Opinion
C.A. No. 06C-12-008 THG.
Date Submitted: March 12, 2007.
Date Decided: June 5, 2007.
Tasha Marie Stevens, Esquire, 28 The Circle, Georgetown, DE 19947, attorney for plaintiff.
A. Dean Betts, Jr., Esquire, 15 South Race Street, Georgetown, DE 19947, attorney for defendants.
ORDER
On this 5th day of June, 2007, upon consideration of the complaint in this matter, the Commissioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendations dated May 14, 2007, and the record in this case, it appears that:
1) Dr. Joseph P. Coladonato ("plaintiff") filed the complaint in this matter maintaining that he was the owner of a 2002 red two-door Cadillac Eldorado, vehicle identification number 1G6EC12972B106518 ("the Cadillac") and seeking the return thereof from defendants William and Aileen Watkins ("defendants"). Plaintiff also sought diminution in the value of the Cadillac during the time defendants have possessed it, costs, interest and attorneys' fees.
2) The Court referred the matter to Superior Court Commissioner Alicia B. Howard pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 512(b) and Superior Court Civil Rule 132(a)(4) for purposes of making findings of fact and reaching conclusions of law. The Commissioner has filed Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendations dated May 14, 2007, wherein she finds plaintiff is the owner of the Cadillac and consequently, entitled to possession thereof and she recommends that the Superior Court enter an order mandating the following: plaintiff is entitled to costs, defendants shall turn over possession to plaintiff of the Cadillac, defendants shall cooperate with the transfer to plaintiff of the title to the Cadillac and pay to Delaware's Department of Motor Vehicles all fees and costs incurred in transferring the title to plaintiff; Delaware's Department of Motor Vehicles shall transfer to plaintiff title to the Cadillac; and plaintiff is not entitled to any award for diminution in the Cadillac's value, interest or attorneys' fees. The Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendations are attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference.
3) No objections to the Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendations have been filed;
NOW, THEREFORE, after careful and de novo review of the record in this action, and for the reasons stated in the Commissioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendations dated May 14, 2007,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) The Court adopts the well-reasoned Commissioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendations;
(2) Plaintiff is entitled to Court costs:
(3) Defendants shall turn over possession to plaintiff of the 2002 red two-door Cadillac Eldorado, vehicle identification number 1G6EC12972B106518.
(4) Defendants shall cooperate with the transfer to plaintiff of the title to the 2002 red two-door Cadillac Eldorado, vehicle identification number 1G6EC12972B106518, and shall pay to Delaware's Department of Motor Vehicles all fees and costs incurred in transferring the title to plaintiff.
(5) Delaware's Department of Motor Vehicles shall transfer to plaintiff title to the 2002 red two-door Cadillac Eldorado, vehicle identification number 1G6EC12972B106518.
(6) Plaintiff is not entitled to any award for diminution in the car's value, interest or
attorneys' fees.
COMMISSIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS EXHIBIT A
This is an action in replevin, trover and conversion which Joseph P. Coladonato, M.D. has filed against William and Aileen Watkins (collectively, "defendants") regarding a 2002 red two-door Cadillac Eldorado, vehicle identification number 1G6EC12972B106518 ("the Cadillac" or "the car"). The matter was referred to the Commissioner pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 512(b). An evidentiary hearing was held on March 12, 2007. This constitutes my proposed findings of fact and recommendations this 14th day of May, 2007.
SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
Each party presented witnesses and introduced documents in support of their case. I summarize this testimony and reference, where appropriate, the exhibits submitted in support of certain statements.a) Joseph Paul Coladonato, M.D.
A summary of the testimony of Joseph Paul Coladonato, M.D. ("plaintiff") follows.
Plaintiff purchased the Cadillac in 2001. Neither defendant made any monetary contribution towards the purchase of the Cadillac. He titled it in New Jersey in February, 2004, when he moved to that state from Pennsylvania. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
He was arrested in New Jersey in August, 2004, for the attempted murders of his wife and brother-in-law. His assets were frozen. The bond holding him on these charges was $400,000.00. ABC Bail Bond s, In c. (" ABC"), t he bonding c omp any, pos ted the bon d. P lai nti ff had t o pay a premium to ABC in the amount of $40,000.00. Because his assets were frozen, defendants, who are plaintiff's sister and brother-in-law, put up $20,000.00 of that amount. Defendants wrote a check to ABC on August 11, 2004. Defendants' Exhibit 1.
Plaintiff's attorney in New Jersey provided the other $20,000.00.
ABC required the signing of a document containing a contingent promissory note and indemnity agreement ("contingent promissory note/indemnity agreement") in connection with this bond. Defendants' Exhibit 1. Plaintiff, not defendants, signed this contingent promissory note/indemnity agreement.
Plaintiff was released from jail on August 13, 2004, and accompanied defendants to their home in Seaford, Delaware.
