Coleman Engineering Co. v. North Am. Aviation, Inc.

92 Citing cases

  1. Earhart v. William Low Co.

    25 Cal.3d 503 (Cal. 1979)   Cited 44 times
    Holding that if the trial court finds plaintiff's allegations that he performed work at defendant's urging—work that the parties had long negotiated—to be true, then "the principles of fairness support plaintiff's recovery for the reasonable value of his labor"

    Indeed, the issue whether we should broaden the basis of quasi-contractual recovery so as to prevent any unconscionable injury to the plaintiff, is not a novel one for our court. In his dissenting opinion in Coleman Engineering Co. v. NorthAmerican Aviation, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 396 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 1, 420 P.2d 713], Chief Justice Traynor cogently urged that we abandon the unconscionable requirement of "benefit" to the defendant and allow recovery in quantum meruit whenever a party acts to his detriment in reliance on another's representation that he will give compensation for the detriment suffered. In Coleman, plaintiff sued for breach of a contract for the construction of missile trailers.

  2. Tanaguchi-Ruth & Assocs. v. MDI Guam Corp

    2005 Guam 7 (Guam 2005)   Cited 40 times
    In Tanaguchi-Ruth + Assocs. v. MDI Guam Corp., this court for the first time explained the doctrinal underpinnings of quantum meruit as a theory of equitable recovery in our jurisdiction.

    The trial court relied upon several California cases for this proposition. The court cited Bodmer v. Turnage, 105 Cal. App. 2d 475, 233 P.2d 157 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951), Earhart v. William Low Co., 25 Cal. 3d 503, 600 P.2d 1344, 158 Cal. Rptr. 887 (Cal. 1979), and Chief Justice Traynor's dissent in Coleman Eng'g Co. v. N. Am. Aviation, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d 396, 420 P.2d 713, 55 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal. 1967).[37] In Bodmer v. Turnage, 105 Cal. App. 2d 475, 233 P.2d 157 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951), the defendant/owner purchased lots in a desert resort development.

  3. Ted Jacob Engineering Group, Inc. v. the Ratcliff Architects

    187 Cal.App.4th 945 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 17 times
    Agreeing with the trial court that a contractor faced with a substantial change in its originally contracted scope of work, who is unable to successfully negotiate a price for that additional work, may elect to continue to work and reserve its right to subsequently obtain a judicial determination as to the value of the changes.

    Among other things, Ratcliff argued that TJEG's claims for additional work based on an increase in the basic scope of work on the project (including the additional contract administration claims) were precluded by the incorporated provisions of paragraph 5 of the Ratcliff/County Contract, and that paragraph 5.05 ("Substantial changes in the Project's scope shall provide sufficient basis for renegotiation of [Ratcliff's] fee.") was an unenforceable agreement to agree. TJEG argued that, under the authority of Coleman Engineering Co. v. North American Aviation, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 396 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 1, 420 P.2d 713] ( Coleman), such contract modifications were within the contemplation of the parties, enforceable even in the absence of prior agreement on price or cost, and required the parties to negotiate in good faith for an appropriate adjustment. In Coleman, the parties' contract (which consisted of purchase orders) included a provision that, "`Buyer reserves the right at any time to make changes in drawings and specifications.

  4. Hotel Del Coronado v. Foodservice Equipment

    783 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1986)   Cited 8 times
    Applying CA law

    See Starsky v. Williams, 512 F.2d 109, 112 (9th Cir. 1975). If an essential element of a promise is reserved for future agreement by both parties there is no legal obligation until such future agreement is made. Coleman Engineering Co. v. North American Aviation, Inc., 65 Cal.2d 396, 405, 420 P.2d 713, 719, 55 Cal.Rptr. 1, 7 (1966). However, if the term awaiting future agreement is not essential, "`each party will be forced to accept a reasonable determination of the unsettled point or if possible the unsettled point may be left unperformed and the remainder of the contract be enforced.'"

  5. Chesapeake Industries, Inc. v. Togova Enterprises

    149 Cal.App.3d 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 107 times
    Finding that the "large discrepancy" between the amount claimed, $115,000.00, and the final judgment, $34,830.04, supported the conclusion that the amount was not calculable

    One effect of this rule is to encourage mitigation of damages. ( Coleman Engineering Co. v. North American Aviation, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 396, 409 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 1, 420 P.2d 713].) ("If the rule were otherwise, a plaintiff might be encouraged to forego opportunities to mitigate damages so as not to jeopardize his right to prejudgment interest.")

  6. General Insurance Co. v. Commerce Hyatt House

    5 Cal.App.3d 460 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 32 times
    In General Ins. Co. v. Commerce Hyatt House, 5 Cal. App. 3d 460 (1970), the court affirmed an award of pre-judgment interest on amounts due to a building contractor for extra work, from the date the contractor provided an itemized accounting to the defendant, 5 Cal. App. 3d at 473-75, where "the only substantial matter in dispute was the amount to which [the defendants] were entitled by way of setoff."

    "[W]hen the exact sum of indebtedness is known or can be ascertained readily, the reason for the denial of interest does not exist ( Conderback, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 239 Cal.App.2d 664, 690 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 901]. If the amount owing can be calculated and determined from statements rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant and the statements are found to be true and correct, it is a matter of mere calculation within the statute ( Coleman Engineering Co. v. North American Aviataion, Inc., 65 Cal.2d 396, 407-408 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 1, 420 P.2d 713].)" ( Distefano v. Hall, 263 Cal.App.2d 380, 388 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 691].) In Conderback, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 239 Cal.App.2d 664, 690 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 901], it was observed that the defendant in that case could not determine the amount it owed until it received from the plaintiff a statement accompanied by supporting data from which to make the determination.

  7. Gourley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

    53 Cal.3d 121 (Cal. 1991)   Cited 79 times
    Finding that damages in action for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing relate primarily to loss caused by interference with a property right, so not subject to prejudgment interest

    Prejudgment interest is also awarded on a cost-plus contract notwithstanding that some of the cost items include percentages of the plaintiff's indirect and overhead costs. ( ColemanEngineering Co. v. North American Aviation, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 396, 407-409 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 1, 420 P.2d 713].) The fact that liability may be disputed does not preclude prejudgment interest.

  8. Westlands Water Dist. v. All Persons Interested

    95 Cal.App.5th 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 2023)   Cited 6 times
    Explaining that an essential or material term is one that is significant to the parties

    "Whether a term is ‘essential’ depends on its relative importance to the parties and whether its absence would make enforcing the remainder of the contract unfair to either party." ( Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1256, fn. 3, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, citing Coleman Engineering Co. v. North American Aviation, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 396, 417, 55 Cal.Rptr. 1, 420 P.2d 713, and City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1959) 51 Cal.2d 423, 433, 333 P.2d 745.) "When, however, ‘a contract is so uncertain and indefinite that the intention of the parties in material particulars cannot be ascertained, the contract is void and unenforceable.’ "

  9. Bay Area Luxury Homes/Stevick I v. Lee

    No. A097690 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2003)

    Where these matters are unessential, the unsettled point may simply be left unperformed and the remainder of the contract enforced as written. (Coleman Engineering Co. v. North American Aviation, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 396, 405; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1959) 51 Cal.2d 423, 433.) When they are essential, however, the agreement to agree in the future is unenforceable.

  10. KGM Harvesting Co. v. Fresh Network

    36 Cal.App.4th 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 44 times
    Declining to reduce damages for U.C.C. sale of goods because buyer was later able to make a profit, explaining “[w]hat the buyer chooses to do with that bargain is not relevant to the determination of damages under section 2712”

    The discrepancy did not "detract from the proposition that the damages [were] fixed or determinable." (See also Coleman Engineering Co. v. North American Aviation, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 396, 408-409 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 1, 420 P.2d 713], disapproved on another ground in Earhart v. William Low Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 503, 513 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 887, 600 P.2d 1344] [plaintiff's original demand was $7,000 too high due to an error in the pricing formula; court explained that "the erroneous omission of a few matters from the account or erroneous calculation of the costs do not mean that the damages are not capable of being made certain by calculation" (65 Cal.2d at p. 409.)].) Similarly in the instant case, buyer's controller's minor error did not make buyer's damages uncertain.