Opinion
23-16153
06-20-2024
JAMES G. COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF MONTEREY, a government entity, Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Argued and Submitted June 12, 2024 San Francisco, California
Appeal from the United States District Court No. 5:22-cv-02560-NC for the Northern District of California Nathanael M. Cousins, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Before: SCHROEDER, GOULD, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM [*]
James Collins appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County of Monterey in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging the County's refusal to approve his request for rezoning. Collins sought to construct a home on property he had purchased that was designated a resource conservation zone. That designation prohibits residential construction.
Collins first contends that the County's decision denied him substantive due process because it lacked any substantial relation to the public health, safety, or general welfare. Yet, the County's decision explained that rezoning the property would be inconsistent with the broader use plan for the area that preserved its natural character. Collins has thus failed to show the government could have had no legitimate reasons for its decision. See Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1994).
Collins also argues that the County's decision deprived his property of any economically viable use. His own expert appraised the property as having significant economic value, so there was no taking within the meaning of Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 332 (2002) (A Lucas taking occurs only in the "'extraordinary case' in which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value.").
Collins's alternative takings claim also fails because he did not proffer evidence showing that any of the Penn Central factors weigh in his favor. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (setting forth three factors for determining whether a taking has occurred). It was not objectively reasonable for Collins to expect to build a residence on the property because he purchased it knowing that the zoning designation did not permit him to do so. The County's decision merely maintained the existing designation and was not at all comparable to a physical invasion of his property. Moreover, the economic impact of the County's decision cannot be assessed because Collins failed to offer an appraisal of the property's value before the decision.
To establish an equal protection violation, Collins had to provide evidence of similarly situated owners of property that the County treated differently than he was. See Gerhart v. Lake County, 637 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2011). Collins showed only that other properties in the surrounding area had homes constructed on them. He did not establish the properties were similarly situated in all material respects.
AFFIRMED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.