Opinion
No. FA 02-0174562
August 5, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This matter came to the Regional Family Trial Docket on referral from the Waterbury Judicial District. The plaintiff, Jillian Coleman whose birth name is Jillian Parle has brought this action seeking a dissolution of marriage, custody of the parties' two minor children and other relief. The defendant has counterclaimed for the same relief. This matter was tried over nine days. The plaintiff was represented by counsel and the defendant appeared and tried the case pro se. The minor children's representative was appointed as a guardian ad litem (GAL). By agreement of the parties the GAL examined witnesses, interposed objections and other wise actively participated in the trial on behalf of the children. He was also a witness and testified on behalf of the children in the narrative and was then cross-examined by both parties. There were witnesses and exhibits entered before the court. The witnesses included lay witnesses, of whom two were police officers, one was a school teacher, two were school principals, one was an attorney specializing in immigration and naturalization matters, and, also a court-appointed psychologist and family relations officer testified.
The court finds the following facts from the credible evidence.
A. Factual Background
The plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of the United Kingdom, both hailing from Liverpool, England In 1988, they came to the United States as an unmarried couple on work visas to work at a camp in Hebron, Connecticut. After that, the plaintiff located work as a nanny in the Hartford area, which provided housing for the parties as well.
At some point not made clear from the evidence, the work visas of both of the parties expired and were not renewed by either of them. Both of the parties have worked in the United States subsequent to the expiration of their respective work visas, apparently in violation of laws of the CT Page 11232-b United States.
The court utilizes the term "apparently" since no judicial determination of the same has been made.
The parties returned to England to be married on October 1, 1994 in Liverpool, and then came back to Connecticut. They have had two minor children born to them, both of whom were born in Connecticut: Liam Patrick Coleman born May 27, 1996 and Aiden William Coleman born June 10, 1998. They are papered with European Union (Community) passports which, though not court-ordered, are being held by the criminal clerk's office in the Judicial District of Waterbury in proceedings there, described hereinafter. An examination of the passports disclose that both boys are British citizens. According to these boys' parents, they are also United States citizens.
There have been no other minor children born to the wife since the date of the marriage. The parties have not been recipients of public assistance in the State of Connecticut. One party has lived continuously in the State of Connecticut for more than one year prior to the bringing of this action. For reasons discussed hereinafter, the marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably with no hope of its reconciliation.
The plaintiff, Jillian Coleman is 41 years old; she was born November 29, 1962. She is in good health. All of her formal education was in England, where she attained the British version of a high school diploma. Prior to coming to the United States she worked for British Telecom. She has no children other than the two children of this marriage. After spending the summer 1988 at the Hebron camp she became a nanny in West Hartford until the summer of 1990. She worked as a waitress for about one year and then performed some administrative services for a camp the defendant was running in New Britain until August 1993. In August 1993, the plaintiff started work with Barker Specialties and has remained in their employ, when she has been in Connecticut, ever since, to the present. The nature of the skills she utilizes in this employment were not explored at trial, but they involve fulfillment of orders of promotional products on the Internet, on the telephone and in writing, the paperwork for the same which includes order processing and shipping, and, interfacing with her main customer, Traveler's Insurance, as well as promotional item purchasers. Her work hours can be flexible as long as she works a 40-hour work week. Sometime in 1994, while employed for Barker Specialities is when the plaintiff believes her work visa expired. Presently, the plaintiff earns $832.39 per week gross, or, $43,280 gross annually. During the marriage, this is the highest income she has attained. This is her first marriage.
The defendant, William Coleman is 44 years old, born June 28, 1960. He CT Page 11232-c is in good health, though he is being treated for depression, apparently directly related to his present circumstances and situation. He is medicated with Lexapro. After observing Mr. Coleman ably conduct a nine-day trial pro se, the court observes that his depressive feelings do not interfere with his ability to function at a very high level. Historically, he has suffered somewhat from asthma but there is no evidence that this presents any current problems for him. Mr. Coleman was educated in England with two years of college in an engineering field. He worked in England at British Telecom before coming to the United States. It was at work that the parties met in England Mr. Coleman was married to his first wife when the parties started their relationship; he was divorced thereafter.
After working at the Hebron camp in the summer of 1988, the defendant had a variety of jobs in sequential order: management trainee at Dairy Mart for one year, several months at TCI as a telephone engineer, and then Ames Department Stores for about one and one-half years to the summer of 1993. While working at Ames the defendant also worked as a soccer coach for travel soccer teams. His coaching of soccer teams and running soccer camp continued to the summer of 1996. At the same time, after working at Ames, the defendant became a substitute teacher for the Goodwin Vocational and Technical School from the fall 1993 to 1996. In the summer of 1996, the defendant was hired by Central Connecticut State University as the soccer coach. He continued in that employment until May 2000 at which time his contract was not renewed. His income as CCSU soccer coach was between $40,000-45,000 annually.
In May 2000, the defendant started work in Rhode Island as teacher and facilitator of anger management and parenting education classes as well as working with abused and neglected children in outreach programs and homes. He continued that work until August 2002 when he voluntarily left it. He has not been employed since August 2002.
While no testimony was received as to this, it is stated in the family relations custody evaluation report and was not challenged in examination of its author.
While the parties have lived together since 1988, they married in October 1996, going back to England for one month for the wedding. The parties then returned to the US, under what legal authority from immigration it is not known.
The parties' first child was born on May 27, 1996 and second child was born on June 10, 1998.