Plaintiff was suicidal at this time. Plaintiff talked about killing himself in the Cadillac and his sister told him that she would prefer he killed himself in their older car rather than the Cadillac. Plaintiff told defendants that since they had put up their own money towards the bond, he would title the Cadillac in his sister's name. He wanted to make sure that defendants would be repaid when he killed himself.
On August 16, 2004, plaintiff and defendants went to the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") and they put the title in Aileen Watkins' ("Aileen") name only. Defendants' Exhibit 2.
On August 24, 2004, plaintiff was arrested again, this time for trying to buy a gun, which was a violation of a court order. He attempted to buy a gun so he could kill himself.
The $400,000.00 bond was revoked since plaintiff was arrested on new charges.
In September, 2004, while he was incarcerated, plaintiff had access to money. Plaintiff wrote two checks to Aileen. On September 2, 2004, he wrote a check for $10,000.00, which had on the memorandum line: "Partial Loan Payment". Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. On September 16, 2004, he wrote another check for $15,000.00, to Aileen, which was deposited and which had on the memorandum line: "$ 10,000 Repay $5,000 Exp." Id. Thus, as of September 16, 2004, plaintiff had repaid defendants the $20,000.00 they had paid towards his bond. Plaintiff also contends that Jeffrey C. Zucker, Esquire ("Zucker"), his New Jersey attorney, gave defendants $20,000.00 for the bond posted in November, 2004. Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. There was confusing testimony about problems with money transfers. However, the bottom line is defendants were repaid the $20,000.00 they paid ABC for plaintiff's bond.
While he was incarcerated, Aileen handled plaintiff's bills and undertook some tasks for him. She either would write checks on his account or she would submit an itemization of expenses to Zucker for payments. Plaintiff's Exhibits 3 and 4. Plaintiff gave William Watkins ("William") his power of attorney.
During this incarceration, there was much correspondence between plaintiff and defendants. Plaintiff recognized that no one else in his family was willing to get him out on bond. He was very appreciative of all defendants did for him and he thanked them frequently. However, there was no mention of the car during these letters. He never stated he was giving them his car in exchange for their kindness.
On cross-examination, it was pointed out that during this time, plaintiff gave defendants movies he owned.
This fact is important for establishing that plaintiff gave defendants gifts and then either took, or attempted to take, them back.
Plaintiff was held on federal charges arising from the attempted gun purchase until June, 2005. He was sentenced to time served in June, 2005. He then was transferred back to New Jersey's criminal system. Upon his transfer back to New Jersey, a new bond amount was set. One bond amount was $700,000.00 and the other was $25,000.00.
ABC charged a premium of $72,500.00 for these bonds. Defendants' Exhibit 3. On June 16, 2005, defendants paid $30,000.00 of their money towards the bond.Id. Zucker transferred the $20,000.00 paid on the first bond to this bond premium. $22,500.00 remained outstanding, and defendants were liable on that amount.
Later testimony established that plaintiff's new wife paid this amount in January, 2007. Plaintiff's Exhibit 10
There were two contingent promissory notes/indemnity agreements required for these bonds; one was for $700,000.00 and the other was for $25,000.00. Defendants' Exhibit 3. This time, defendants, rather than plaintiff, signed the contingent promissory notes/indemnity agreements. Each document provides that if plaintiff should fail to appear for court appearances as ordered, then defendants must repay the bond company the full amount that ABC would lose due to plaintiff's failure to appear.
For some reason, the witnesses referred only to the $700,000.00 contingent promissory note/indemnity agreement. Although there is an additional $25,000.00 contingent promissory note/indemnity agreement on which defendants are liable, I will adopt the parties' references to $700,000.00 rather than $725,000.00.
Plaintiff's divorce became final and his assets were freed up. Plaintiff repaid defendants various monies defendants had advanced and interest thereon on August 9, 2005, by a check in the amount of $25,125.00 made out to William. Plaintiff no longer owed defendants any monies for reimbursement purposes.
Although plaintiff testified he did not owe defendants any more money at that time, he did to the extent they were obligated for the $22,500.00 premium noted above. He did not, however, owe them for any more monies they actually had advanced.
On September 28, 2005, the Cadillac was retitled from Aileen's name only to Aileen C. Watkins /or Joseph P. Coladonato. Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. Plaintiff did not place the title in his name alone so that defendants might enjoy a financial benefit; it was less expensive to have three people and three vehicles on the insurance policy than to have just two. Defendants' insurance premium went down by $200.00.
Plaintiff had total, exclusive use of the Cadillac. Only he maintained it. He paid the gas. He put a trailer hitch on it. Once, defendants asked to borrow it to take it on a trip to the Carolinas, and he gave them permission to use it for that trip. The battery died while they were on that trip; defendants paid for a replacement battery at plaintiffs suggestion.
During March, 2006 through May, 2006, defendants were traveling. Defendants returned in early May, 2006.
Plaintiff was scheduled to be married on May 28, 2006. Plaintiff had asked William to be his best man. In early May, Aileen told plaintiff that William did not want to be his best man. Plaintiff did not speak to William about this change of heart. Plaintiff denied this episode provoked him into asking for the car's return. Plaintiff planned to be included on his new wife's insurance. He wanted to put the Cadillac's title in his name alone. He talked to Aileen about going to DMV to retitle the Cadillac, but she said she was not able to go because she was sick.
Although plaintiff would not characterize what happened as a "falling out", he acknowledged a strain with defendants at this time. He was marrying defendant's priest and they were not happy about that situation. They voiced concerns to his fiance' but his fiance' did not tell him about these concerns until after the wedding.
Aileen demanded that plaintiff become responsible on the bond. He offered to indemnify defendants if they ended up paying on the bond. They would not agree to this arrangement because it required that they continue to be responsible for any default. Defendants would not accept a personal note because they were not relieved of the $700,000.00 obligation.
On May 23, 2006, the car was retitled to Aileen C. Watkins /or William L. Watkins. Plaintiff's Exhibit 7. Plaintiff had nothing to do with this retitling.
On May 24, 2006, Aileen appeared at plaintiff's residence with the title in her name and the Delaware State Police. She took the Cadillac.
Plaintiff denied he was involved in a car accident in New Jersey in May, 2006.
Plaintiff has appeared at all of his court appearances.
Plaintiff never promised Aileen the vehicle. It was in her name only while he owed defendants the money for the bail.
Plaintiff acknowledged that at no point was he listed on the title as a lienholder.
Defendants have driven the vehicle 7,000 miles since they took it. Plaintiff seeks to recover the diminution in value due to their driving it. He submitted information showing the value of the car before the 7,000 miles and that showing the value after the 7,000 miles. Plaintiff's Exhibit 8.
b) Reverend Jeanne Kirby-Coladonato
Plaintiff called the Reverend Jeanne Kirby-Coladonato to testify. Her testimony is summarized below.
She married plaintiff on May 28, 2006.
She has known defendants for about three years. They became parishioners at the Church where she is the Priest/Rector. She had a wonderful relationship with defendants up until they returned from their trip in May, 2006. She does not know why the relationship changed then.
Whe n de fend ants returned from th eir trip in May, 200 6, A ile en ca lled Revere nd Kirb y-Coladonato and told Reverend Kirby-Coladonato that she had to take complete control of plaintiff. The $700,000.00 bond was addressed. Defendants also expressed disapproval of the marriage. Aileen asked Reverend Kirby-Coladonato to postpone the wedding.
Defendants sent an e-mail dated May 23, 2006, to members of their Bible Study Group informing those members that defendants were uncomfortable with the impending marriage, relating their request that Reverend Kirby-Coladonato postpone it, and telling the recipients that defendants would not be attending the wedding. Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.
On May 23, 2006, defendants sent Reverend Kirby-Coladonato an e-mail stating the following:
Due to insurance issues, we need to have the Eldorado returned to our possession as soon as possible. We were notified by the NJ State Police that Joe was involved in a hit and run accident on Monday. We want the car delivered to our drive way with both sets of keys today or tomorrow morning.
We will keep the car in our possession until we have the suitable promissory note for $700,000; after that time we will discuss sale of the car to you and Joe.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.
She believes defendants did receive a call from the New Jersey State Police about a hit and run involving the car.
Defendants wanted to be removed from the bond. Plaintiff had inquired about substituting himself on the bond, but was told that it was not allowed. Plaintiff offered to indemnify defendants, but they were not agreeable to that alternative.
On May 24, 2006, the car was taken from them. This was a surprise to plaintiff and Reverend Kirby-Coladonato. She testified she had not yet read the May 23, 2006 e-mail when the
car was taken.
In another e-mail dated May 25, 2006, defendants made the following pertinent statements:
*** We told you on Sunday evening that we would do everything within our legal rights to protect our financial interests. ***
***
As we have requested, we still want to settle the matter of the Promissory Note and sale of the car to you and Joe. After that is done, we need to sit down to discuss ways to salvage the relationship among the four of us.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.
An e-mail dated July 18, 2006 contains the following statements of defendants:
AS WE STATED PRIOR TO YOUR WEDDING (see email below dated 5/23/06), WHEN YOU PROVIDE US WITH A PROMISSORY NOTE FOR $700,000, WE WILL DISCUSS THE SALE OF OUR CAR TO YOU; THEN WE CAN TRY TO SALVAGE A RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE FOUR OF US. IF YOU CHOOSE NOT TO PROVIDE US A PROMISSORY NOTE BY AUGUST 1, 2006, WE WILL BE COOPERATING WITH THE PROSECUTION IN YOUR HUSBAND'S ATTEMPTED MURDER/AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CASE. IT IS OUR HOPE AND PRAYER THAT YOU RELIEVE US OF THIS FINANCIAL BURDEN SO THAT WE ARE NOT FORCED INTO THIS ACTION.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.
