Boeing removed the case to federal court and on March 1, 2012, this Court dismissed all but one aspect of the complaint, in the main because the DCHRA does not cover alleged actions in Virginia. See Cole v. Boeing Co., 845 F.Supp.2d 277 (D.D.C.2012). Only Ms. Cole's claim for retaliation under the DCHRA based on facts occurring in the District of Columbia remained.
In reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), a court need not accept unsupported factual inferences or legal conclusions, but it should "review the complaint liberally, granting the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Cole v. Boeing Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d 277, 282-83 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Barr v. Clinton, 370 F.3d 1196, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Similarly, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the court may take judicial notice.” Gustave–Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F.Supp.2d 191, 196 (D.D.C.2002) (citation omitted); Cole v. Boeing Co., 845 F.Supp.2d 277, 283–84 (D.D.C.2012) (same). A court may consider extrinsic documents not expressly reference in the complaint without converting the motion to a summary judgment motion if the document is a matter of public record which the court may take judicial notice.
(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Cole v. Boeing Co., 845 F.Supp.2d 277, 283 (D.D.C. 2012)). That said, a court need not accept “inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
“If an employee is not employed in the District, ‘[e]ither the [adverse employment] decision must be made, or its effects must be felt, or both must have occurred, in the District of Columbia' for there to be jurisdiction under the DCHRA.” Cole v. Boeing Co., 845 F.Supp.2d 277, 284 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Monteilh v. AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 982 A.2d 301, 305 (D.C. 2009)). In other words, “[t]he DCHRA is not extraterritorial; it does not and cannot secure an end to discrimination in jurisdictions outside of the District of Columbia.”
The DCHRA does not apply extraterritorially. Cole v. Boeing Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d 277, 284 (D.D.C. 2012). "[F]or the DCHRA to apply to a set of facts, '[e]ither the decision must be made, or its effects must be felt, or both must have occurred, in the District of Columbia.'"
In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court may consider "the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the court may take judicial notice." Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao , 226 F.Supp.2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002) ; see alsoCole v. Boeing Co. , 845 F.Supp.2d 277, 283–84 (D.D.C. 2012) (same). "A court may consider extrinsic documents not expressly referenced in the complaint without converting the motion to a summary judgment motion if the document is a matter of public record [of] which the court may take judicial notice."
01 (emphasis added); see Monteilh v. AFSCME, 982 A.2d 301, 305 (D.C. 2009) (finding that the DCHRA applies where "[e]ither the decision must be made, or its effects must be felt, or both must have occurred, in the District of Columbia"). It "is not extraterritorial; it does not and cannot secure an end to discrimination in jurisdictions outside of the District of Columbia." Cole v. Boeing Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d 277, 284 (D.D.C. 2012). Absent any allegation that any discriminatory action occurred in the District or that its effects were felt in the District, plaintiff cannot sustain a DCHRA claim.
"The DCHRA is not extraterritorial; it does not and cannot secure an end to discrimination in jurisdictions outside of the District of Columbia." Cole v. Boeing Co. , 845 F.Supp.2d 277, 284 (D.D.C. 2012). Accordingly, for the DCHRA to apply to a set of facts, "[e]ither the decision must be made, or its effects must be felt, or both must have occurred, in the District of Columbia."
"To make out a claim under the DCHRA for creating a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must prove (1) that [she] is a member of a protected class, (2) that [she] has been subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) that the harassment was based on membership in the protected class, and (4) that the harassment is severe and pervasive enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment." Cole v. Boeing Co. , 845 F.Supp.2d 277, 287 (D.D.C.2012) (citing Barrett v. Covington & Burling LLP , 979 A.2d 1239, 1245 (D.C.2009) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A work environment is actionably hostile when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult ... that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment ...."