A short while after his birth the parties' difficulties became apparent. Ms. Coleman returned to England on an emergency basis on December 27, 1996 in response to a telephone call on the evening of December 24, 1998 from her family that her father was gravely ill. Upon CT Page 11232-d arriving in England, she was told he had died. It came to pass that the plaintiff's family had already known he was dead before the plaintiff had flown over but not told her until she arrived. This choice made by her family in crisis became a reason for the defendant to direct rage and anger toward her family (apparently for pre-empting his ability to confront this news with his wife directly rather than her first learning it from her birth family). The relationship of Mr. Coleman with the plaintiff's family disintegrated and remained sore for the balance of the parties' marriage. The plaintiff remained in England with her relatives for about 10 days while the defendant was at home with the baby, Aiden, then six months old. Aiden was a handful for his father — he was quite young and also had some problems with asthma that demanded extra parental attention. Over the days that the plaintiff was gone, the defendant became increasingly agitated at her absence and insisted she return early. She did, on January 6, 1999, and thus missed her father's funeral on January 14, 1999. Upon Ms. Coleman's return, her husband did not offer to pick her up, thinking in anger, that she should learn to fend for herself and it was not his role to bail her out. When she got home, the defendant threw a bag of toys she had bought for Liam and hit her as well. The plaintiff stated that the defendant kicked her, spit on her and punched her, made her crawl outside on the deck and take showers to "rub her family off her skin." The defendant denied all of that other than insisting she take the shower to rub her family off her skin. At trial, and he says previously, he apologized to the plaintiff for his conduct, to the extent he acknowledged it, surrounding this whole trip. He did not apologize at the time. It was against this backdrop that the parties' marriage continued.
She had flown out of the US on December 26, 1998.
The parties differ on whether the defendant barred the plaintiff from calling her family in England on the telephone, or, as he said, from talking with them when he was around. In any case, the plaintiff's brother and brother-in-law came over and helped her move out of the home with Liam and Aiden, into a women's shelter on a weekend that the defendant was away with the soccer team. Mr. Coleman moved out of the marital home. Then the plaintiff moved back into the home with her mother who had come over from England to be with her. Then, in February 1999, the plaintiff took Liam and Aiden with her and returned to England with her mother. This trip to England was initially without the knowledge of the defendant, though he came to be aware that she was there, fairly straight away.
The defendant called the plaintiff in England almost daily, imploring her to come back and telling her that Aiden and Liam needed their father. Alternating, he would indicate that perhaps they should divorce. Unknown to the plaintiff at the time, the defendant was making inquiries CT Page 11232-e in the United States and England attempting to gain the return of Liam and Aiden through procedures set up by the Hague Convention. The plaintiff finally agreed to return and flew back to the United States into JFK Airport, with the defendant's sister. The plaintiff was denied entry to the United States and returned to England A short while later, the plaintiff did reenter the United States through Canada. She returned back home to live with the defendant. The plaintiff was, in all, away from the home in England until August 1999.
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction provides inter alia:
The States signatory to the present Convention,
Firmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody, Desiring to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access,
Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect, and have agreed upon the following provisions —
CHAPTER 1
SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
Article I
The objects of the present Convention are —
a. to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and
b. to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.
Article 2
Contracting States shall take all appropriate CT Page 11232-x measures to secure within their territories the implementation of the objects of the Convention. For this purpose they shall use the most expeditious procedures available.
Article 3
The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where —
a. it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and
b. at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.
Article 4
The Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights. The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.
Article 5
For the purposes of this Convention —
a. "rights of custody" shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child's place of residence;
b. "right of access" shall include the right to take CT Page 11232-y a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child's habitual residence.
After the plaintiff's return, the defendant filed a court action for joint custody of the minor children with primary residence to him, though the parties were all under one roof and no divorce action existed. The defendant did this so that, in his mind, he was protected if the plaintiff were to want to leave the country for England again with the boys. The plaintiff acquiesced and signed an agreement which became a court order with these terms. This was accomplished on August 30, 1999.
Upon the return to Connecticut, the plaintiff was able to get her job back at Barker's Specialties in Cheshire and she started back there September 1999. On a daily basis, she would take the boys to a day care near her employment in the morning and pick them up in the afternoon. The defendant continued to work at CCSU, until May 2000. His contract was not renewed for reasons including his illegal immigration status and his relationship with the assistant coach, which had included a romantic relationship. Mr. Coleman had become romantically involved with the assistant coach while the plaintiff was in England in 1999. Previous to that three of them had been involved in sexual liaisons. The plaintiff asserted at trial that this was only as a result of coercion by the defendant which he denied. After listening to all of the evidence as to these three-party sexual encounters by these parties with others, the court concludes that both parties were consenting adults. Indeed, in retrospect, the plaintiff may have shame for her involvement but there is not sufficient evidence for the court to conclude it was involuntary. Of particular concern to the court is that these encounters occurred in the family home when the children were supposed to be asleep. There is no evidence that they were not asleep; the poor judgment of both of these parents in this respect is condemned.
In the spring of 2000, while the parties still lived together, they did not have a healthy, happy relationship. Many nights after the children went to bed, the defendant left the home and stayed at the home of the assistant coach. He asserts that he slept on the couch. If so, then his previously romantic relationship with her had evaporated. At the end of July 2000 the defendant moved out of the marital home and moved to Newport, Rhode Island He remained in residence there until August 2002, CT Page 11232-f when a critical chronology of events started to occur that bring the parties to their present Hobbesian situation. Initially, Mr. Coleman worked at mansions performing bartending, maintenance and associated services until somewhere around Christmas 2000 or the beginning of January 2001. Mr. Coleman started a job with Rhode Island Children and Family Services which he remained in until August 2002 when he quit. From December 2001 to August 2002, the defendant gave the plaintiff $150 per week for the household. The entire time that the defendant lived in Newport, Rhode Island he lived at the premises of Amy Kuel, taking a bedroom in her condominium unit.
While Mr. Coleman lived at Newport he visited with his children on weekends. They lived with their mother and initially she would come down on weekends with them and stay with Mr. Coleman. That arrangement continued for about one and a half years. Then the plaintiff no longer came to stay with Mr. Coleman but instead they met in Mystic, Connecticut for the exchange of the children for their weekends with their father.
In December 2001, the plaintiff moved with the boys into a house that the owners of Barker's had purchased for her to rent from them in Waterbury, Connecticut. She moved all of the family furnishings which had been in storage into the home. In August 2002 she bought the house from them; she took a mortgage for the same. The plaintiff is the only signer on the note and mortgage and the property in Waterbury is in her name alone. The defendant kept asserting at trial that he helped pay for the property because he had to provide written verification for the mortgagee that he was providing $150 per week support. Mr. Coleman had a duty to support his children then (and still does now) regardless of whether the plaintiff was renting or buying her home with the children.
