Summary
In Coleman v. Worster, 140 A.D.3d 1002, 1003 [2d Dept. 2016], an action in which, as in the instant case, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for false arrest and false imprisonment, the Second Department affirmed the lower court's decision to grant the request to amend the Answer to add a statute of limitations affirmative defense.
Summary of this case from Desouza v. City of New YorkOpinion
06-22-2016
Henry COLEMAN, appellant, v. Audry WORSTER, respondent.
Robert L. Greenberg, P.C., New York, N.Y., for appellant.
Robert L. Greenberg, P.C., New York, N.Y., for appellant.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, and VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for false arrest and false imprisonment, the plaintiff appeals (1), as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Martin, J.), dated April 27, 2015, as granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend her answer to assert the statute of limitations as a defense and, thereupon, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred, and (2) from an order of the same court dated May 5, 2015, which denied, as academic, his motion for leave to enter a default judgment. ORDERED that the order dated April 27, 2015, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order dated May 5, 2015, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant to recover damages for false arrest and false imprisonment. After the defendant interposed an answer, she moved pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend her answer to assert the statute of limitations as a defense and, thereupon, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred. The plaintiff opposed the defendant's motion and moved for leave to enter a default judgment. In an order dated April 27, 2015, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted the defendant's motion. In an order dated May 5, 2015, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment on the ground that it was rendered academic in light of the order dated April 27, 2015.
“A party may amend his or her pleading ... at any time by leave of court or by stipulation of all parties” (CPLR 3025[b] ). “Applications to amend pleadings are within the sound discretion of the court, and that of the Appellate Division” (Kimso Apts., LLC v. Gandhi, 24 N.Y.3d 403, 411, 998 N.Y.S.2d 740, 23 N.E.3d 1008 ).
“As a general rule, ‘leave to amend a pleading should be freely granted in the absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party where the amendment is not patently lacking in merit’ ” (Davis v. South Nassau Communities Hosp., 26 N.Y.3d 563, 580, 26 N.Y.S.3d 231, 46 N.E.3d 614, quoting Pink v. Ricci, 100 A.D.3d 1446, 1448, 954 N.Y.S.2d 306 ). “Mere lateness is not a barrier to the amendment. It must be lateness coupled with significant prejudice to the other side, the very elements of the laches doctrine” (Edenwald Contr. Co. v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 957, 959, 471 N.Y.S.2d 55, 459 N.E.2d 164 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see HSBC Bank v. Picarelli, 110 A.D.3d 1031, 1032, 974 N.Y.S.2d 90 ). “The burden of establishing prejudice is on the party opposing the amendment” (Kimso Apts., LLC v. Gandhi, 24 N.Y.3d at 411, 998 N.Y.S.2d 740, 23 N.E.3d 1008 ). Accordingly, where, as here, a plaintiff opposes a motion for leave to amend an answer so as to add a defense, the plaintiff has the burden “to establish prejudice accruing to him [or her] as a consequence of defendant's failure to timely assert the defense, and to include a showing that the prejudice could have been avoided if the defense had been timely asserted” (Caceras v. Zorbas, 74 N.Y.2d 884, 885, 547 N.Y.S.2d 834, 547 N.E.2d 89 ; see Loomis v. Civetta Corinno Constr. Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 18, 23, 444 N.Y.S.2d 571, 429 N.E.2d 90 ).
Here, since the proposed amendment did not result in any prejudice or surprise to the plaintiff and was not palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend her answer to assert the statute of limitations as a defense (see Carducci v. Bensimon, 115 A.D.3d 693, 694, 981 N.Y.S.2d 597 ; HSBC Bank v. Picarelli, 110 A.D.3d at 1032, 974 N.Y.S.2d 90 ; cf. Murray v. City of New York, 43 N.Y.2d 400, 406, 401 N.Y.S.2d 773, 372 N.E.2d 560 ).
Furthermore, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred. “Causes of action based on false arrest and false imprisonment ... are governed by a one-year statute of limitations” (Bellissimo v. Mitchell, 122 A.D.3d 560, 560, 995 N.Y.S.2d 603 [citations omitted]; see CPLR 215[3] ). Such causes of action accrue upon the individual's “release[ ] from confinement” (Charnis v. Shohet, 2 A.D.3d 663, 663, 768 N.Y.S.2d 638 ; see Bellissimo v. Mitchell, 122 A.D.3d at 560, 995 N.Y.S.2d 603 ; Roche v. Village of Tarrytown, 309 A.D.2d 842, 843, 766 N.Y.S.2d 46 ; Avgush v. Town of Yorktown, 303 A.D.2d 340, 341, 755 N.Y.S.2d 647 ).
Here, the defendant established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the action accrued on July 4, 2009, when the plaintiff was released from custody, and that this action was not commenced within one year of that date. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred (see Bellissimo v. Mitchell, 122 A.D.3d at 560, 995 N.Y.S.2d 603 ; Charnis v. Shohet, 2 A.D.3d at 663, 768 N.Y.S.2d 638 ; see also Frumento v. On Rite Co., Inc., 66 A.D.3d 828, 829–830, 887 N.Y.S.2d 620 ), and denied, as academic, the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment.