Opinion
5:16-CV-00836 (LEK/TWD)
07-22-2016
ROCHELLE COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. SYRACUSE POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendant.
APPEARANCES: ROCHELLE COLEMAN Plaintiff pro se 231 Lilac Street Syracuse, New York 13208
APPEARANCES: ROCHELLE COLEMAN
Plaintiff pro se
231 Lilac Street
Syracuse, New York 13208 THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
The Clerk has sent to the Court three complaints filed in one action at the request of pro se Plaintiff Rochelle Coleman. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-1, and 1-2.) Each of the separate complaints has purportedly been brought pursuant to a different civil rights statute: 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 (Dkt. No. 1); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Dkt. No. 1-1); and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §12101, et seq. (Dkt. No. 1-2.) Plaintiff has sued the Syracuse Police Department and the 911 Administration Center. Id. Plaintiff has also filed two motions to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP application") and a motion for the appointment of counsel. (Dkt. Nos. 2, 2-1 and 4.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiff's first IFP application (Dkt. No. 2); deny her second IFP application (Dkt. No. 2-1) as moot; recommend dismissal of her three complaints (Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-1, and 1-2) with prejudice for failure to state a claim; and deny her motion for the appointment of counsel (Dkt. No. 4) without prejudice.
Records from the Clerk's Office show that this lawsuit is one of five presented to the Clerk's Office for filing on July 8, 2016. Each appears to contain multiple complaints. See Coleman v. Engle, No. 5:16-cv-833 (MAD/DEP) (challenging the handling of her family's public assistance benefits, including charges of errors, fraud, and theft of benefits by Onondaga County Social Services workers ); Coleman v. Detter, No. 5:16-cv-834 (MAD/DEP) (suing attorneys involved in a Family Court child protective proceeding involving Plaintiff and her children); Coleman v. Sutkowsky, No. 5:16-cv- 837 (MAD/DEP) (claim that defendants have ignored her welfare fraud complaints against Onondaga County Social Services workers); and Coleman v. Olinsky, No. 5:16-cv-838 (MAD/DEP) (lawsuit against Plaintiff's attorneys claiming that benefits were unlawfully taken, overcharging on fees, and benefits wrongfully unreported). Plaintiff earlier presented two lawsuits containing multiple complaints for filing on June 22, 2016. See Coleman v. Levandowski, No. 5:16-cv-734 (NAM/ATB) (claims against social workers involved in child protective proceeding involving Plaintiff and her children); and Coleman v. Hanuszczak, No. 5:16-cv-735 (NAM/ATB) (suit against Family Court Judge in child protective proceeding).
Although the Syracuse Police Department is the named Defendant, Plaintiff has listed "Chief of Police" as the official position of Defendant. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 3.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court will review the complaint as though both the Syracuse Police Department and the Chief of Police had been named as Defendants. Plaintiff has also named the 911 Administration Center as a Defendant. Id. Plaintiff has listed the "Call Operators" as the official position of the 911 Administration Center. Id. Inasmuch as Plaintiff has not identified any specific call operators, the Court will treat the 911 Administration Center as the sole Defendant in its analysis. Id.
I. IFP APPLICATION
A court may grant in forma pauperis status if a party "is unable to pay" the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's first IFP Application, the Court finds that Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 2) is granted and her second application (Dkt. No. 2-1) is denied as moot.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR INITIAL REVIEW
Even when a plaintiff meets the financial criteria for in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must look to see whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). "An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless such as when the claims are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Although extreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and the parties have had an opportunity to respond, Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983), the court still has a responsibility to determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a plaintiff to proceed. See, e.g., Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that a district court has the power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte if the complaint is frivolous).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is "plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the general rules of pleading, "does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation." Id. In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, "the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.
Where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the pleadings must be read liberally and construed to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A pro se complaint should not be dismissed "without giving leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An opportunity to amend is not required where "the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive" such that "better pleading will not cure it." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
III. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINTS
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that when she calls the police, they refuse to come, lie about coming, or refuse to investigate out of retaliation because she called the police on police officers for running someone off the road, and taped the beating by the police of a teen on Butternut Street. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff alleges that the police also refuse to help her when she walks in the police station, and that her family is victimized by police officers failure to investigate and act on her reports. Id. at ¶ 5. Plaintiff also alleges that the 911 center personnel try to refuse her calls. Id. at ¶ 4.
