Opinion
C/A No. 8:18-cv-2744-MGL-JDA
10-24-2018
Michael Alexander Collins, Plaintiff, v. Aiken County Detention Center, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Michael Alexander Collins ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Aiken County Detention Center. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, and for the reasons below, the undersigned finds this action is subject to summary dismissal without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a rambling, hand-written letter to the Court, which was construed as a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and which was signed on behalf of Plaintiff by another inmate in the Aiken County Detention Center. [Doc. 1.] By Order dated October 15, 2018, Plaintiff was directed to complete a standard complaint form and to sign the form. [Doc. 5.] Plaintiff complied with the Court's Order and filed a Complaint on the standard complaint form, which was entered on the docket at Doc. 1-4. The Court has reviewed both the original filing [Doc. 1] and Plaintiff's Complaint on the standard form [Doc. 1-4] as a single Complaint in this matter.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a hand-written Complaint, which is difficult to decipher, against a single Defendant, the Aiken County Detention Center. [Docs. 1; 1-4.] In sum, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, by denying him proper medical care, among other things, and he appears to seek money damages and injunctive relief related to his medical needs. [Doc. 1-4 at 4; Doc. 1 at 3.] The Court notes that this is the fourth action regarding the same claims that Plaintiff has filed with this Court since June 2018. See Collins v. Ridell, No. 8:18-cv-1580-MGL-JDA (D.S.C. filed Jun. 11, 2018), Collins v. Aiken Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:18-cv-1811-MGL-JDA (D.S.C. filed July 2, 2018), Collins v. State of South Carolina, No. 8:18-cv-2596-MGL-JDA (D.S.C. filed Sept. 24, 2018), Collins v. Aiken Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:18-cv-2744-MGL-JDA (D.S.C. filed Oct. 9, 2018); see also Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'") (alteration omitted).
In sum, Plaintiff asserts claims of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need related to his injured knee and his tooth. [Doc. 1 at 1-3.] The allegations in this action are identical to the allegations made in his prior cases.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if: (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but the Court may not rewrite a pleading to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). "A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed his Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights, 'but merely provides' a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Defendant is entitled to dismissal
It is well settled that only "persons" may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a "person." See Harden v. Green, 27 F. App'x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). The Aiken County Detention Center is a group of officers in a building or is a facility or building, which cannot be sued as a "defendant" in a § 1983 lawsuit. See Preval v. Reno, 57 F. Supp. 2d 307, 310 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a 'person,' and therefore not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.") aff'd in part, modified in part on other grounds, vacated in part on other grounds by 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 2000); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1989) ("Claims under § 1983 are directed at 'persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit."); Williams v. Dorchester Cty. Det. Ctr., 987 F. Supp. 2d 690, 696 (D.S.C. 2013); Morrison v. Greenville Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 4:17-cv-2657-JMC-TER, 2017 WL 7732598, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 936383 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2018). Likewise, as noted, buildings and correctional institutions usually are not considered legal entities subject to suit. See Nelson v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a building—the detention center—is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and that Food Service Supervisors was a group of people not subject to suit); Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F. Supp. 1131, 1132 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because it was not a "person" under the statute). Further, the Aiken County Detention Center is subject to summary dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Aiken County Detention Center is administered by, and under the control of, the Aiken County Sheriff's Office. See, e.g., Williams, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 695-98 (finding that Dorchester County Detention Center is controlled by the Dorchester County Sheriff's Office, and thus a state agency). As such, Plaintiff's claim is actually against the Aiken County Sheriff's Office, which is considered a state agency for purposes of Plaintiff's claims. See Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F. Supp. 947, 954-55 (D.S.C.1988) (explaining that a Sheriff's Office is considered a state agency in South Carolina). Because the County Sheriffs are state officers, not county employees, a suit against the "Aiken County Detention Center" is a suit against the state of South Carolina for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. (noting Sheriff's office is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit); see also Cash v. Thomas, No. 6:12-cv-1278-MGL, 2013 WL 3804375, at *7 (D.S.C. July 19, 2013) ("It is well settled, both in South Carolina and federal law, that a Sheriff in South Carolina is an arm of the State and not a County employee and therefore is entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity in his or her official capacity from suit in Federal Court") (citing Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996)).
