Opinion
NO. 4-14-0138
04-08-2015
JEFFERSON COLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SALVADOR A. GODINEZ and DONALD GAETZ, Defendants-Appellees.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from Circuit Court of Sangamon County
No. 12MR1032
Honorable John P. Schmidt, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Knecht and Harris concurred in the judgment
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court reversed, concluding the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's mandamus complaint.
¶ 2 In November 2013, plaintiff, inmate Jefferson Coleman, pro se filed an amended complaint for mandamus and injunctive relief. In December 2013, after defendants, Salvador A. Godinez and Donald Gaetz, failed to answer the amended complaint or otherwise plead, the trial court sua sponte dismissed plaintiff's complaint. In January 2014, the court denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider the dismissal of his amended complaint.
¶ 3 Plaintiff appeals, arguing the trial court (1) violated basic principles of due process when it failed to give him notice of its intent to grant defendants' motion to dismiss or permit him to respond to defendants' motion; (2) erred by dismissing his amended complaint where it stated a cognizable cause of action under the due-process clause; (3) erred by dismissing
his amended complaint where it was not barred by sovereign immunity; and (4) erred by dismissing his amended complaint where it was not barred by the doctrine of laches. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 A. The Parties
¶ 6 Plaintiff is an inmate at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (Pinckneyville) and has proceeded pro se throughout the entirety of these proceedings. Defendant Godinez is the Director of the Department of Corrections (DOC). Defendant Gaetz is the warden at Pinckneyville.
¶ 7 B. Section 3-6-2(f) of the Unified Code of Corrections
¶ 8 Plaintiff's mandamus complaint centers on section 3-6-2(f) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/3-6-2(f) (West 2010)). At the time plaintiff filed his initial prison grievance, on September 21, 2011, that statute provided, in pertinent part:
"(f) In the event that the person requires medical care and treatment at a place other than the institution or facility, the person may be removed therefrom under conditions prescribed by [DOC]. [DOC] shall require the committed person receiving medical or dental services on a non-emergency basis to pay a $2 co-payment to [DOC] for each visit for medical or dental services. The amount of each co-payment shall be deducted from the committed person's individual account." 730 ILCS 5/3-6-2(f) (West 2010).
¶ 9 By the time plaintiff filed his mandamus complaint, the legislature had amended section 3-6-2(f) of the Unified Code. See Pub. Act 97-562, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2012). The
amendment increased the co-payment to $5 and included a definition of "indigent" for purposes of the statute. Pub. Act 97-562, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2012).
¶ 10 C. Plaintiff's Grievance
¶ 11 In September 2012, plaintiff filed a grievance, complaining he had been wrongfully subjected to a $2 co-payment for dental services he received. The grievance form indicated plaintiff requested an "Inmate Transaction Statement" after he received only $7.42 of his $10 monthly stipend. At this time, plaintiff discovered "there had been an unlawful $2.00 dollar [sic] withdrawal from [his] account for the purpose of a 'Medical Co-Payment' in relations [sic] to dental services [he] had received on June 21, 2011." Plaintiff's grievance further stated the dental services he received did not meet the requirements of section 3-6-2(f) of the Unified Code because he received the services at the institutional facility in which he was housed. Further, plaintiff alleged, even if the services he received met the requirements of section 3-6-2(f), he was indigent and therefore exempt from the $2 co-payment.
¶ 12 Later that month, plaintiff's unit counselor responded to plaintiff's grievance. According to the response, plaintiff's counselor spoke with the health care unit administrator, who indicated defendant received dental treatment on May 31, 2011, and should have been charged the co-payment. Further, the response stated plaintiff had signed a money voucher for the co-payment.
¶ 13 Thereafter, plaintiff forwarded his grievance to the institutional grievance officer. In November 2011, the grievance officer recommended the grievance be denied, as it was DOC's policy to charge a $2 co-payment any time an inmate requests services from the health care unit. Further, the grievance officer noted plaintiff had been receiving $10 each month in "state pay" and his inmate account had "maintained a positive balance for the last several months." In
December 2011, Gaetz concurred in the grievance officer's recommendation, and plaintiff appealed to the Administrative Review Board. On May 9, 2012, the Administrative Review Board recommended the appeal be denied and Godinez concurred.
¶ 14 D. Plaintiff's Mandamus Complaint
¶ 15 On November 13, 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint, seeking mandamus relief. Therein, plaintiff alleged he had requested defendants "provide him a proper reading of [section 3-6-2(f) of the Unified Code] and to return all monies withdrawn from his account based on their strained reading of the statute." Plaintiff alleged defendants "refused to perform the ministerial act of correctly reading [section 3-6-2(f) of the Unified Code], or that of reimbursting [sic] Plaintiff's inmate trust account of those monies wrongfully withdrawn," even though he was clearly entitled to the performance of both. Plaintiff sought an order of mandamus, compelling defendants to (1) "cease all recognition and adherence of the policy/practice of requiring and assessing [section 3-6-2(f)] co[-]payment costs and fees for non-emergency medical and/or dental treatment and services provided at the institution or facility (within [DOC]) in which Plaintiff is located"; and (2) reimburse plaintiff for all monies that were unlawfully withdrawn from his inmate account as a result of defendants' misreading of section 3-6-2(f).
¶ 16 In April 2013, defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civil Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2012)) and attached a memorandum in support thereof. Pursuant to section 2-615 of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2012)), defendants argued plaintiff was not "indigent" for purposes of section 3-6-2(f) of the Unified Code and was therefore properly assessed the $2 co-payment for dental services he received. Pursuant to section 2-619 of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2012)), defendants asserted two bases for dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. First,
defendants contended the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, as plaintiff's claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Second, defendants asserted plaintiff's mandamus complaint was barred by the doctrine of laches.
¶ 17 E. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
¶ 18 In June 2013, in response to defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint for mandamus and injunctive relief and attached his proposed first amended complaint. Plaintiff's amended complaint set forth more factual detail in relation to his request for mandamus relief and further developed his theory of the case.
¶ 19 Additionally, plaintiff set forth the circumstances surrounding a second grievance he filed in November 2012. Plaintiff alleged on October 16, 2012, he was denied dental treatment at Pinckneyville when he refused to sign an inmate money voucher authorizing the withdrawal of the now $5 co-payment (see Pub. Act 97-562, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2012)) from his inmate account prior to receiving treatment. The dentist informed plaintiff he must either sign the voucher or an "inmate refusal of treatment form." Plaintiff would not sign the refusal-of-treatment form as he was not refusing treatment—he was refusing to authorize the withdrawal of the co-payment. When plaintiff persisted in his refusal, the dentist had his assistant and a correctional officer sign the refusal-of-treatment form indicating they witnessed plaintiff refuse treatment.
¶ 20 Plaintiff's unit counselor responded to his grievance. Plaintiff's unit counselor spoke with the health care unit administrator, who stated the $5 co-payment is the law and must be paid before an inmate receives medical treatment. Plaintiff thereafter forwarded his grievance to the grievance officer, who, in December 2012, recommended plaintiff's grievance be denied. Later that month, Gaetz concurred in the grievance officer's recommendation. Plaintiff appealed
this decision to the Administrative Review Board. However, the record does not contain any indication that his appeal to the Administrative Review Board had been resolved. Plaintiff's amended complaint further asserts that during the pendency of this grievance, he had to pull his own teeth "using crude methods" and has experienced great pain and infection as a result.
¶ 21 Plaintiff also asserted he placed his complaint in the prison mail on November 5, 2012. He alleged he placed the appropriate number of copies of the complaint in a properly addressed envelope that was marked "LEGAL MAIL." Based on information and belief, plaintiff alleged the envelope was given the proper amount of postage and "was properly post[]marked[,] dated[,] and forwarded to the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, Springfield, Illinois, on November 7, 2012.
¶ 22 Plaintiff sought an order "declaring the Defendants['] actions of implementing a policy that requires Plaintiff *** to make co-payments for non-emergency medical or dental treatment they receive at a [DOC] facility, constitutionally invalid under Section 5/3-6-2(f) of the [Unified] Code" where the Unified Code limits co-payments to such treatment at places other than DOC facilities. Plaintiff also sought an order of mandamus, compelling defendants and their employees to (1) cease and desist any and all recognition and adherence to the policy of charging a co-pay for treatment at DOC facilities where such policy conflicts with section 3-6-2(f) of the Unified Code; and (2) reimburse him for all monies unlawfully withdrawn from his inmate prison account.
¶ 23 In November 2013, following a hearing conducted via telephone, the trial court allowed plaintiff's motion for leave to file his amended mandamus complaint. According to plaintiff, defendants opposed plaintiff's motion for leave to file his amended complaint for the reasons set forth in their April 2013 motion to dismiss plaintiff's original complaint. The court
allowed defendants 14 days to file a responsive pleading to the amended complaint. Plaintiff would then be given 14 days to respond to defendants' pleadings. The court also stated it would rule based on the pleadings.