The relief sought by Plaintiff is to have the police officers do their jobs, take her reports, and treat Plaintiff and her family with respect. Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff also asks for $3,000,000 in damages. Id.
B. Title VII Complaint
Plaintiff alleges retaliatory discrimination against her by Defendants on account of her race or color, income, retaliation, and education in violation of Title VII . (Dkt. No. 1-1 at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff claims that when she goes to the police station for assistance they refuse help and allow criminals to violate her and her family. Id. at ¶ 8. She further claims that the police refuse to take her reports, refuse to investigate, refuse to allow her to speak to an investigator, retaliate against her, and allow criminals to get away with violating her. Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff asks that the police officers and 911 operators be held accountable and not retaliate against her, and that she be awarded $3,000,000 in damages.
C. ADA Complaint
Plaintiff alleges she is disabled with post traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, arthritis, migraines/brain cancer, lung and heart cancer, a joint disorder, and insomnia. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff claims that the police have retaliated against her by delaying or not showing up and refusing to take her report and telling her to leave when she comes to the police station. Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of an end to the retaliation and that the police officers and 911 operators be held accountable. Id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiff also seeks $3,000,000 in compensatory damages. Id.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim
1. Syracuse Police Department and the Chief of Police
Plaintiff has sued one or the other of, or both the Syracuse Police Department and the Chief of Police. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 3.) Although a municipality is subject to suit pursuant to § 1983, see Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), a municipal police department does not have the capacity to be sued as an entity separate from the municipality in which it is located. See Krug v. County of Rennselaer, 559 F.Supp. 2d 223, 247 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Orraca v. City of N.Y., 879 F.Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (police department and police precincts are not suable entities separate from the City)). Therefore, the Court recommends that the Syracuse Police Department be dismissed from the action.
The Court would recommend dismissal of Plaintiff's claim even if Plaintiff had correctly named the City of Syracuse as defendant. Pursuant to the standard for establishing municipality liability laid out in Monell, 436 U.S. at 658, in order to set forth a cognizable claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove that a deprivation of his constitutional rights "was caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage of the municipality." Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 658); see also Vippolis v. Village of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1985) ("The plaintiff must first prove the existence of a municipal policy or custom in order to show that the municipality took some action that caused his injuries beyond merely employing the misbehaving officer.") A municipality may be liable for deprivation of constitutional rights under § 1983 for policies or customs resulting in inadequate training, supervision, or hiring when the failure to train, supervise, or hire amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those with whom municipal employees will come into contact. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989). To establish causation, there must "at the very least be an affirmative link between the policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged." Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985). Plaintiff has failed to identify or allege any facts showing that the alleged refusal of the unidentified Syracuse police officers to take or investigate her reports was connected in any way to the existence of any municipal policy or custom of the City of Syracuse or the result of a failure to properly train, supervise, or hire the police officers.
The Court also recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's claim as against the Chief of the Syracuse Police Department. "Personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under 1983." Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. ("Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior."). "Holding a position in a hierarchical chain of command, without more, is insufficient to support a showing of personal involvement." Groves v. Davis, No. 9:11-CV-1317 (GTS/RFT), 2012 WL 651919, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2012) (citing McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977)); see also Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 435 (2d Cir. 2003) (a "mere 'linkage in the prison chain of command' is insufficient to implicate a state commissioner of corrections . . . in a § 1983 claim") (quoting Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 1985)). Therefore, "a plaintiff must . . . allege a tangible connection between the acts of a defendant and the injuries suffered." Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986).
The Clerk will be directed to provide Plaintiff with copies of all unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
The Second Circuit has held that personal involvement by a supervisor necessary to state a claim under § 1983 may be found where: "(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring." Colon, 58 F.3d at 873. Plaintiff's complaint is devoid of allegations plausibly showing the existence of any of the Colon criteria in this case.