After the plaintiff moved into her home at the end of 2001, the defendant would occasionally come up on weekends to see the children there. The parties were apparently keeping up marital relations in this period of time: the plaintiff had become pregnant and miscarried in March 2002. The defendant was not terribly supportive, telling her, essentially, to get counseling if she wanted emotional support. Then when she bought the house in the end of August 2002, Mr. Coleman, over her objections, started moving his belongings into her home. She asserts that he knew she was then dating Michael Barrett and he did not want her to and instead wanted them to work on her marriage. From then until the end of September, the defendant moved most all of his belongings back in the plaintiff's home and lived there. She did not bring any kind of legal action to throw him out. She relied on him for child care inasmuch as he was unemployed, having voluntarily quit his job. He occasionally had to go back to Rhode Island to finish up some classes he was leading. CT Page 11232-g
The plaintiff denies that the defendant was living with her over this period acknowledging only that he moved in only as of September 27, 2002. The defendant's driver's license listed her home address as his address. His landlady said he had moved out and had left only a box or two behind that was up in her attic. The court finds based on the credible evidence that while the plaintiff would have preferred the defendant not live with her, she had acquiesced in it and allowed it from sometime in late August 2002 until October 2, 2002.
The regulations of the DMV of Connecticut for non-US citizens provides, in relevant part:
You must be a resident of Connecticut in order to obtain a driver's license in this state. If you currently hold a valid out of state license, once you have established residency, you have 30 days to obtain a Connecticut license. If you do not currently hold a valid out of state license, you must schedule an appointment for a driver's license test.
At the time of your appointment, you must show the following items:
Verification of Connecticut resident address (P.O. Box is not acceptable). Verification may be in the form of your appointment confirmation letter, a utility bill, mortgage, rental or lease agreement or postmarked mail such as magazines, letters, etc.
You will be required to show proof of your legal status in this country in addition to one form of identification from list of acceptable forms of identification. Photocopies of documents are not acceptable.
http://www.ct.gov/dmv/cwp/view.asp?a=805Q=244774dmvPNavCtr=| 28069|dmvPNavCtr=|41640|41679|#31252
How Mr. Coleman satisfied the last requirement is not before this court.
During this time in late summer 2002, at the insistence of the defendant, the Coleman family would all sit down to family meetings. Some of it was simply supportive of discussing every day activities. However, Mr. Coleman also used these opportunities to discuss with the boys that their mother had become involved with another man. Somewhere about September 12, 2002, at one of these meetings, the defendant claims that the plaintiff said she was resigning from the family and would sign a letter to that effect. She denies it. What is undisputed is that Mr. Coleman prepared a letter for her to sign that said she was resigning from the family and she never signed it. The day after that meeting, Mr. Coleman decided to pack the car and the boys to take them first to Boston, en route to taking them to England As he drove out with the packed car and the boys, he told them that they were going to see their mother at work to `give her another chance.' Mr. Coleman spent the next few hours in the parking lot of Barker's talking with the plaintiff and much of the time, as well, with the principal owner of Barker's, Gerry Barker. The children were at the parking lot the whole time, though no one knows that they heard the conversation. The upshot of it all was that the defendant returned to the plaintiff's home with the children, and she went there as well. At one point, while driving his car, speaking on the cell phone, the defendant pleaded with the plaintiff to choose him and the boys over Michael Barrett.
On Saturday, September 28, 2002, the plaintiff told the defendant that she was going with her friend Heather to an evening function for work. She in fact was going to meet Michael Barrett. It came to pass that her car did not work and she stayed out all night. When she was gone until what was well past the time the defendant had expected her home, he called Heather's father and Michael Barrett's parents' home, as well as the Springfield, Mass. police and the Waterbury police to file a missing person report regarding the plaintiff.
The court declines to include the full names of some of these people in the decision, though they are well known to the parties and the court; this individual testified at trial.
The next morning, Sunday, September 29, 2002, the plaintiff had her car towed to an auto repair place in Cheshire. She called the defendant to pick her up and he declined. She also called Heather for a ride. Heather CT Page 11232-h came with her sister to pick her up and as they pulled into the parking lot, so did Mr. Coleman. Heather and her sister called the Cheshire police fearing the defendant's attitude toward the plaintiff; they arrived very quickly. The Cheshire police came and interviewed the plaintiff, away from the defendant and determined that she did not fear him and felt safe going home. The plaintiff claims that she told the officer that she feared for her life; after examination of the Cheshire Police Incident Report, the court finds that she never said this to the officer.
The parties went back to the home in Waterbury; one of them called the children's babysitter to come be with the children for a few hours, out of the house while they talked. During those few hours, the parties discussed their marriage and divorce. The defendant told the plaintiff that he was going to go to the court the next day and ask for a court order of sole custody, that she was going to have to be in his sight all the time and not return to work until he left with the boys for England After a few hours, the babysitter returned the children. She saw the plaintiff and saw no marks or bruises on her, and other than exhaustion, did not see the plaintiff looking upset or otherwise disturbed. Later that day, in the early evening, the parties took the children for ice cream and met Heather and her friend Joe (apparently facile with automobile mechanics) at the Cheshire parking place and examined the plaintiff's car. The battery was temporarily charged and then the car was driven back to the home in Waterbury where the battery then died.
The next day, Monday, September 30, 2002, the parties dropped Liam at school, went to the courthouse in Waterbury, where the defendant filed papers seeking sole custody, which the plaintiff was served with, and then went to the Brass City Mall. There is dispute in the testimony of the parties and fog in the memory of other witnesses as to whether the plaintiff went to work for a couple of hours that day. Certainly the parties were functioning with only one automobile. After Liam was picked up, the whole family drove to Newport, where the defendant had to give a last class. The plaintiff was there. Then they went to his former landlady's house. While the plaintiff and children visited, the defendant went upstairs into the attic to retrieve a carton of belongings. The family returned to Waterbury.
The next day, Tuesday, October 1, 2002 and Wednesday, October 2, 2002 the plaintiff went to work at Barker's. The defendant drove her to and from work. Over those two days he bought a battery for the plaintiff's car, discovered it was the wrong one, bought another and installed it. On October 2nd, the defendant went to see about some bunk beds for the boys that he had answered an ad to buy. He rented a U-Haul for but it turned out the owner had sold them to another person. The defendant is sure the CT Page 11232-i plaintiff gave him her ATM card and a check for alternate means for the purchase depending what the seller would want. In any case those items remained in his possession.
On Thursday morning, the plaintiff told Heather that her husband had raped her. She invited Heather to dinner at the Coleman home that evening. Heather drove her to the house and ate dinner there. Plaintiff claims Heather left at around 10 or 10:30 p.m. She also testified that she does not recall going to sleep herself that night. The defendant claims Heather stayed late into the night engaging in intimate relations with both of the parties. Heather testified that she has no memory of what happened after dinner that evening.
The next day, the plaintiff went to work and then met with her lawyer, went to the police and gave a statement. The police, without further investigation, went in force to the house, and knocked on the door. The defendant opened the door, let them in and after a brief inquiry was arrested. He was charged with trespass, larceny and threatening. He was unable to post the bond set. While being held on those charges, he was then subsequently arrested on a warrant for sexual assault in the first degree on a spouse. He was unable to post the bond for the combined charges until December 4, 2002. And therefore remained incarcerated from October 4, 2002 until that date. As one of the conditions of his release his UK passport was surrendered to the clerk of the Waterbury criminal court. For reasons that are not clear, the plaintiff and the minor children's passports were also handed over to that clerk's office and remain there without any court order.
A protective order was issued by the criminal court, providing for no contact between the defendant and the plaintiff, and the minor children. The defendant was informed that the presiding criminal court judge would consider a modification of that protective order to allow for visitation contact of the defendant with the children. Somehow, those comments were construed to mean that the visitation could be set up if allowed by the family court, with out further criminal court order.
The court will make such other findings of fact as are necessary for the disposition of the issues before the court.
B. Court proceedings
Plaintiff commenced the present divorce action shortly after the defendant's arrest. After his release from jail, the defendant became actively involved in these proceedings. On the case management date, January 30, 2003, the matter was declared to be fully contested. At that CT Page 11232-j time, the court (Leheny, J.) referred the matter to family relations for custody mediation.
On June 11, 2003, the court (Cutsumpas, J.) ordered the defendant, pendente lite to pay child support in the amount of $105 per week and "additional day care expenses in accordance with the Connecticut Child Support Guidelines."
On June 11, 2003, a psychological evaluation was ordered to be performed on the two parents by Dr. Sidney Horowitz.
On July 16, 2003, the defendant filed a motion for visitation, pendente lite. On the same date he filed; Motion for Order pendente lite (#119) seeking that the children have no contact with Michael Barrett. At this trial, the defendant seeks relief under that motion, along with Motion to restrain, pendente lite (#120) filed August 26, 2003, which seeks essentially the same relief. On September 8, 2003, the July motion for visitation was granted by agreement of the parties as follows: "the parties agree that the defendant shall have therapeutic visitation arranged immediately with Thomaston Counseling Center with his sons Liam (5/27/96) and Aden[sic] (6/10/98). The visitation shall consist of 8 visits and then upon completion either party shall file a motion to schedule future visitation."
On that same date, September 8, 2003, the defendant was found in contempt of court for failure to pay his child support order. He was ordered incarcerated with a purge amount set of $1693.00, which the court found to be the matter owed. Counsel fees were referred to a later date.
Also, a referral to family relations was granted for an evaluation in January 2003. That evaluation was completed on March 4, 2004 and filed with the court on March 11, 2004.
The guardian ad litem was appointed by the court on October 24, 2003, by the court after agreement of the parties that he be payed `at State rates.' That order was modified on December 22, 2003 to provide that the guardian would remain David Griffin, but he was not required to accept `State rates.' It was further ordered, "Guardian fees will be paid 40% by the Plaintiff and 60% by the defendant. Mrs. Coleman will pay $300 within thirty days and turn over 1/3 of her income tax return and pay $100 per month until balance is paid in full. Mr. Coleman will pay $100 on 1/15/04 and each month after."
Neither party has satisfied that court order. The plaintiff has paid, and failed to pay, and the defendant has not paid. The guardian ad litem CT Page 11232-k submitted a motion for payment of fees at trial and an affidavit to support the same. Neither party contested the time expended or the amount charged, only the allocation of order of payment. The fees charged by the guardian ad litem are found to be fair and reasonable.
On January 2, 2004, the defendant filed a motion for return of personal property, including a briefcase, his Social Security Card, a red cartoon folder, his clothing and shoes and work-related coaching supplies. On a certain date not provided in the order by the court, but coded in on May 25, 2004, the court (Resha, J.). Ordered the parties, the plaintiff's attorney and the guardian ad litem to go to the house to search and retrieve these items. Some were found, but notably not the briefcase or red cartoon folder. Those retrieved were brought back to the court by the guardian (by court order) and ordered turned over to the defendant. The evidence at trial disclosed that at the time the court ordered the parties to go to the house directly with no contact with others, and the plaintiff did, anyway, call to her home and speak with Michael Barrett who was there.
As a result of viewing the plaintiff's home on the surprise visit, the guardian reported the conditions of the home on the DCF hotline as a mandatory reporter. He believed the clutter to be so severe that it was unsafe for his wards. DCF followed it up with a visit some days later and at that time found the home tidy and closed the file on this.
On January 2, 2004, the defendant also filed a motion to modify visitation pendente lite, which sought unsupervised visitation for him with his children. On January 12, 2004, by agreement of the parties the matter was continued to February 9, 2004 and the court ordered by the parties' agreement, that "during the interim period father will have supervised visitation with the two minor children at the Thomaston Counseling Center under the same terms and conditions as previously ordered on 9/8/03. The parties will cooperate in allowing the GAL to observe a visitation between father and children." It came to pass that the GAL had the opportunity to witness two such visits. On February 9, 2004, the court (Resha, J.) continued the supervised visitation.
At the same hearing, in response to another motion for contempt, the court appointed counsel for the contempt proceedings for the defendant. Also, the court order stated, "The court does not make a finding of willful contempt against Mr. Coleman. The court makes a finding of an arrearage in child support in the amount of $560 and orders Mr. Coleman to pay the full amount prior to March 18, 2004 court date. Mr. Coleman is ordered to pay $500 in counsel fees which shall be paid by today's date." On April 19, 2004, another motion for contempt was filed regarding child CT Page 11232-l support. On May 6, 2004, the court (Resha, J.), found the defendant in contempt and found an arrearage of $2,380, and, ordered attorneys fees of $1,300. On May 10, 2004, the same court ordered, "Upon review of this court, it appears that the plaintiff's case was not properly docketed before the court for the May 6, 2004 hearing, therefore, the court sua sponte vacates its orders pertaining to the plaintiff's motion for contempt." On May 6, 2004, the court did deny a motion to modify child support that had been filed by the defendant. That ordered remained intact.
Thereafter, the matter was before the RFTD and tried to conclusion.
C. Discussion of Facts and Law
The parties have each sought sole custody of their two boys.
General Statutes 46b-56(a) provides: "Subject to the provisions of section 46b-56a, the court may assign the custody of any child to the parents jointly, according to its best judgment upon the facts of the case and subject to such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable."
General Statutes 46b-56a provides:
(a) For the purposes of this section, joint custody means an order awarding legal custody of the minor child to both parents, providing for joint decision-making by the parents and providing that CT Page 11232-z physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure the child of continuing contact with both parents. The court may award joint legal custody without awarding joint physical custody where the parents have agreed to merely joint legal custody.
(b) There shall be a presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child where the parents have agreed to an award of joint custody or so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the custody of the minor child or children of the marriage. If the court declines to enter an order awarding joint custody pursuant to this subsection, the court shall state in its decision the reasons for denial of an award of joint custody.
(c) If only one parent seeks an order of joint custody upon a motion duly made, the court may order both parties to submit to conciliation at their own expense with the costs of such conciliation to be borne by the parties as the court directs according to each party's ability to pay.
"The statute, read as a whole, reflects a legislative belief that joint custody cannot work unless both patties are united in its purposes. Therefore, joint custody cannot be an alternative to a sole custody award where neither seeks it and where no opportunity is given to the recalcitrant parent to embrace the concept. Further, it is significant that the statute contains no additional subsection providing for a procedure in the event neither parent seeks joint custody." Emerick v. Emerick, 5 Conn.App. 649, 658, 502 A.2d 933 (1985). Therefore, the court is constrained to order sole custody of the minor children to either their mother or their father. General Statutes § 46b-56(b) provides in relevant part: "In making or modifying any order with respect to custody or visitation, the court shall (1) be guided by the best interests of the child, giving consideration to the wishes of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent preference, provided in making the initial order the court may take into consideration the causes for dissolution of the marriage or legal separation if such causes are relevant in a determination of the best interests of the child . . ."
Among the various factors the court may consider when determining the best interest of the child are the parties' parenting skills; Knock v. Knock, 224 Conn. 776, 785, 621 A.2d 267 (1993); the child's emotional ties to each parent; Seymour v. Seymour, 180 Conn. 705, 711, 433 A.2d 1005 (1980); the psychological instability of the parent and whether the child CT Page 11232-m is in a stable and loving environment. Schult v. Schult, 241 Conn. 767, 777, 699 A.2d 134 (1997); see also Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 180 Conn. 533, 541, 429 A.2d 801 (1980). The court may also take into account the recommendations of the child's therapist; see Szczerkowski v. Karmelowicz, 60 Conn.App. 429, 433-34, 759 A.2d 1050 (2000); In re David E., 4 Conn.App. 653, 657, 496 A.2d 229 (1985); and the child's guardian ad litem. See Schult v. Schult, supra, 779 ("the guardian ad litem is the representative of the child's best interests")." Janik v. Janik, 61 Conn.App. 175, 181, 763 A.2d 65 (2000).
Until October 4, 20002, at different times during their marriage, each party has been actively involved in the upbringing of these two boys. Their parenting styles have differed significantly. The plaintiff, by all of the evidence is a loving, nurturing parent who provides a laid back, easy going environment for the children. It undoubtedly has helped support their sense of adventure, play and humor that emerged vividly from the evidence. At the same time, an outgrowth of the same, is a circumstance where the plaintiff has difficulty having the children mind her, or be responsive to her parenting direction in a timely and useful manner. This has played out in behavioral problems at school — one of the boys being described as the class clown, and, in social situations. The family relations officer observed that the children in the mother's care are `wild' at times. Similar observations were made by the visitation supervisor in her brief opportunities to see the children with the mother when she dropped them off. Their guardian describes them with their mom in a more circumspect way but still unruly. On the other hand, by all the evidence, the defendant is a loving, nurturing parent who provides a firm set of social boundaries for the boys which results in their quick responsiveness to his admonishments to them. When observed by others, the boys' presentation when in the care of their father is entirely appropriate. Each parent would have the court conclude that the other's parenting style is in the extreme. Contrary to that, the court finds that they complement each other, and provide the children a respite one from the other. Neither parent is so extreme in their respective parenting styles that they fail to give the children the nurturance, guidance they need and both parents support the children's creativity, intellect, and spontaneity in their parenting style.
The problems in this case really have nothing to do with the children but they have come out the losers. It is a pitted battle between a wife who claims her husband is a controlling and abusive man who has sexually assaulted her and physically held her hostage, and a husband who claims that his wife has used her allegations to deprive him, literally, of his physical liberty, alienate him from his children, and gain tactical legal advantage in the proceedings before this court. The result for the CT Page 11232-n children is an extremely limited and unnatural relationship with their father, and, only one active day to day parent in their lives where they clearly need two for their healthy development.
The defendant claims that the plaintiff's composite behavior toward him is part and parcel of his being victim to parental alienation syndrome. The court restricted the defendant on this reminding him that he had no expert to establish the viability of such a syndrome and its connection to his situation. Connecticut courts have not, as a matter of law, recognized parental alienation syndrome. "As we will discuss, the court made a factual finding that the plaintiff had engaged in parental alienation. The plaintiff's claim concerning parental alienation dealt with the issue of the validity of a finding of parental alienation syndrome. The court did not address any potential mental health condition. This opinion utilizes the court's factual conclusion that the plaintiff's activity as a parent alienated the defendant, and this court makes no decision concerning the validity of such a syndrome." Ruggiero v. Ruggerio, 76 Conn.App. 338, 349, 819 A.2d 864 (2003). Therefore, the conduct that the plaintiff complains of is examined in the context of whether the plaintiff has fostered the relationship of the children or undermined or restricted it (and, if so, for what reasons).