¶ 24 In December 2013, the trial court entered the following docket entry: "Defendant's [sic] Motion to Dismiss is allowed. Case Dismissed, Cause Stricken." The court directed the clerk to forward a copy of the docket entry to all parties of record.
¶ 25 In January 2014, plaintiff filed a "motion for reconsideration and vacation [sic] of the court's December 30, 2013[,] order granting the defendant's [sic] ex parte motion to dismiss and to reinstate mandamus proceedings" and attached a memorandum in support thereof. Therein, plaintiff asserted he had not received a copy of defendants' motion to dismiss his amended complaint. Additionally, plaintiff asserted defendants, by failing to file a motion to dismiss or an answer to his amended complaint, had defaulted, and he was therefore entitled to a default judgment under section 14-103 of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/14-103 (West 2012)).
¶ 26 Later that month, defendants responded to plaintiff's motion. Therein, defendants admitted they never filed a motion or other responsive pleading directed at plaintiff's amended complaint. Nevertheless, defendants contended the trial court had the authority to sua sponte strike a complaint for mandamus. Further, defendants argued, dismissal was proper for the reasons set forth in their April 2013 motion to dismiss plaintiff's original complaint. Additionally, defendants contended reconsideration of the court's order dismissing plaintiff's complaint was not proper where, as here, plaintiff failed to show a manifest error of law or fact or present newly discovered evidence.
¶ 27 The next day, by docket entry, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider and vacate the court's December 2013 order dismissing plaintiff's amended mandamus complaint.
¶ 28 This appeal followed.
¶ 29 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 30 On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court (1) violated basic principles of due process when it failed to give him notice of its intent to grant defendants' motion to dismiss or permit him to respond to defendants' motion; (2) erred by dismissing his amended complaint where it stated a cognizable cause of action under the due-process clause; (3) erred by dismissing his amended complaint where it was not barred by sovereign immunity; and (4) erred by dismissing his amended complaint where it was not barred by the doctrine of laches.
¶ 31 A. Mandamus and the Standard of Review
¶ 32 Plaintiff appeals from the grant of defendants' combined motion to dismiss filed under section 2-619.1 of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2012)). Section 2-619.1 permits the defendant to attack the legal sufficiency of the complaint (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2012)) and assert an affirmative matter defeats the plaintiff's claim (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2012)) within the same pleading. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2012). A section 2-615 motion asserts the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, fail to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363, 369, 789 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (2003). A section 2-619 motion, on the other hand, admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint but asserts some affirmative matter outside the complaint defeats the claim. Reynolds v. Jimmy John's Enterprises, LLC, 2013 IL App (4th)
120139, ¶ 31, 988 N.E.2d 984. Under either section, our review is de novo. Schloss v. Jumper, 2014 IL App (4th) 121086, ¶ 15, 11 N.E.3d 57.
¶ 33 Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy whereby a court compels a public official to perform a ministerial duty where no exercise of discretion is involved. Montes v. Taylor, 2013 IL App (4th) 120082, ¶ 15, 985 N.E.2d 1037. An inmate may state a cause of action for mandamus by properly stating a due-process-rights violation. Id. Mandamus generally provides affirmative rather than prohibitive relief, and it can be used to compel the undoing of an act. Noyola v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 133, 688 N.E.2d 81, 86 (1997). To obtain mandamus relief, a plaintiff must show " 'a clear right to the relief requested, a clear duty of the public official to act, and clear authority in the public official to comply with the writ.' " Montes, 2013 IL App (4th) 120082, ¶ 16, 985 N.E.2d 1037 (quoting People ex rel. Alvarez v. Skryd, 241 Ill. 2d 34, 39, 944 N.E.2d 337, 341 (2011)).
¶ 34 B. The Trial Court Improperly Granted Defendants' Motion To Dismiss
¶ 35 Plaintiff contends the trial court improperly granted defendants' motion to dismiss, as his complaint in fact stated a cognizable cause of action. Specifically, plaintiff contends defendants' and DOC's policy of requiring inmates to pay a co-payment for all medical treatment, regardless of where that treatment is received, is contrary to section 3-6-2(f), as that statute requires the co-payment only when the inmate receives services outside the DOC facility in which he or she is housed. Defendants, on the other hand, argue the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's amended complaint was proper because plaintiff could "allege no violation of a clear legal duty because [DOC] is statutorily required to charge prisoners a co-payment for their in-facility medical and dental care." Defendants assert, contrary to plaintiff's central contention,
"the plain meaning of the language [plaintiff] cites is to authorize, not limit, DOC's conduct." (Emphasis in original.) We agree with plaintiff.