The Second Circuit has expressly declined to determine whether Iqbal eliminated any of the Colon bases for liability. See Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2013) . --------
As noted above, a pro se plaintiff should generally be granted leave to amend her or his complaint unless the problem with a claim is substantive such that a better pleading will not cure it. Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112. The Court finds that allowing Plaintiff to amend his § 1983 claim against the Police Department and/or its Chief, or the City of Syracuse were it to be named as a party, would be futile in this case. Plaintiff claims that police officers refused to accept and investigate her reports. (Dkt. No. 1.) However, it is well established that "[t]here is no . . . constitutional right to an investigation by government officials." Troy v. City of New York, No. 13-cv-5082 (AJN), 2014 WL 4804479, * 6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2014) (quoting Stone v. Dept. of Investigation of City of New York, No. 91-cv-2471 (MBM), 1992 WL 25202, at * 2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1992)); see also Harrington v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 607 F.3d 31, 35-36 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that parents did not have a protected property interest in an investigation into their son's death); Rodrigues v. Village of Larchmont, N.Y., 608 F.Supp. 467, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (dismissal of claim against police department for refusing to allow plaintiff to file a complaint and refusal to investigate on the ground that "[t]here is certainly no constitutional right to be protected from criminal activity").
In light of the foregoing, the Court recommends that the dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the Syracuse Police Department (City of Syracuse) and the Chief of Police be with prejudice.
2. 911 Call Center
Plaintiff has also sued the 911 Administration Center, alleging that call officers tried to refuse to take her calls. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) As with the Syracuse Police Department, the Department of Emergency Communication -- 911 Center ("911 Call Center") is not an independent suable entity but rather a department of Onondaga County. See http:.www. ongov.net/911/ (last visited on July 20, 2016). Therefore, the proper defendant with respect to Plaintiff's claim against the 911 Call Center would be Onondaga County, and the Court recommends dismissal of the three complaints against the 911 Administration Center. See, e.g., Pazaras v. Onondaga County, No. 5:14-CV-1227 (DNH), 2016 WL 297423 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2016) (Onondaga County the named defendant on a claim against the Onondaga County 911 Call Center).
The Court would recommend dismissal of Plaintiff's claim even if Plaintiff had correctly named Onondaga County as defendant. The complaint does not contain allegations plausibly showing that the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights with respect to the 911 Call Center "was caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage of [the County of Onondaga]," Jones, 691 F.3d at 80, or inadequate training, supervision, or hiring of 911 Call Center call operators. Plaintiff's complaint does not allege facts describing the reason or reasons for her calls to the 911 Center. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Moreover, the sole allegation in Plaintiff's complaint as to the 911 Center call officers is that "the 911 center personal (sic) try to refuse my calls and I am tired of the retaliation." which Plaintiff has alleged is for her reports to the police of police misconduct. Plaintiff has not alleged that she sustained any damages as a result of the call operations trying not to take her calls, and damages is an element of claims under § 1983. See Doe v. City of Waterbury, 453 F. Supp. 2d 537, 542 (D. Conn. 2006).
Because there are no allegations in Plaintiff's complaint from which the Court could surmise that if granted leave to amend to name Onondaga County as a defendant and state a municipal liability claim against the County under § 1983, she might be able to do so, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the 911 Administration Center (Onondaga County) be dismissed with prejudice.
B. Title VII Claim
In what Plaintiff has labeled a Title VII claim, she alleges that the police turn her away and refuse to take her reports, refuse to investigate, refuse to allow her to speak to an investigator, retaliate against her, and allow criminals to get away with violating her rights. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.) Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual with regard to compensation and terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In order to state a claim under Title VII, Plaintiff must show that she was a member of a protected class, she was qualified for a position of employment, she suffered an adverse employment action, and the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff has alleged that she is a member of a protected class (race or color). However, there are no allegations in the complaint plausibly showing that the allegations against Defendants have anything whatsoever to do with an employment situation or with employment discrimination. Furthermore, individuals are not subject to liability under Title VII; thus to the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a Title VII claim, including any retaliation claim against the Syracuse Police Chief, she would be unable to do so in any event. Sassaman v. Gamache, 566 F.3d 307, 315-16 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 221 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Plaintiff Title VII complaint (Dkt. No. 1-1) be dismissed with prejudice.