Defendants have contacted the prosecutor in New Jersey. There have been no further contacts between the parties about the car since the attorneys became involved.
Reverend Kirby-Coladonato made the last payment due on the bond in January, 2007. Plaintiff's Exhibit 10. Before she paid the $22,500.00 to the bond company, ABC was looking to defendants for payment. She knew the money was owed and did not think defendants should have to pay it. She paid it from her own funds.
On cross-examination, Reverend Kirby-Coladonato testified to the following.
Defendants were the only ones who helped plaintiff from the time of his arrest. Other members of his family would not help him. They led him to be the Christian he is today. He was grateful to them.
Plaintiff knew before the wedding that defendants were objecting to them getting married and that William was not going to be the best man.
Plaintiff talked to someone at the bond place and was told that in New Jersey, a bond obligat ion cann ot b e cha nged from on e per son to another. Pla int iff and /or Reveren d Kirby-Coladonato have not applied to a bonding company to be a surety. They have been told they could not do that. They had made an effort to give a promissory note. It is her understanding that defendants are on the hook for $700,000.00, but only if plaintiff does not appear at court. He has not missed any court dates.
She understands their fear of him fleeing, and in her opinion, that is the basis for "this whole bizarre situation."
She does not know if plaintiff had possession of the title after the car was put in his and Aileen's name.
She agrees defendants consider it to be their car; that is why the litigation is taking place.
c) Aileen Watkins
Defendant Aileen Watkins testified on behalf of the defense. A summary of her testimony follows.
On August 6, 2004, she received a call about plaintiff barricading himself in his home.
The police seized him. Defendants went to the police station in New Jersey. Plaintiff had been charged with two counts of attempted murder, two counts of aggravated assault, contempt of court, and discharging a weapon.
Defendants paid $20,000.00 of their funds in order to obtain a $400,000.00 bond. Defendants' Exhibit 1. Plaintiff was released to reside in their home.
On the following Thursday, plaintiff told defendants he wanted to go to New Jersey to get the title for the car. He wanted to give the car to them because they had helped him when no one else would. The next day, while plaintiff and defendants were in the car together, plaintiff told defendants he was going to give them the car, he wanted them to have it. On Monday, plaintiff asked them to go to DMV. William suggested they just put the car in Aileen's name so they would not have to pay a transfer tax. There was no mention that this car was security for the $20,000.00 defendants paid towards the bond. No notes were signed. Plaintiff gave the Cadillac to them as a gift because he was so relieved when he was released from jail. There was no real discussion of repayment.
Aileen handled plaintiff's finances. She was not worried about repayment. She thought the trial would be over in less than a year.
Plaintiff talked to her husband about purchasing a gun. Plaintiff said he was going to kill his wife. At the dinner table, he told them he tried to buy a gun but the computer was down. The next day, they arrested him. The attempted purchase of the gun delayed everything.
Defendants posted the second bond. By this time, they had been repaid by plaintiff's attorney for the monies they put up on the first bond. The attorney applied $20,000.00 posted on the original bond to the premium. They paid $30,000.00, which came from defendants' account.
A balance of $22,500.00 was owed to ABC. Defendants owed that amount until January 10, 2007. Defendants signed two promissory notes, one for $700,000.00 and the other for $25,000.00. Defendants' Exhibit 3. Defendants, to the present, continue to be liable on the contingent promissory notes/indemnity agreements. Defendants' Exhibit 9.
The car never came up after plaintiff repaid them. The car was given to them as a gift. Plaintiff insisted they take the car as a gift.
In June, 2005, when he was released from jail the second time, Aileen told plaintiff the car was his to use as long as he was living in their home.
Defendants cancelled their vacations for two years straight to be home to help plaintiff.
The August, 2005 check for $25,125.00 from plaintiff reimbursed defendants for monies they had spent on plaintiff's behalf. However, it did not speak to the promissory note signed. Defendants continue to be liable on the bond. Defendants' Exhibit 9.
Aileen had a brain tumor in December, 2003. In June, 2004, she was having recurring headaches. In September, 2005, she added plaintiff's name to the car's title because she did not want there to be a problem with probate if something happened to her. She was willing to give the car back to plaintiff if something happened. It was her idea to retitle the car. Plaintiff never came to her and said, "Give me the car back." When the car was transferred, there was no discussion about it being his car. The change in the title was strictly for probate reasons.
Plaintiff had full use of the car and he signed the registration. Aileen maintained the title in her safe deposit box.
Defendants added plaintiff as a driver on their insurance policy. He was covered as long as he was living in their home.
While defendants were on their trip in the spring of 2006, plaintiff was to take care of their home and to feed the cat. He did neither. Plaintiff started moving out and he took some things that were theirs. He never told them he was moving out. There was no mention that plaintiff planned to move out before the marriage. Plaintiff left their home in poor condition. This was not the proper way to show his gratitude.