¶ 36 Our resolution of this issue requires us to interpret section 3-6-2(f) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/3-6-2(f) (West 2010)). In doing so, our primary goal is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent. Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C., 235 Ill. 2d 1, 6, 919 N.E.2d 300, 303 (2009). The best indication of the legislature's intent is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 26, 828 N.E.2d 1155, 1169 (2005). Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction. Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392, 395, 789 N.E.2d 1211, 1212 (2003). With these principles in mind, we look to the statutory language at issue.
¶ 37 Section 3-6-2(f) of the Unified Code provides, in pertinent part:
"(f) In the event that the person requires medical care and treatment at a place other than the institution or facility, the person may be removed therefrom under conditions prescribed by [DOC]. [DOC] shall require the committed person receiving medical or dental services on a non-emergency basis to pay a $2 co-payment to [DOC] for each visit for medical or dental services." 730 ILCS 5/3-6-2(f) (West 2010).
¶ 38 Defendants invite this court to read the first and second sentences of section 3-6-2(f) in isolation. When doing so, defendants argue, it is clear the legislature intended this statutory section to authorize, and not limit, DOC's conduct. Additionally, defendants argue it is clear the legislature intended inmates be charged a $2 co-payment each time they receive
medical or dental services, regardless of where those services are received. We decline to use defendants' approach, as it is well settled statutory provisions are not to be read in isolation and should instead be construed as a whole. People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 506, 782 N.E.2d 251, 256 (2002).
¶ 39 The plain language of section 3-6-2(f) is clear: Where an inmate requires medical care at a place other than the DOC facility in which he is housed, the inmate may be removed from the facility in accordance with DOC regulations. When the inmate is removed to receive nonemergency medical or dental services, DOC may charge a $2 co-payment.
¶ 40 DOC has enacted regulations to implement section 3-6-2(f) of the Unified Code, which provide, in pertinent part:
"Section 415.30 Medical and Dental Examinations and Treatment
* * *
(g) Adult offenders who require non-emergency medical or dental services shall authorize [DOC] to deduct a $2.00 co-pay from present or future funds in his or her trust fund prior to each visit." 20 Ill. Admin. Code 415.30(g) (amended at 31 Ill. Reg. 9842 (eff. July 1, 2007)).
¶ 41 By promulgating section 415.30, plaintiff argues, DOC has exceeded its statutorily granted authority, as the regulation has removed the first sentence of section 3-6-2(f) and authorized DOC to collect a co-pay without regard to where the inmate receives the medical or dental treatment. We agree.
¶ 42 We acknowledge "where, as here, an agency is charged with the administration and enforcement of the statute, courts will give deference to the agency's interpretation of any
statutory ambiguities." Hadley v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 224 Ill. 2d 365, 370, 864 N.E.2d 162, 165 (2007). We will not substitute our own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation adopted by the agency charged with administering the statute. Id. at 371, 864 N.E.2d at 165. "Courts, however, are not bound by an agency's interpretation that conflicts with the statute, is unreasonable, or is otherwise erroneous." Id. We review de novo issues of statutory interpretation. Landis, 235 Ill. 2d at 6, 919 N.E.2d at 303.
¶ 43 Based on our interpretation of the statutory authority for this regulation, we conclude the regulation conflicts with section 3-6-2(f), as it requires inmates to pay a $2 co-payment regardless of where the medical services are received. 20 Ill. Adm. Code 415.30(g) (amended at 31 Ill. Reg. 9842 (eff. July 1, 2007)). The regulation directly conflicts with the plain language of section 3-6-2(f), which allows a co-pay to be charged only where the inmate receives nonemergency medical services at an outside facility. Accordingly, we conclude the regulation authorizing the co-payment to be charged regardless of where services are received is invalid.
¶ 44 Given our interpretation of section 3-6-2(f) and our resultant determination DOC's regulation is invalid, we conclude plaintiff properly stated a claim for mandamus relief. Here, plaintiff alleged (1) he had a right to the "correct" application of section 3-6-2(f), (2) defendants had a ministerial duty to correctly apply the statute, and (3) defendants had the authority to stop charging the co-payment. Because defendants fail to show plaintiff's claim was otherwise deficient, we conclude the trial court could not have properly dismissed plaintiff's mandamus complaint under section 2-615 of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2012)).