C. ADA Claim
In her ADA complaint, Plaintiff alleges numerous physical and mental disabilities. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at ¶46.) The sole allegations in the complaint are that when Plaintiff calls the police for assistance, the officers delay or do not show up, and when she goes to the police station, they refuse to take her report and tell her to leave the building. Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff does not allege facts plausibly showing a relationship between her disabilities and the police officers' actions. Although Plaintiff seeks damages from the 911 Administration Center, there are no factual allegations of wrongdoing by the 911 Call Center in the complaint. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-2.)
The ADA provides protection against discrimination based upon disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Title II of the ADA, which covers public services and programs, is the only section of the ADA that could conceivably apply to Plaintiff's claim. 42 U.S.C. § 12182. Title II provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." Id.
To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff "must demonstrate that (1) [she is a] qualified individual with a disability; (2) that defendants are subject to the ADA ; and (3) that [she was] denied the opportunity to participate or benefit from defendants' services, programs, or activities, or [was] discriminated against by defendants, by reason of [her] disabilities." Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2003). "Qualified individual with a disability" has been defined by Congress to refer to apply to "an individual with a disability who . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements" established for receipt of services, programs, or activities provided by a public entity. 42 U.S.C. §12132(2). "Public entity" is defined as "any State or local government; any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
Actions of police departments have been found to fall within the scope of ADA Title II, although as discussed above, the City of Syracuse would be the proper party defendant. See Williams v. City of New York, 121 F.Supp. 3d 354, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). The Onondaga County 911 Call Center also falls within the Title II definition of public entity, although Onondaga County would be the proper party defendant. Parties, including the Syracuse Chief of Police Department, may not be sued for violations of ADA Title II in their individual capacities inasmuch as the provision provides for suit only against public entities. See Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 76 (2d Cir. 2006) (ADA claim dismissed against individual defendant because an individual is not a public entity.)
Even assuming for purposes of this initial review that Plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability and the Syracuse Police Department and Onondaga County are public entities under Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly showing that she was denied the opportunity to participate or benefit from defendants' services, programs, or activities, or was discriminated against by the Syracuse Police of the Onondaga County 911 Call Center by reason of her alleged disabilities. To the contrary, Plaintiff has alleged in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint that the police officers' actions were acting in retaliation for her reporting of police misconduct. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 4.) Her complaint under Title II of the ADA contains no factual allegations of wrongdoing whatsoever by the 911 Call Center. (Dkt. No. 1-2.) Furthermore, as with the police officers, Plaintiff attributes the 911 callers' attempts to avoid her calls to retaliation for reporting police misconduct. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 4.)
Based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's third complaint for failure to state a claim. Because Plaintiff has clearly attributed the police officers' and the 911 operators' allegedly wrongful actions to retaliation for reporting police misconduct, and not her alleged disabilities, the Court recommends that the dismissal be with prejudice.
D. Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Plaintiff has moved for appointment of counsel and submitted correspondence from attorneys declining her request for representation in support of her motion. (Dkt. No. 4.) Even if the Court were not recommending dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice, a more fully developed record would be necessary before an assessment can be made as to whether counsel should be appointed. See Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 392 (2d Cir. 1997) (court must look to the likelihood of merit of the underlying dispute in determining whether to appoint counsel). Therefore, the motion is denied. The denial is without prejudice so that Plaintiff will not be precluded from making a subsequent motion for appointment of counsel in the event the District Court allows the action to proceed.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's first IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's second IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2-1) is DENIED AS MOOT; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (Dkt. No. 4) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's civil rights complaint 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE upon initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Title VII complaint (Dkt. No. 1-1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE upon initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Title II of the ADA complaint (Dkt. No. 1-2) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE upon initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk send Plaintiff a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein, in accordance with the Second Circuit decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Dated: July 22, 2016
Syracuse, New York
/s/_________
Thérèse Wiley Dancks
United States Magistrate Judge