Defendants initially supported plaintiff and Reverend Kirby-Coladonato's decision to marry.
Defendants became concerned about plaintiff's character. Consequently, they talked to Reveren d Ki rby-Col adonato about put tin g off the weddin g. Th ey also aske d Revere nd K irby-Coladonato to sign a promissory note and Reverend Kirby-Coladonato said she absolutely would not sign one. The issue of retitling never was discussed until May, 2006, when they told Reverend Kirby-Coladonato to rethink getting married.
On May 14, plaintiff called and said he wanted to go to DMV and take Aileen's name off of the title and add Reverend Kirby-Coladonato's name. Aileen did not do that because she was not planning to give the car back. It was a gift. It was her car.
On May 22, 2006, defendants went to ABC to try and get the bond revoked. The bond company sent them to court and they wrote something up for the court asking to be relieved of the bond. They also talked to the prosecutor and asked if he would plead with the Judge to allow them to be relieved of the bond.
When they got home that night, they had a message on the answering machine stating that the car had been involved in a hit and run accident and requesting plaintiff to call the police. The message on their answering machine was played in court. Defendants called their insurance company. The insurance company told Aileen that plaintiff was on their policy as a driver. When the insurance company learned he no longer lived there, they said he no longer was covered as an insured.
The testimony regarding this hit and run was nebulous. Apparently, as it turns out, there was no hit and run involving defendant and/or this vehicle.
The next morning they sen t the May 23, 2006 e-mail message to Reverend Kirby-Coladonato regarding the return of the car.
The e-mails show defendants considered the car to be theirs.
On May 23, 2006, defendants went to DMV, removed plaintiff's name from the title, and obtained a new title. On May 24, 2006, defendants went to the Delaware State Police and had them accompany them to pick up the car. They wanted to get the car off the road.
Plaintiff has tol d them a number o f times that he will no t sp end another day i n ja il. They greatly fear he will skip out.
On cross-examination, Aileen testified to the following.
The conversation about the car took place a couple of days after plaintiff was released from jail the first time. On that Friday after he was released, he retrieved the title from New Jersey. Defendants told him he did not have to do that; he insisted. She accepted the car as a gift.
It was coincidental that when they put his name back on the title in September 2005, plaintiff had repaid defendants. The reason for the name change was not the repayment but because of her headaches. If she died, the car would return to him.
Plaintiff wreaked havoc in their home. He did not cut their grass for seven weeks. She confronted plaintiff about things he took from defendants and the next day, plaintiff said that he wanted her to take her name off the car. He was angry with her.
She was pleased about plaintiff marrying Reverend Kirby-Coladonato until she learned plaintiff might n ot be who sh e had tho ught he was. She was not ups et w ith Reveren d Ki rby-Coladonato because she refused to sign a promissory note to defendants.
On May 22, 2006, they discovered plaintiff was not covered as an insured and they were liable. She took his name off the title in May, 2006, because of the call about the hit and run and because plaintiff was not covered as a driver.
Aileen was willing to give plaintiff a $20,000.00 car in exchange for being relieved of the $70 0,0 00. 00 d ebt. Defend ants were no t tr ying t o ex tort a prom iss ory note from Re vere nd K irby-Coladonato. They were not using the car as leverage; the events involving the Cadillac were in response to the hit/run situation. Taking the car had nothing to do with the $700,000.00 bond.
Aileen was not willing to take her name off the car because it was hers. He gave it to defendants. She allowed him to use it while he lived in her home. The first time he asked for the car was on May 14, 2006, and she was shocked.
They did tell plaintiff's attorney they would give, as opposed to return, the car to plaintiff if they were relieved of the $700,000.00 note.
Their whole concern is the potential for future liability. They continue to be liable on the bond. Defendants' Exhibit 9. They do not trust him.
Zucker was the one who suggested being relieved from the bond if they returned the car. Their local counsel prepared papers and then they were sued by plaintiff.
Aileen knew plaintiff wanted the car back and she was willing to trade it for getting off the note.
Plaintiff repeatedly told her he would not spend a day in jail.
d) William Watkins
William Watkins testified to the following.
In December, 2006, defendants were involved in other litigation with plaintiff. Defendants' Exhibit 10. Plaintiff sued defendants in Justice of the Peace Court No. 17 seeking two book cases, a leaf blower, a shopvac, a printer/copier/fax, an antique garden scythe, a foreign film collection, an automatic coffee pot, a wall map of the Holy Land, yard geese and a couch table. Defendants countersued. Plaintiff gave them 3,500 videos while he was incarcerated. Plaintiff took all but 250 o f those videos from them. Defendants' countersuit sought the videos. It also sought payment for damage to a van. The result of this litigation was pretty much "a wash".
