Admission of evidence rests within the broad discretion of the district court and its ruling will not be disturbed unless it is based on an erroneous view of the law or constitutes an abuse of discretion. Colby v. Gibbons, 276 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Minn. 1979); Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Minn. 1997).

The selection of questions to be submitted to the jury as special interrogatories falls within the trial court's discretion. See Colby v. Gibbons, 276 N.W.2d 170, 178 (Minn. 1979). The formulation of special verdict questions must include questions raised by the pleading or evidence that are important to the judgment to be rendered and must be submitted to the jury to ensure the parties their constitutional right to a jury trial.

Further, the instruction was not questioned at trial and cannot be successfully challenged on appeal. Colby v. Gibbons, 276 N.W.2d 170, 178 (Minn. 1979). Equitable also objects to an instruction that employment agreements always include a covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Respondent argued at trial that the depositions should not be allowed to impeach Mr. Brandenberg since appellant called him as its own witness and failed to demonstrate it was surprised by his testimony. Respondent cites Colby v. Gibbons, 276 N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. 1979), in support of her position. The surprise doctrine has been superceded by Rule 607, Minn.R.Evid. which permits any party to attack the credibility of a witness.

2000); State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 101 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1132, 101 S.Ct. 954, 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981) (holding that rulings under rule 403 are committed to the sound discretion of the district court); Colby v. Gibbons, 276 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Minn. 1979), reh'g denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 1979); Hiedeman v. Hiedeman, 290 Minn. 210, 217, 187 N.W.2d 119, 124 (1971). Here, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the alleged evidence because of its cumulative nature when, at the very worst, the evidence was only marginally repetitive and it was highly probative.

Objection, however, was made in the company's motion for a new trial. The court of appeals relied on our holding in Colby v. Gibbons, 276 N.W.2d 170, 178 (Minn. 1979), that objections to jury instructions not made prior to jury sequestration could not be heard on review. Colby, however, involved objections to the wording of instructions.

" Under Minnesota law, rulings on the admissibility of evidence are left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Colby v. Gibbons, 276 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Minn. 1979). The record in this case does not support a finding that the trial court abused its discretion.

We first note that evidentiary rulings on materiality, foundation, remoteness, relevancy, or the cumulative nature of the evidence are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will only be the basis for reversal where that discretion has been clearly abused. See, e.g., Hiedeman v. Hiedeman, 290 Minn. 210, 187 N.W.2d 119 (1971); Colby v. Gibbons, 276 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Minn. 1979). Further, as we stated in Poppenhagen v. Sornsin Construction Co., 300 Minn. 73 at 79-80, 220 N.W.2d 281 at 286 (1974), in construing Minn.R.Civ.P. 61, "before an error in the exclusion of evidence may be grounds for a new trial, it must appear that such evidence might reasonably have changed the result of the trial if it had been admitted."

Because Bliss approved the instructions and failed to make any objection before the jury retired, the objections are waived. See Colby v. Gibbons, 276 N.W.2d 170, 178 (Minn. 1979) (stating that to preserve an objection to jury instructions for appellate review, a party must object before the jury retires). VI.

On this record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this evidence. See Colby v. Gibbons, 276 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Minn. 1979) (stating that an evidentiary ruling is not a ground for a new trial unless the ruling was an abuse of the district court's discretion). C. Prohibition of Identifying A.L.S.