In one trial court decision, the court implicitly accepted the notion of the validity of parental alienation syndrome: "There is evidence that the plaintiff has engaged in negative behavior towards the defendant in front of the children, which adversely impacts their perceptions of him. She has made disparaging remarks about the defendant regarding child support, these court proceedings, her opinions of his motivation for custody, and other issues. These types of statements can lead to the Parental Alienation Syndrome. Joseph's view of his father is quite positive and does not appear to have been affected by the plaintiff's comments. Andrew, on the other hand, has become alienated from his father, which is partially due to this alienating behavior." Metza v. Metza, No. FA92 029 82 02 S, 1998 Ct.Sup. 10907 (Sep. 25, 1998). However, a review of the literature of the late Dr. Richard A. Gardner, the major proponent of the viability of the notion of parental alienation syndrome, suggests that a confluence of circumstances more than `mere CT Page 11232-aa parental alienation' must be present for his diagnosis of the syndrome. Accordingly, while Metza does not itself, in any case, establish the viability of recognizing the syndrome in the courts of Connecticut, this court would have to distinguish this case even if it did. The issue remains one for another date and need not be reached here. "This court need not reach the question of the reliability of the claims of the theoreticians espousing the parental alienation syndrome. Whether it is legitimate or not is not a determination necessary for a proper determination of the custodial orders in this case." Bowles v. Bowles, No. 356104, 1997 Ct.Sup. 9863, 9869-70 (Aug. 8, 1997).
The original order for the defendant's visitation with his children to be supervised was for an eight-week session. The sessions were all supervised. The supervisor issued a supervised visitation report on December 20, 2003, after observing eight visits as mandated by the court. The supervisor observed that the defendant was in every respect an appropriate parent with his children. He focused on the children throughout the visits, was able to divide his time equally with the children and also have them in activities together, he utilized praise and encouragement in each visit, was aware of safety issues, encouraged them to clean up after themselves, was able to redirect their behaviors and praise their good behaviors, was appropriately affectionate and handled their difficult questions (regarding their circumstances) and provided them appropriate answers. The supervisor concluded, "Mr. Coleman. Liam and Aiden interacted well during the supervised visitations and enjoyed their time together. Based upon my clinical observations, I see no need to continue with supervised visitation. Mr. Coleman was able to set structure and boundaries throughout the visits, also reinforcing the rules . . . Liam and Aiden will benefit from therapy to address the current and past issues and this will allow the children to have an opportunity to express their overwhelming feelings regarding the current situation and any conflicts in the past."
The supervision has not been eliminated. The only reason the court can CT Page 11232-o conclude is because the plaintiff has steadfastly opposed it, and, then when it became apparent that all of the professionals were going to recommend the elimination of the supervision she has interposed other barriers to unsupervised visitation: that she believes Mr. Coleman is a flight risk, and that the visits should not be in Rhode Island, where he lives. As to the latter, it is clearly a newly acquired attitude of the plaintiff's that the children should not visit their father in Rhode Island, for she allowed and facilitated it for one and one-half years during their marriage.
The court is disinclined to view Mr. Coleman as any substantial flight risk. As between the parties, it is the plaintiff who went back to England on multiple occasions, not the defendant. The defendant's passport is being held by the Waterbury clerk's office. Finally, the defendant does not have substantial resources to rely on if he were to go missing. The court does not perceive the defendant to be a flight risk under the present circumstances. The only circumstance that might increase the likelihood of a flight risk would be if Mr. Coleman were to be convicted of a serous criminal offense. If that were to occur, it is the province of the criminal court to address the issue of his likelihood of flight.
There is no substantial or credible reason for Mr. Coleman not to have had unsupervised and significant contact with his children since the December 2003 supervisor's report, and, after the trial there remains no reason.
The court then must go on to reach the other major custodial question before it: both of the parents are seeking sole legal custody of the children. Ironically, the plaintiff does not assert fear of the defendant or some other similar apprehension as her reason for failing to confer with and work with the defendant on decision-making for the children. Instead, she testified that joint custody is not possible, that she has done a great job, that Mr. Coleman decided to leave the family, that he did not want to be a father, and only when she wanted a relationship with another man, he showed sudden attachment to the children and family. Further as her reasons that joint custody will not work, the plaintiff asserted that she is very stable with a job and house and Mr. Coleman is in Newport, that the children have schedules and activities in Connecticut and are well adjusted to visiting their father one or two days a week in Newport, and that the children should thus stay in Connecticut. She further pointed out that he does not live in Connecticut, he has no home of his own and no job, so how could he share joint custody, she wondered aloud. Then, only when prodded by counsel, the plaintiff points to the protective order, a full no contact order, as CT Page 11232-p the reason joint custody is not possible. From observing the plaintiff and listening to her testimony, the court finds that the plaintiff's objections to joint custody have no basis in fear, apprehension or concern for her well-being or the well-being of the children.
There is evidence that the boys, both bright and capable, could perform better at school and benefit from a more vigilant watch on the home front. One of the boys was not turning in homework, and their mother was not aware of it until the issue was brought to the attention of the family relations evaluator. After the mother was directed in this matter, the child's homework was more often turned in timely, though problems still remain. The active participation of both the parents in the boys' lives will undoubtedly help diminish this problem.
The family relations officer who performed a lengthy and comprehensive study of this family was ultimately of the opinion that absent a protective order and the criminal allegations, this would be a situation where she would otherwise have recommended joint legal custody. Her opinion now is that if the criminal allegations are true, then the mother should have sole custody, and if they are not true then that is a strong reason to tip the scales the other way to another wise able father who would then have been intentionally estranged from his children by their mother, and the officer would recommend sole custody to him. With the presence of the protective order the officer feels bound to recommend the children presently live with their mother. She initially did not recommend sole custody to the mother but put that language in after direction from her supervisor to do so.
The guardian ad litem recommends the immediate cessation of supervision of the time Mr. Coleman spends with the boys. He recommends a transition to overnight visitation and a utilization of an intermediary for pick up and drop off. The GAL does not believe either party is a flight risk. It is his opinion that both parents have involved the children in the adult aspects of the conflict between them unnecessarily.