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts. U.S. Const. Amend. XI; see also Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1996); Bellamy v. Borders, 727 F. Supp. 247, 248-50 (D.S.C.1989). The law is clear that a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984). However, the State of South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal court. See S.C. Code § 15-78-20(e) (1976) (South Carolina statute expressly providing that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another State); see also McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741, 743 (S.C. 1985) (abolishing sovereign immunity in tort "does not abolish the immunity which applies to all legislative, judicial and executive bodies and to public officials who are vested with discretionary authority, for actions taken in their official capacities"), superseded by statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-100(b), as recognized in Jeter v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 633 S.E. 2d 143 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006). Since the Eleventh Amendment bars the relief that Plaintiff requests against the Aiken County Detention Center, the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted against this Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant Aiken County Detention Center is entitled to summary dismissal from this § 1983 action.
Plaintiff's claims are duplicative
Further, as to Plaintiff's claims concerning deliberate indifference to a serious medical need related to Plaintiff's knee and tooth, Plaintiff has already filed separate actions concerning those claims, which remain pending in this Court at Case No. 8:18-cv-1580 and Case No. 8:18-cv-1811. Here, Plaintiff again makes allegations concerning Defendant's deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and the present action is therefore duplicative and should be dismissed.
As noted, Plaintiff has filed two prior cases in this Court, which remain pending, asserting claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Collins v. Riddell, No. 8:18-cv-1580-MGL-JDA (D.S.C. Jun. 11, 2018) ("Collins I") and Collins v. Aiken Cty. Det. Ctr., Case No. 8:18-cv-1811-MGL-JDA (D.S.C. Jul. 2, 2018) ("Collins II"). In his first case, Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that he was denied medical treatment, punished for his condition, and harassed, constituting deliberate indifference to his medical needs. [Collins I, Doc. 1 at 5.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that his knee is "messed up," that his medical conditions are not being treated, that his condition is deteriorating daily, and that he has constant headaches, dizziness, nosebleeds, nausea, chest pain, mental stress, and panic attacks. [Id. at 6.] In his second case, Plaintiff alleged that he has been enduring excruciating tooth pain that has resulted in an ongoing infection, for which Defendants have failed to provide proper treatment or a remedy. [Collins II, Doc. 1-1 at 2-9.] Plaintiff's claims in the instant case regarding deliberate indifference to his knee injury and tooth issues are nearly identical to those asserted in Collins I and Collins II.
Thus, the Court finds that the claims concerning deliberate indifference in the instant Complaint are substantially duplicative of the two other actions Plaintiff previously filed in this Court, Collins I and Collins II, which remain pending. "Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to [section] 1915(e). Generally, a lawsuit is duplicative of another one if the parties, issues and available relief do not significantly differ between the two." Cottle v. Bell, No. 00-6367, 2000 WL 1144623, at *1 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citations omitted). It is clear that, in the three actions, Plaintiff seeks to assert claims of deliberate indifference related to two distinct serious medical needs. Given the similarities between the allegations in the two prior actions and those in the present action, Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims in this action should be dismissed without prejudice as duplicative. See, e.g., Harrison v. South Carolina, 126 F. App'x 100, 101 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see also Shaw v. Byars, No. 9-12-cv-2830-RBH, 2012 WL 6138325, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 11, 2012) (dismissing action as duplicative where remedies were available in the identical action); Noonsab v. N.C. Gov't, No. 5:16-CT-3122-FL, 2016 WL 7650591, at *1 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2016), aff'd, 669 F. App'x 664 (4th Cir. 2016) (same). Plaintiff will have an opportunity to fully litigate his deliberate indifference claims related to his knee injury and tooth pain in the actions already pending in this Court.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge October 24, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).