¶ 45 C. Plaintiff's Complaint Is Not Barred by the Doctrine of Laches
¶ 46 Defendants argue that even if plaintiff's amended complaint stated a viable cause of action, the trial court properly dismissed the complaint because it was barred by laches. We disagree.
¶ 47 Generally, courts apply the doctrine of laches where one party's failure to timely assert a right causes prejudice to an adverse party. Van Milligan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners of the Village of Glenview, 158 Ill. 2d 85, 89, 630 N.E.2d 830, 833 (1994). "The two fundamental elements of laches are lack of due diligence by the party asserting the claim and prejudice to the opposing party." Id. In Ashley v. Pierson, 339 Ill. App. 3d 733, 791 N.E.2d 666 (2003), this court discussed the doctrine of laches in the context of inmate mandamus filings. We held a plaintiff's "lack of due diligence is established by showing that more than six months elapsed between the accrual of the cause of action and the filing of the petition, unless the plaintiff provides a reasonable excuse for the delay." Id. at 739, 791 N.E.2d at 671. Additionally, we found prejudice is inherent where a detriment or inconvenience to the public results and held "that such detriment and inconvenience exist in cases where inmates file petitions for writs of mandamus more than six months after the completion of the original DOC *** proceedings and no reasonable excuse exists for the delay." Id.
¶ 48 In this case, plaintiff accrued his cause of action on May 9, 2012, when Godinez rendered the final administrative decision by concurring in the Administrative Review Board's denial of plaintiff's grievance. Plaintiff's original mandamus complaint, however, was not stamped "filed" until November 13, 2012, which is more than six months after plaintiff exhausted the administrative process. In his amended mandamus complaint, plaintiff asserted he placed his mandamus complaint in the prison mail on November 5, 2012, but it was not received by the circuit clerk for filing until November 13, 2012, eight days later.
¶ 49 Plaintiff contends his original mandamus complaint was timely filed by operation of the mailbox rule. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b) (eff. Dec. 29, 2012). Plaintiff's contention is without merit, as courts have consistently held the mailbox rule is not applicable to pleadings that initiate a new cause of action. See Kelly v. Mazzie, 207 Ill. App. 3d 251, 253, 565 N.E.2d 719, 721 (1990).
¶ 50 However, we conclude the circumstances surrounding the filing of plaintiff's initial complaint show a reasonable excuse exists for the delay. See Pierson, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 739, 791 N.E.2d at 671. Pierson is distinguishable. In Pierson, the inmate's mandamus complaint sought review of prior disciplinary proceedings that had been completed approximately two years before he filed his complaint. Id. at 736, 791 N.E.2d at 669. Here, on the other hand, plaintiff's complaint was only four days late and sought to remedy an ongoing problem that was nearly certain to continue.
¶ 51 Here, after plaintiff filed his original complaint, defendants moved to dismiss based, in part, on plaintiff's failure to bring his action within six months of the final administrative decision on his grievance. Plaintiff thereafter sought and was granted leave to cure any defects in his complaint, i.e., his failure to provide a reasonable excuse for his failure to bring his mandamus complaint within six months of the final administrative decision. Plaintiff did so in his verified amended complaint, alleging he placed his original complaint in the mail eight days before it was stamped "filed" by the circuit clerk. Given plaintiff's original complaint was only four days late, we hold plaintiff's excuse for the delay—the prison mail system caused his complaint to be late—is reasonable. Accordingly, the trial court could not properly have dismissed plaintiff's complaint under section 2-619.
¶ 52 D. Defendants Forfeited Their Contention That Plaintiff's
Claim Was Barred by Sovereign Immunity
by Abandoning the Argument on Appeal
¶ 53 In their motion to dismiss, defendants contended plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because his claims were barred by sovereign immunity. However, defendants failed to raise this argument in their brief, and it is therefore forfeited. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (effective Feb. 6, 2013) ("Points not argued are waived ***.").
¶ 54 E. The Trial Court's Failure To Give Plaintiff Notice
of Its Intent To Grant Defendants' Motion To Dismiss or
Permit Plaintiff To Respond to Defendants' Motion
¶ 55 Plaintiff also contends the trial court erred when it "sua sponte decided *** to revisit the defendants' section 2-619.1 motion for involuntary dismissal of plaintiff's mandamus complaint *** and, then applied it to the amended complaint, without ever notifying the plaintif [sic] or giving him an opportunity to respond." Because we have determined plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a cause of action and his amended mandamus complaint was not barred by laches, we need not consider whether the trial court erred by sua sponte dismissing plaintiff's action.
¶ 56 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 57 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 58 Reversed and remanded.