The defendant, believing that he is a victim of parental alienation syndrome perpetrated by the plaintiff and fostered by court process, seeks at some point in the future to bring media attention to his plight, so that in the future, other fathers will be saved the difficulties he has experienced. This all may be well meaning, but the defendant failed to understand that this publicity might ultimately be very unsettling for the boys and undermine their ability to live their respective childhood free from the unusual scrutiny and notoriety that media attention often brings. The defendant's failure to appreciate this important aspect of protecting his children as a paramount issue is CT Page 11232-q disconcerting.
The children have lived continuously with their mother. Even before the arrest of the defendant, except for the hiatus of the month of September 2002, the children lived with their mother for one and one-half years with the tacit approval of the defendant who saw them on weekends. Though the defendant asserts that the present circumstances of his estrangement from the children being as a result of what he characterizes as false allegations, there is a long history of the children living in Connecticut; and in the latter time period, primarily with their mother. In a vacuum it can be said that both parents are capable of parenting and, in fact, the defendant may well be better equipped with parenting skills and style to handle the high energy levels of the boys. However, in the care of their mother they have largely thrived.
The court sees no reason for the continuation of the protective order as between Mr. Coleman and his children. He poses no risk to their well-being. The protective orders between the parents should also be modified to allow email contact between them as to well-being issues of the children. The court is concerned about the inability of these parents to communicate at all about their children. While the court is not in a position to determine whether the defendant raped his wife, the past sexual activities of the parties and the inconsistencies in the plaintiff's statements about the week proceeding October 2002, leads this court to the conclusion that the factual findings that will ultimately be made by a jury on this will largely be based upon credibility and are by no means conclusions that can be reached by this court without questions. Also, whatever the verdict is, it is clear that the circumstances that wrought this situation will result in lingering tension between the parties. Further, the defendant's insistence in excising Michael Barrett from the lives of the boys is inexplicably wound up in this. Whatever negative emotions he felt after realizing the importance of Mr. Barrett in his wife's life in September 2002, has seemingly not disappeared. This makes it nearly impossible for the parties to communicate at a mature and respectful level.
Further both of the parties have involved the children in their conflict: Mr. Coleman before his arrest and Mrs. Coleman during the pendency of this action. To Mr. Coleman's credit he has been able to avoid similar behavior in his supervised visits with the boys. Having observed Mr. Coleman at length through his pro se presentation of this trial, and considering his remaining and enduring feelings about Mr. Barrett and his frustration about the circumstances he is in, it is regrettably likely that he will not always exercise his better judgment when he has unsupervised access to the boys. Both parties must be vigilant to protect CT Page 11232-r the boys from these enduring issues between them.
Mr. Coleman seeks sole custody with the children primarily residing with him. His plan for caretaking the children is disorganized and insubstantial. On the one hand he asserts that they will stay with him for now in Newport, though he has done nothing to investigate the schooling for them and he is only generally aware of what is available. Nor has he created a concrete plan for child care help other than generally relying on friends. At the same time, he understands that the boys have developed important peer relationships where they live in Waterbury and he thinks that the Rotella school is "fantastic" for both boys.
Only one of the boys is in school there presently; it is a magnet school and the plaintiff has applied for the second boy and is awaiting admission for him.
"The best interests of the child include the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of its environment . . ." Schult v. Schult, 241 Conn. 767, 777, 699 A.2d 134 (1997). Mr. Coleman has offered no reason as to why he does not relocate himself to the Waterbury area. The court can only infer that Mr. Coleman does not relocate because of his financial insecurity and lack of means: he presently is able to live rent-free with Ms. Kuel in Newport, Rhode Island and no such advantage presently exists for him in the greater Waterbury area. Economic security is not an absolute test for custody, nor should it be. However, the court is confronted with a person who cannot make definitive plan because of his financial insecurity. There is no reason the children should be moved away from the security of their friends and school to a housing situation that is tenuous at best.
Rotella, being a magnet school, is a catchment for several of the area towns.
This financial insecurity of Mr. Coleman creating an instability in his housing does not appear likely to cure itself immediately. Mr. Coleman asserts that he is not working in the United States because it would be illegal to do so and such illegal activity would or could result in his bond being called, landing him back in jail. The cure to this, it would seem, is first to prevail on his criminal matters. After that, apparently, Mr. Coleman would then have the choice of working illegally with no threat of a bond being called, or finding a way to support his children while he remains unemployed and attempts to regularize his immigration status so that he could work legally. The children's sense of security and continuity in their primary home should not have to wait until Mr. Coleman sorts these Hobbesian choices out.
As to economic opportunities, it is likely that Mr. Coleman could be self supporting if he were able to work legally. He is 44 years old, with a college equivalent education in engineering, and, employment history in telecommunication engineering, coaching soccer at collegiate level and CT Page 11232-s teaching and facilitating parenting and domestic violence classes. Surely somewhere in this eclectic collection of job skills Mr. Coleman would be an attractive candidate for employment opportunities.
The defendant has been behind in his payment of child support on substantial occasions throughout the pendency of this action. Presently, as a part of this trial the court has before it a motion for contempt as a result of his accumulating child support arrearage. He has not paid his child support order since February 9, 2004, when he last was in court for a previous arrearage. Mr. Coleman's defense is that payment is an impossibility inasmuch as he is unable to work as discussed above. The court finds that while Mr. Coleman has been unable to work legally, he has been able to support himself through the regular gifts of family, for his ongoing support, and, the gift of free rent from his friend Amy Kuel. Mr. Coleman tells his family how much money he needs and they send it to him. It has averaged $210.00 per week. These have not included funds for child support. He has not even made modest payments toward child support. Pendente lite, in response to two different contempt motions he has managed to come up with lump sums when he was facing incarceration for this civil contempt. The court finds that the plaintiff has proven that the defendant understood the child support order and willingly allowed the arrearage to accumulate; it is not clear whether he could have paid everything in whole as it accumulated, under the circumstances, but he could have paid some and his unwillingness to pay any made it impossible for the court to determine what part was not within his ability to pay. The court finds the defendant in contempt of court.
As to current support, the court finds that the regularly recurring gifts of $210.00 per seek result in the Guidelines amount of a low-income obligor of $46.00 per week. The plaintiff works illegally to support the children and herself. When the defendant is no longer under a bond, he will be in the same position (just as he was up until August 2002, when he worked illegally) and should be charged with the responsibility of providing greater support to his children than he is now. Of course, once his bond is released, he always has the option of returning to the UK and working legally there.