A review of the Justice of the Peace Court judgment shows the following. Defendants agreed the leaf blower, shopvac and dolly belonged to plaintiff and they would return those items. Plaintiff agreed a rototiller, a ladder and two pitchforks belonged to defendants and he would return those items. With regard to the damage to the van which plaintiff caused, the Court concluded defe ndants forgave that de bt in ex chan ge fo r pl ain tiff ere cti ng a s hed on t hei r property. The Court further concluded that the evidence was well-balanced so that neither party provided the preponderance of the evidence that would be necessary to sustain their respective claims. Except for what they agreed to return to each other, the parties were not granted relief. They kept what they had in their respective possessions. Defendants' Exhibit 10.
Plaintiff was insistent about giving them the car. There never was any discussion about it being security for a loan or debt. There was not an issue about plaintiff paying them back for the bond premium.
They accepted the gift. William thought they could do a "sibling transfer". That is what they did when they put the car in Aileen's name instead of Aileen and William's name. At DMV, William said to plaintiff that when he fulfilled the obligation, they would give it back. Plaintiff said, "No, it is yours."
When Aileen started with the headaches, she told William that something could happen to her and she would like for her brother to have the car. There never was any discussion about plaintiff paying them back and them needing to put plaintiff's name back on the car. Plaintiff never asked for a retitling until May, 2006.
When they left for their trip, plaintiff was to take care of their house and cat. The grass was knee-high until the day before they arrived home. The mistreatment of the cat particularly upset William. Defendants did not expect plaintiff to move out while they were gone; that was a complete surprise. They also did not expect him to take all of the videos.
They were concerned about their liability on the bond, plaintiff's behavior, and him marrying Reverend Kirby-Coladonato. All this led to them asking Reverend Kirby-Coladonato to postpone the wedding and discussing the $700,000.00 with her. In late July, their attorney is the one who asked if they would be willing to give the car back if they were relieved of the $700,000.00 bond and they responded they would.
On cross-examination, William testified to the following.
Even though he knew plaintiff was getting married, he was surprised at the extent to which plaintiff had moved out of their house. William also was surprised at what was missing as a result of the move.
The behaviors which alarmed him were plaintiff's not feeding the cat and letting the grass grow to knee-high length. Defendants gave plaintiff twenty (20) months of their life and plaintiff did these things to them. They were so upset that they then had concerns about the $700,000.00 and about Reverend Kirby-Coladonato marrying him.
They already had made enough mistakes with him. They decided to get his name off the car title so that they would not be liable for anything. The impetus was their concerns about liability and insurance coverage. The issues (car and bond) were separate at that time. They did not intend to gain an advantage; their only concern was that plaintiff was not insured. The discussion about the $700,000.00 and giving the car back came later.
e) Rebuttal
Plaintiff testified in rebuttal. His testimony was as follows.
He moved out of defendants' home in 2006. His sister had asked him to move his things out before they returned. He intended to retrieve the items he left behind.
On May 2, 2006, they asked for the key from him under the pretense of having company. He never went back. The lawsuit ensued and he got a few things back.
On cross-examination, he testified to the following. Defendants sued to retrieve some of their items he took. He could not return those items because he did not have a car.
PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff makes the following arguments.
Plaintiff seeks the return of the 2002 Cadillac, retitling of the Cadillac, costs, fees for transfer, payment for the use of car and interest. Plaintiff's burden is to prove he had personal property of which he was deprived. He has proven that. He asks the Court to pay attention to the time lines. The objective facts support plaintiff's position. Plaintiff was in possession and control of the car, maintained the car, asked for a change in the title before his wedding. Defendants fear the obligation they have on the bond. However, it is not lawful to deprive him of possession of the vehicle. Defendants are holding the car hostage.
Defendants argue as follows. The Court must determine if the car was a security agreement or a gift. Was the car transferred as a gift showing plaintiff's gratitude for defendants coming to his aid? Defendants came to his aid twice. Defendants ask the Court to examine the facts surrounding each retitling. The retitling into Aileen and plaintiff's names for insurance reasons does not make sense. The titling of a vehicle in the insured owner's name and a third party's name creates insurance coverage problems, as was evidenced by the hit and run scenario. When they retitled the vehicle the last time, it was in connection with the hit and run. Defendants' testimony is more credible. Now that there has been a falling out, plaintiff has sued them for the car.
PERTINENT LAW
A replevin action can be used to obtain recovery of possession of an item, Harlan Hollingsworth Corporation v. McBride, 69 A.2d 9, 11 (Del. 1949), and to determine title to goods and chattels, In re Markel, 254 A.2d 236, 239 (Del. 1969). As explained in Harlan Hollingsworth Corporation v. McBride, 69 A.2d at 11:
In this State replevin is primarily a form of action for the recovery of the possession of personal property which has been taken or withheld from the owner unlawfully. [Citations omitted.] . . . Moreover, if the defendant in an action of replevin claims title to the goods mentioned in the writ it may retain possession upon giving a proper bond to the sheriff to satisfy any judgment which may be entered against it. If that be done, the suit proceeds and the plaintiffs have the defendant's bond as security. [Citations omitted.] A secondary object of the action may, therefore, be for the recovery of a sum of money equivalent to the value of the property claimed if the defendant cannot or will not surrender possession. [Citations omitted.] If the verdict is for the plaintiff for the value of the property and no special damages are alleged, interest may be added as damages from the date of the unlawful conversion. [Citation omitted.]
