due to his custody status of “Security Detention.” (Dkt. No. 54-1 at 1.) Tisdale avers that he has requested a tablet for Plaintiff, but “due to supply, there has been a delay in receiving the tablets.” (Dkt. No. 54-1 at 1.)
According to Tisdale, Plaintiff “has access to a law clerk to assist him.” (Id.) Tisdale further avers that the light fixture in Plaintiff's cell has been repaired. (Id.) Finally, Tisdale notes that Plaintiff's claims in this case do not involve any staff member at Lee, and none of the staff at Lee “are aware of a pending lawsuit with Inmate Collins unless he has told them.” (Id. at 2.) Notably, Plaintiff has not disputed any of Tisdale's sworn testimony.
Upon review, there is no basis to grant Plaintiff's motion. As an initial matter, his claims of retaliation at Lee are entirely unrelated to his Eighth Amendment claims arising from events at McCormick Correctional Institution. Accordingly, his motion for a temporary restraining order should be denied as unrelated to the issues in the suit. (See Dkt. No. 29 at 3 (denying Plaintiff's Motion for TRO because “when a party moves for a temporary restraining order on issue outside of the suit, the underlying purpose of the temporary restraining order is absent”).
Even assuming that the basis of the suit and the temporary restraining order were the same, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff has failed to make the required showing under Winter. First, Plaintiff has failed to show that he will succeed on the merits. “To prevail on a claim of denial of access to the court, prisoners must demonstrate actual injury.” Long v. Vaughan, 652 Fed.Appx. 176, 178 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996)). “Thus, a prisoner must show that the prison policies “‘hindered his effort to pursue a legal claim.'” Id. (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351). Here, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence of actual injury resulting from his alleged denial of access to the courts. He has not indicated that he has missed a filing deadline or failed to present a claim as a result of any act of Defendants. There is nothing pending on the docket to which a legal argument from Plaintiff is required-dispositive motions are not due until February 15, 2024. (Dkt. No. 49.) Without any evidence that Plaintiff's efforts to pursue a legal claim have been “hindered,” it is unlikely Plaintiff will succeed on the merits of his First Amendment claim. See Rountree v. Robinson, No. 7:18-cv-00318, 2020 WL 2475878, at *6 (W.D. Va. May 13, 2020) (“[T]his right of access [to the courts] does not require prisons to provide an inmate litigant with physical access to a law library or to provide her with whatever type of legal material or equipment that she believes to be necessary to her litigation efforts.”).
Because there is no evidence of actual injury or even the likelihood of actual injury, Plaintiff has likewise failed to show that he will suffer any irreparable harm. In addition, the balance of the equities does not tip in Plaintiff's favor. Finally, Plaintiff has not shown that an injunction would be in the public interest.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. No. 52) be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).