The Memphis Housing Authority was created pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-401, et seq. Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 00-150, 2000 WL 1597410, at *1 (Oct. 27, 2000). The Memphis Housing Authority is an "agency or instrumentality of the city" and is considered a local government agency.
See HUD.GOV, Project Based Vouchers, https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_9157.pdf. The Memphis Housing Authority is created pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-401, et seq. Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 00-150, 2000 WL 1597410, at *1 (Oct. 27, 2000). The Memphis Housing Authority is an "agency or instrumentality of the city" and is considered a local government agency.
In order for a stranger to a contract to sue upon it, there must be (1) an intent by the promisee to secure some benefit to the third party; and (2) some privity between the two—the promisee and the party to be benefitted—and some obligation or duty owing from the former to the latter that would give him a legal or equitable claim to the benefit of the promise, or an equivalent, from him personally. Collins v. Cunningham, 71 Ark. App. 297, 29 S.W.3d 764 (2000). Furthermore, it is not necessary that the person be named in the contract; if he is otherwise sufficiently described or designated, he may be one of a class of persons if the class is sufficiently described or designated. Elsner, 364 Ark. at 395, 220 S.W.3d at 635.
The presumption is that parties contract only for themselves and, thus, a contract will not be construed as having been made for the benefit of a third party unless it clearly appears that such was the intention of the parties. Elsner v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 364 Ark. 393, 220 S.W.3d 633 (2005). In order for a stranger to a contract to sue upon it, there must be (1) an intent by the promisee to secure some benefit to the third party; and (2) some privity between the two— the promisee and the party to be benefitted— and some obligation or duty owing from the former to the latter that would give him a legal or equitable claim to the benefit of the promise, or an equivalent, from him personally. Collins v. Cunningham, 71 Ark.App. 297, 29 S.W.3d 764 (2000). Furthermore, it is not necessary that the person be named in the contract; if he is otherwise sufficiently described or designated, he may be one of a class of persons if the class is sufficiently described or designated.
No convincing argument is made, nor is any authority cited in support of this contention; therefore, we do not address it. See Collins v. Cunningham, 71 Ark. App. 297, 29 S.W.3d 764 (2000). Affirmed.