As further explained in Hitch v. Riggin, 80 A. 975, 976 (Del.Super. 1911):
The issue of property in replevin . . . is not whether the property in the chattel is that of the plaintiff or the defendant, but whether the property is in the plaintiff or claimant in the action and whether the plaintiff as such has a consequent right to its immediate and exclusive possession . . . regardless of the title and property of the defendant.
Title is important, but not irrebuttable, in determining who owns or should have possession of a vehicle.
Under Delaware laws regulating ownership of a motor vehicle, an owner is "a person who holds legal title of a vehicle. . . ." *** In Delaware, proof that a motor vehicle is registered by a Certificate of Title in a person's name creates a prima facie case of ownership. However, this presumption is rebuttable. [Citations omitted.]Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Devlin, Del. Super., C.A. No. 96C-01-171, Quillen, J. (March 26, 1998) at 11-12. Accord In the Matter of: One 1985 Mercedes Benz Automobile, 644 A.2d 423, 430 (Del.Super. 1992);William M. Young Co. v. Tri-Mar Associates, Inc., 362 A.2d 214, 216 (Del.Super. 1976); State v. One 1968 Buick Electra, 301 A.2d 297 (Del.Super. 1973). Additionally, in the "and/or" situation, the Court must review the facts to determine if title is held in the conjunctive or disjunctive, and it may find that only one of the named owners had the authority to transfer ownership of the property. Willey v. Wiltbank, 567 A.2d 424 (Del. 1989). The primary evidence is the intent of the parties. William M. Young Co. v. Tri-Mar Associates,Inc., 362 A.2d at 216. See also Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware v. Howard, 258 A.2d 299, 301 (Del.Ch. 1969) (creating a joint tenancy requires "an equal right in all of the tenants to share in the enjoyment during their lives, . . .; and this means that unity of possession (along with unity of interest, title, and time) is an essential element of such ownership. [Citations omitted.]"); Paul v. Sturevant, Del. CCP, C.A. No. 05-07-0135AP, Trader, J. (April 19, 2006) (although defendant was listed as purchaser on the motor vehicle title, court believed plaintiff's testimony that the purchase of the trailer was a gift to plaintiff).
The law regarding gifts also is important to this case. There are two types of gifts: gifts inter vivos and gifts causa mortis.
Generally speaking gifts are classified as gifts inter vivos and gifts causa mortis. A gift inter vivos is usually defined as one between living persons, consisting of a voluntary transfer of property from one living person to another without any valuable consideration perfected and made absolute during the lifetime of the parties. A gift causa mortis is usually defined as a gift of personal property made in expectation of the donor's death but which may be revoked by him, upon condition that the donee shall be entitled to the property if the donor dies as expected and the donee survives him. [Citation omitted.]
The principle is well established by the authorities that there must be an actual or constructive delivery of the property to the donee, in order for a gift inter vivos or causa mortis to be valid and effective. [Citations omitted.]Hill v. Baker, 102 A.2d 923, 926 (Del.Super. 1953).
As explained in Highfield v. Equitable Trust Company, 155 A. 724, 727 (Del.Super. 1931):
The essential elements of a gift inter vivos seem to be a donor competent to make it; freedom of will on his or her part; an intention to make it; a donee capable of taking the gift; the gift must be complete and nothing left undone; the property must be delivered by the donor and accepted by the donee; the gift must go into immediate and absolute effect, must be gratuitous and irrevocable. [Citation omitted.]
As further explained regarding gifts inter vivos in Bothe v. Dennie, 324 A.2d 784, 787 (Del.Super. 1974):
It must appear that during his lifetime the donor relinquished in favor of the donee all present and future dominion and control over the gift property. Any further possession and control by the donor must be in recognition of the right of the donee, i.e., as agent or trustee or custodian for the doneee. If the donor retains dominion and control of the property during his lifetime, so that the gift would take effect only upon the death of the donor, it must comply with the testamentary law if it is to be valid. [Citations omitted.]
A gift causa mortis is a completely different animal. A gift causa mortis is revocable. Robson v. Jones, 3 Del. Ch. 51, 63 (Del.Ch. 1866). Furthermore, it becomes ineffective if the donor does not die as contemplated. Id. As explained in Robson v. Jones, 3 Del. Ch. at 63:
Upon the recovery of the donor and his consequent ability to comply with the statute [of wills], the dispensation from its requirements ceases and the gift causa mortis though valid when made becomes of no further force. No express condition to this effect is necessary.Accord Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware v. Howard, 258 A.2d at 301;Farmers Trust Company of Newark v. Evans, 162 A. 41, 41-43 (Del.Ch. 1932), aff'd, 168 A. 208 (Del. 1933).
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND DISCUSSION
The parties' testimony, in many important instances, was diametrically opposed. Although each witness basically testified to the truth, each also "colored" some of their statements to reflect their position and to present themselves in the best light possible. Thus, my proposed findings of fact necessarily stem from credibility determinations I make. My findings are as follows.
Defendants advanced plaintiff monies to get him out of jail in August, 2004. Defendant was suicidal. He wanted to make sure defendants were repaid for advancing the funds. His assets were frozen. The only immediate means of repaying defendants was by giving them the vehicle. He had the Cadillac put in Aileen's name so that when he died, defendants could be repaid the monies they had advanced to get him out of jail. This constituted a gift causa mortis, or alternatively, a gift conditioned on him killing himself. It lacked the absolute element of a gift inter vivos.
Plaintiff was foiled in his attempt to buy a gun and consequently, kill himself. The gift causa mortis no longer was effective. Alternatively, the condition under which the car was given (plaintiff killing himself) was not met. Even though title was in Aileen's name, the vehicle was not hers. The car, no longer a gift, became security for repayment of the loaned monies. Thus, the car remained in Aileen's name until the monies due defendants were paid, and to that extent, it constituted security for repayment of the loaned monies.
While plaintiff was incarcerated, he and defendants developed a relationship. Plaintiff was very grateful to defendants for all they did for him. Defendants were very good to plaintiff, providing him support and having their friends and acquaintances provide him support. Defendants felt plaintiff had changed into a better person, and they were willing to do for him because he had changed. Thus, they were willing to sign the contingent promissory notes/indemnification agreements.
On August 9, 2005, plaintiff repaid all outstanding amounts due defendants. He was using the car; he had physical control of the car. Since the monies owed had been paid back, the parties decided to put the title back in plaintiff's name. Even though it was placed in his and Aileen's names, there was no intent that the Cadillac belonged to Aileen alone or Aileen at all. Aileen's name remained on the title for insurance reasons or some undisclosed financial reason.
When defendants returned from their trip in May, 2006, they witnessed a part of plaintiff's personality that they did not like. They were betrayed by his acts during their absence. He had failed to care for their pet or their home. He had taken things from them which he previously had given them and other things which did not belong to him. This betrayal caused alarm regarding their obligation on the bond. Before they thought he was a man they could trust. They now realized they did not know him as they thought they had and they realized he might not appear for court as he was obligated to do. They panicked. They wanted to be removed from the bond.
Defendants pursued different avenues for being removed from the bond obligation. They sought relief from the court, they asked his fiance to substitute herself on the bond. They could not obtain the relief they sought.
In the midst of all this turmoil involving plaintiff, they received a call that he had been involved in a hit and run accident and they learned from their insurance company that they possibly could be liable. Their reaction was to place the title in their names alone and get the car into their possession. They had had enough of plaintiff s actions potentially causing them financial problems. They knew, however, that the car did not belong to them.
Meanwhile, during the month of May, defendants realized they could use the car as leverage to be removed from the bond. The following facts support this conclusion. Aileen refused to accompany plaintiff to DMV to transfer the title. Defendants tied the car to the bond in their May 23, 2006 e-mail, before any attorneys were involved. Even though defendants referred to the car as theirs, they knew it was not theirs. After plaintiff had repaid them, neither plaintiff nor defendants had considered defendants to have any claim to the car.
The Cadillac belongs to plaintiff and should be returned to him.
Plaintiff also seeks to recover the diminution in the value of the car. However, had he possessed it during the time at issue, plaintiff would have been driving the car. He has not shown how the devaluation would have been any less if he had possessed the car during that time. He is not entitled to any award for diminution in value.
Plaintiff is entitled to costs. He also is entitled to a return of the Cadillac and a judgment directing DMV to transfer the title to the Cadillac to him. He is entitled to a reimbursement for any fees that will be owed to DMV for the transfer of title. He is not entitled to interest since no award of money is made. He has not presented any basis for receiving an award for attorney's fees; thus, he is not entitled to such.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the foregoing, it is my recommendation that the Superior Court enter an order mandating the following:
1) Plaintiff is entitled to Court costs.
2) Defendants shall turn over possession to plaintiff of the 2002 red two-door Cadillac Eldorado, vehicle identification number 1G6EC12972B106518.
3) Defendants shall cooperate with the transfer to plaintiff of the title to the 2002 red two-door Cadillac Eldorado, vehicle identification number 1G6EC12972B106518, and shall pay to Delaware's Department of Motor Vehicles all fees and costs incurred in transferring the title to plaintiff.
4) Delaware's Department of Motor Vehicles shall transfer to plaintiff title to the 2002 red two-door Cadillac Eldorado, vehicle identification number 1G6EC12972B106518.
5) Plaintiff is not entitled to any award for diminution in the car's value, interest or attorneys' fees.
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