The defendant has two outstanding pendente lite motions as well that he seeks orders for as a part of this dissolution. The motions, essentially, ask the court to issue an order restraining Michael Barrett from having any contact with the minor children, and, an order for psychological testing of the minor children. As to both, they are denied. Mr. Barrett is the boyfriend of the plaintiff, he is a fixture in the children's lives and is helpful and supportive to the plaintiff in her CT Page 11232-t parenting responsibilities for the children. His help to her in driving the children about and watching them after school has been invaluable to her. By all accounts, the children are fond of him and gain positive attention and support from him. Whether the prominence of his role in the boys' life was a good idea right after Mr. Coleman was arrested and imprisoned is another question, and, is much of what concerns the defendant. That however is not the matter before the court with this motion. Also, it would be wrong for Mr. Barrett to actually seek to replace the defendant in the lives of his children. That admonition however is a long stretch to the defendant's desire to restrain him from contact with the children. The evidence simply does not support such a request.
As to the request for the boys to be tested, the court sees no need for it in the evidence. From the evidence, it is apparent that these boys have heard much they should not, have suffered from the loss of contact and unhindered access to their father, and from the behavior of both of the parents when they all lived together. Undoubtedly, they would both benefit from counseling to address their adjustment needs.
Each of the parties has a deferred compensation plan. The plaintiff has a 401K with a value of $27,100.00. The plaintiff has a TIAA-CREF account with a value of $11,137.40. The plaintiff violated the automatic orders by selling the Honda during the pendency of this action. However, given the problems that she has had collecting support for the children from the defendant, and that for a period of time she was their sole support, the court declines to enter any orders as a result thereof.
The court orders:
1. Dissolution of marriage
2. Restoration to the plaintiff of her maiden name of Jillian Parle.
3. Sole legal custody of the minor children in the plaintiff mother, subject to reasonable rights of visitation in the defendant father, as follows, to take effect upon the termination or modification of the protective order currently in place in the matter of State of Connecticut v. William Coleman, so that this visitation is not a violation thereof.
The present visitation shall continue until then, mindful that the protective order has never been modified to allow for it, but the parents have remained in no contact and the defendant has been supervised with his children.
For three weeks, every Sunday from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m. and every Wednesday after school or at 3 p.m. to 7 p.m. to commence after modification or termination of said protective order. Thereafter, every other weekend Friday after school or at 3 p.m. when there is no school to Sunday at 7 CT Page 11232-u p.m.; and every Wednesday after school or at 3 p.m. when there is not school to Sunday at 7 p.m.; and every other Monday, to follow the weekend that is not the father's access weekend after school or at 3 p.m. when there is no school to 7 p.m. Also:
Holidays and Vacations (shall pre-empt all regular weekly visitation):
The parties shall alternate the major holidays and shall have the children with them on Mother's Day and Father's Day, respectively from 10 a.m. to 7 p.m.
While there is a no contact order between the parents as a part of the protective order, Thomaston Counseling shall be utilized for pick up and drop off for visitation. When the order is terminated or modified to allow contact in a public place, pick up and drop off shall be at the McDonald's closest to the plaintiff's residence.
The plaintiff shall not relocate the children's residence more than 30 miles without giving the defendant advance written notice not less than 90 days before the intended move. Neither party shall take the children from the United States without court order or the written permission of the other parent, which shall not be unreasonably withheld. The children currently have UK passports; copies of the same shall be provided to the defendant. In the event the children seek to acquire US passports (as minors), they may be enrolled by either parent in the United States Department of State Children's Passport Issuance Alert Program. The terms of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction apply in the event there is an abduction or wrongful retention.
4. The defendant shall pay child support in the amount of his child support arrearage of $3,384.00 at the rate of $9.20 per week in compliance with the Guidelines, Sec. 46b-215a-4a(b)(A). He shall pay current child support of $46.00 per week to the plaintiff. This order is effective from the commencement of the trial on this matter and the arrearage that has accrued to the date of this decision shall be paid in full within 90 days. As soon as the defendant is released from his bond, or gets a job, whichever shall first occur, he shall immediately give written notice of the same to the plaintiff through her counsel.
5. The plaintiff shall maintain health insurance for the benefit of the minor children, which may be the Husky plan (as it currently is). The parties shall split unreimbursed health expenditures for the minor children as follows: the plaintiff shall pay the first $100 per year per CT Page 11232-v child; thereafter she shall pay 80% and the defendant shall pay 20%; the same percentages apply to qualifying day care. These orders are in compliance with the Guidelines. The defendant shall pay such bills within 14 days of receipt of the same.
6. The plaintiff is entitled to both of the minor children as dependency exemptions. This may be reconsidered if there is a future upward modification of child support.
7. The plaintiff shall remain the sole owner of her Waterbury home and the contents therein.
8. The minor children's guardian ad litem total fees of $32,994.00 are approved. Payments of $1,000 have been received by him, $150 from the defendant and $850.00 from the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall pay $16,412.00 at the rate of $100.00 per month plus $1,000.00 within 90 days for her failure to so pay from her IRS refund as previously court ordered, and, the defendant shall pay $16,482.00 at the rate of $100.00 per month plus $1,000.00 for failure to pay previous pendente lite orders of periodic payment now currently exceeding that amount. The GAL is not precluded from bringing proceedings to secure his fees from the proceeds of the defendant's bond, if any upon its release. These obligations to the GAL as court ordered are in the nature of support, having been services rendered to the children, and therefore are intended to not be dischargeable in bankruptcy.
9. The fee of Dr. Horowitz for testifying in the amount of $1,250.00 is approved and each party shall pay half within 90 days.
10. The court retains jurisdiction over the issue of entry of an educational support order (Gen. Stat. Sec. 46b-56c).
11. The parties are each the sole owners of their respective retirement funds, free and clear of any claim of the other.
12. The court declines to order attorney fees for the plaintiff for the trial or for the contempt.
13. Each party shall retain ownership of personal property in their respective possession and are responsible for their own debts as shown on their respective financial affidavit with the exceptions of the orders entered above.
MUNRO, J. CT Page 11232-w