Thus, the court concluded, Pennsylvania law should apply as Pennsylvania was the only interested jurisdiction. In Colley v. Harvey Cedars Marina, 422 F. Supp. 953 (D.N.J. 1976), the court was again faced with these identical facts. The Colley court, however, analyzed this case as a true conflict.
On the other hand, the district courts to hold that New Jersey law applied found a conflict in the respective Survival Acts and then a conflict in state interests. Capone v. Nadig, 963 F.Supp. 409, 412-13 (D.N.J. 1997); Amoroso v. Burdette Tomlin Mem'l Hosp., 901 F.Supp. 900, 902 (D.N.J. 1995); Cannon v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 664 F.Supp. 199, 202 (E.D.Pa. 1987) (applying Pennsylvania choice of law rules to hold that New Jersey's Survival Act applied in case involving an accident in New Jersey with New Jersey resident defendants and a Pennsylvania resident decedent); Colley v. Harvey Cedars Marina, 422 F.Supp. 953, 957 (D.N.J. 1976). Because New Jersey and Pennsylvania survival laws differ on the scope of damages, there is a true conflict between the laws of each potentially interested jurisdiction.
The legislatures of New Jersey and Pennsylvania have made different judgements on the measure of damages in a survival action. As recognized in Colley v. Harvey Cedars Marina, 422 F. Supp. 953 (D.N.J. 1976), "Pennsylvania has determined that compensation to decedents' estates is of primary importance."Id. at 955. Here, because Plaintiff is charged with administering a Pennsylvania estate, the interests of Pennsylvania would be furthered by application of its own law on this issue.
The majority of the cases in this district and elsewhere which have addressed the New Jersey Legislature's intent in enacting New Jersey's Survival Act have found that, although the Legislature may have taken into account the interest of the decedent's estate by permitting an action to survive the decedent's death in the first instance, the Act's severe limitation on the recovery in such an action demonstrates that the Legislature's interest in the "protection of defendants from large recoveries [took] priority" over the interest of the decedent's estate. Colley v. Harvey Cedars Marina, 422 F. Supp. 953, 955 (D.N.J. 1976). See also Amoroso v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital, 901 F. Supp. 900, 904 (D.N.J. 1995); Cannon v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 664 F. Supp. 199, 201 (E.D.Pa. 1987); Mathis v. Motley, 649 F. Supp. 38, 40 (D.N.J. 1986); Nolen v. Foundations and Structures, Inc., No. 83-1372, 1984 WL 3580 (D.N.J. April 19, 1984).
Courts have repeatedly emphasized that "[w]hen a person chooses to travel across state lines, he should expect the laws of the place in which he is located to govern his transactions." Lebegern v. Forman , 471 F.3d 424, 433 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Colley v. Harvey Cedars Marina , 422 F. Supp. 953, 957 (D.N.J. 1976) ("By entering the state or nation, the visitor has exposed himself to the risks of the territory and should not expect to subject persons living there to a financial hazard that their law had not created.")); see alsoBlakesley v. Wolford , 789 F.2d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting in a medical malpractice case that "it is only fair that the law of the state to which the patient has voluntarily traveled, and in which the doctor has chosen to conduct the operation, be applied to adjudicate the respective rights, duties, and obligations between the parties"); Amoroso v. Burdette Tomlin Mem'l Hosp. , 901 F. Supp. 900, 906 (D.N.J. 1995) ("Citizens do not ... carry their home state's laws with them wherever they go."). Further, businesses operating in a given jurisdiction reasonably expect that their operations will be governed by the laws of that jurisdiction.
For example, where torts have occurred in New Jersey and one of the parties in the action has been a New Jersey domiciliary, courts applying New Jersey's choice-of-law rules have applied New Jersey law. See, e.g., Amoroso v. Burdette Tomlin Mem'l Hospital, 901 F. Supp. 900, 902 (D.N.J. 1995) (Irenas, J.) (applying New Jersey law in a suit involving New Jersey defendants and a stabbing in New Jersey of a Pennsylvania resident); Colley v. Harvey Cedars Marina, 422 F. Supp. 953, 954, 957 (D.N.J. 1976) (Brotman, J.) (using New Jersey in a case involving a Pennsylvania plaintiff, New Jersey defendants, and a drowning off the coast of New Jersey). Conversely, where torts have occurred in other states and one of the parties has been a domiciliary of that other state, New Jersey courts have repaired to the laws of that state.
On the other hand, Judge Brotman and Judge Cohen have found that the survival statute was intended to protect New Jersey resident defendants from large recoveries. Mathis v. Motley, 649 F. Supp. 38, 40 (D.N.J. 1986) (Brotman, J.) (citing Colley v. Harvey Cedars Marinas, 422 F. Supp. 953, 955 (D.N.J. 1976) (Brotman, J.) and Nolen v. Found. and Structures, No. 83-1372, 1984 WL 3580, DCTU database (D.N.J. April 19, 1984) (Cohen, J.)). The Third Circuit has recognized that a wrongful death statute inherently concerns the rights of both parties:
In his subsequent written opinion of December 22, 1986, the judge fully set forth the reasons why he had dismissed the case. He explained that in this diversity case he used New Jersey conflicts of law principles to determine whether to apply Florida or New Jersey substantive law, as he was sitting in New Jersey. He then decided that New Jersey law would apply, citing Colley v. Harvey Cedars Marina, 422 F. Supp. 953 (D.N.J. 1976), as New Jersey had an interest in protecting its residents from excessive damage awards. Thus, he rejected other district court decisions suggesting a contrary result.
Although the court did finally uphold its power to promulgate the prejudgment interest rule, its resolution of the issue did not hinge on the substantive-procedural dichotomy. The parties focused much attention in their briefs on Colley v. Harvey Cedars Marina, 422 F. Supp. 953 (D.N.J. 1976). In that case, New Jersey and Pennsylvania law on the computation of damages in a survival action were in conflict, and the district court found that New Jersey would apply New Jersey's law.
It is important to keep in mind, though, that "New Jersey is not interested in protecting all defendants but only its own residents." Colley v. Harvey Cedars Marina, 422 F. Supp. 953, 955 (D.N.J. 1976). 1. Plaintiff's Claims Against Pennsylvania Defendants