Opinion
C. A. 23-2221-JFA-SVH
09-12-2023
William Theoplas Coleman, Plaintiff, v. Officer Steven Timbs; Unknown Female officer; Unknown Police Officers, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
William Theoplas Coleman (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this complaint against Officer Steven Timbs and Unknown Defendants (collectively “Defendants”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be summarily dismissed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff's original complaint alleged Timbs unlawfully violated his “Ramsey Right” in November 2022. [ECF No. 1]. He further claims Timbs “began a slew of malicious prosecution efforts including the stacking of charges and unlawful enhancements without valid merits to enhance such charges.
In his amended complaint filed June 20, 2023, Plaintiff alleges he was arrested and initially booked in for shoplifting under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-13110. [ECF No. 8 at 6]. Plaintiff argues Timbs violated S.C. Code Ann. § 56-710 by using an arrest warrant instead of a uniform traffic ticket. Id. Plaintiff therefore claims he was illegally seized in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff further claims that pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-80, shoplifting may not be used to make a custodial arrest. Id.
Plaintiff alleges he informed Timbs on the scene that he was “going to take [Timbs] to the United States District Court for the unlawfulness of his arrest ....” Id. at 7. Plaintiff claims in retaliation for this statement, Timbs charged him with charges of criminal conspiracy, grand larceny, and a habitual traffic offense. Id.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
B. Analysis
1. Shoplifting Arrest
Plaintiff cites to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-10 for the proposition that only a uniform traffic ticket may be used for a shoplifting charge. That section states in relevant part:
There will be a uniform traffic ticket used by all law enforcement officers in arrests for traffic offenses and for the following additional offenses: ...
(26) Shoplifting Section 16-13-110.S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-10(A). Subsection (C) of the statute states “No other ticket may be used for these offenses.” S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-10(A). However, South Carolina courts have specifically found that this statute “expands the general jurisdiction of the magistrate court by identifying certain offenses beyond the statutory limits of section 22-3-540.” Bayly v. State, 724 S.E.2d 182, 184 (S.C. 2012). Although it eliminates the need for an arrest warrant, it does not prohibit the use of a warrant. Id. (“[S]ection 56-7-10 eliminates the need for an arrest warrant and authorizes the use of a uniform traffic ticket to notify an accused and commence judicial proceedings in the magistrate court.”). Subsection (C) states that no other ticket may be used, presumably referring to a ticket other than the uniform traffic ticket, but does not prohibit the use of a warrant. Further, Plaintiff's reference to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-80 is inapposite, as that statute discusses the use of a county or municipality ordinance summons.
Therefore, Plaintiff's arguments that his arrest for shoplifting was illegal based on S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-10 is unfounded. Further, even if Plaintiff's arrest was procedurally inadequate under South Carolina law does not mean his arrest was unreasonable or without probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.
2. Charges of Criminal Conspiracy, Grand Larceny, and Habitual Traffic Offender
To the extent Plaintiff claims his charges of criminal conspiracy, grand larceny, and habitual traffic offender lack probable cause, such claims are subject to summary dismissal because the grand jury has indicted Plaintiff on such charges.“[A]n indictment, fair upon its face, returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See York County General Sessions Case Nos. 2022A4620400203, 2022A4620400204, and 2022A4620400206. https://publicindex.sccourts.org/ York/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=46&CourtAgency=46001&Casenum=2022A4620400203&CaseType=C&HKey=481168510311755571138798515057122891207568771141184885828499797979111475579487689868811265 5011077 (last visited August 8, 2023). A court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites. See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (court may “properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”).
Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for any Constitutional violation, his amended complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's action be summarily dismissed without further leave for further amendment.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).