Opinion
Civ. No. H-98-1329.
April 1999.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending before the Court in this civil action is defendant's motion for summary judgment. This suit arises as the result of defendant's termination of the employment of plaintiff Hillary Cohan ("Cohan"), a Jewish female. Prior to her discharge, Cohan was employed by defendant Fitzgerald Auto Mall, Inc. ("Auto Mall"). Plaintiff alleges that defendant has discriminated against her on the basis of her sex and her religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
Shortly after this suit was filed, plaintiff remarried and her surname has accordingly been changed. Because she was known as Hillary Cohan during her employment with defendant, counsel in their memoranda have referred to her as "Cohan" rather than "Jensen." The Court will do likewise in this Memorandum Opinion.
The parties have submitted memoranda with attached exhibits in support of and in opposition to defendant's pending motion for summary judgment. The Court has had an opportunity to review numerous deposition excerpts, affidavits and other documents submitted by both plaintiff Cohan and defendant Auto Mall. A hearing on the pending motion has been held in open court. For the reasons to be stated herein, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
I Background Facts
Defendant Auto Mall is a family owned corporation which is located in Frederick, Maryland and which is engaged in the business of selling new and used automobiles of various types. John Fitzgerald, III ("Fitzgerald"), is President and one of the owners of Auto Mall. On December 26, 1994, Cohan was hired by defendant as a salesperson. As disclosed by her application, Cohan is a member of the Jewish faith. Fitzgerald is a member of the Catholic faith.
Lester Stanford ("Stanford") was the General Sales Manager of Auto Mall and throughout Cohan's employment was her supervisor. Stanford is an African American male. In March of 1995, Cohan was promoted to the position of After Market Sales Manager. In the Spring of 1995, she resigned because she claimed that she was doing a lot of the work of Stephanie Lee, another After Market employee, and that she was becoming extremely frustrated. Cohan was out of work for four or five days, but after talking to Fitzgerald she was reinstated.
As After Market Sales Manager, Cohan was responsible for the sale of additional equipment for new vehicles installed after their purchase.
In June of 1995, Cohan was promoted to the position of Finance Manager. Her direct supervisor at the time was Mark Sonn, Director of Finance. Stanford also continued to supervise her. In September of 1996, Cohan returned to the position of After Market Sales Manager, a position preferred by her.
During the second half of 1996, Auto Mall received a number of complaints from customers concerning Cohan's attitude and demeanor towards them. Complaints relating to her conduct had also been received from co-workers. In December of 1996, Auto Mall began the process of reviewing and restructuring the management of the company as a result of its acquisition of another dealership located in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. On December 21, 1996, Cohan was informed by Stanford that she was being discharged because of customer and co-worker complaints. The position of After Market Sales Manager was not thereafter filled, and the position itself was later abolished. On the same day that Cohan was discharged, Stan Grow ("Grow"), the Finance Manager, was also fired because of customer complaints made about him. Grow is a male and is not a member of the Jewish faith. Grow later applied for reinstatement and was rehired in June of 1997.
In support of her claims of religious and sex discrimination, Cohan relies on statements made by Stanford and Fitzgerald which she contends evince a discriminatory motive on the part of defendant Auto Mall. She also refers to several events which occurred during her employment. On three occasions, Stanford told her to put her Star of David necklace charm inside her shirt. On another occasion, one Donald Toms, a known leader of the Ku Klux Klan (the "KKK") in Frederick County, came to the dealership to purchase a vehicle. According to Cohan, Stanford told her that she could not sell after market products to Toms because the KKK disliked Jews. Plaintiff has also referred to a long list of incidents which she says indicates that during her employment with Auto Mall she was treated differently from male employees.
On February 7, 1997, plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination against defendant Auto Mall with the Maryland Commission on Human Relations (the "MCHR"). No action on that administrative charge was taken by the MCHR. On January 28, 1998, plaintiff Cohan received a notice of right-to-sue issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC"). This civil action was filed in this Court on April 27, 1998.
II Summary Judgment Principles
It is well established that a defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958 (4th Cir. 1984). Where, as here, the nonmoving party will bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, "the burden on the moving party [at the summary judgment stage] may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
One of the purposes of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to require a plaintiff, in advance of trial and after a motion for summary judgment has been filed and properly supported, to come forward with some minimal facts to show that the defendant may be liable under the claims alleged. See F.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the nonmoving party "fail[s] to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof," then "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment."Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323.
While the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1985), "when the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "`A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a fact issue; there must be evidence on which a jury might rely.'" Barwick, 736 F.2d at 958-59 (quoting Seago v. North Carolina Theaters, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 627, 640 (E.D.N.C. 1966),aff'd, 388 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 959 (1968)). Moreover, only disputed issues of material fact, determined by reference to the applicable substantive law, will preclude the entry of summary judgment. "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In the absence of the necessary minimal showing by the plaintiff that the defendant may be liable under the claims alleged, the defendant should not be required to undergo the considerable expense of preparing for and participating in a trial. See Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323-24; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has stated that, with regard to motions for summary judgment, the district courts have "an affirmative obligation . . . to prevent `factually unsupported claims and defenses' from proceeding to trial." Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323-24).
Applying these principles to the facts of record here, this Court has concluded that defendant's motion for summary judgment must be granted.
III Plaintiff's Claims
The amended complaint contains two counts. In Count I, plaintiff alleges that she was discharged because she was a female, in violation of Title VII. In Count II, she alleges that she is an individual of the Jewish religion and that defendant violated Title VII by discharging her because of her religion.
Compensatory damages in the amount of $2,000,000 are sought as well as punitive damages in the amount of $300,000. Plaintiff also seeks to recover attorneys' fees and costs.
IV Applicable Law
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discharge any individual" because of such individual's "religion" or "sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In order to prevail on either one of her claims, plaintiff must prove that, but for defendant's discriminatory motive, she would not have been discharged. Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371, 374 (4th Cir. 1992); Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 458 (4th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 713 F.2d 1011, 1014 (4th Cir. 1983). Plaintiff may seek to prove her case in two different ways. To survive defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff may proceed under ordinary principles of proof and "produce direct evidence of a stated purpose to discriminate and/or circumstantial evidence of sufficient probative force to reflect a genuine issue of fact."Goldberg v. B. Green Co., 836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir. 1988);EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 940 (4th Cir. 1992). In the alternative, she may meet her burden under the judicially created proof scheme established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), and reaffirmed in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). See also Goldberg, 836 F.2d at 847.
Plaintiff has here chosen to pursue her claims by way of direct evidence of discrimination. In proceeding in this case under ordinary standards of proof, plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that she was an employee covered by Title VII, (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action taken by an employer covered by the Act, and (3) that "but for" her employer's intent to discriminate against her on the basis of her sex and/or religion, she would not have been subjected to the adverse employment action. Clay Printing, 955 F.2d at 941.
V Discussion (a) Complaints of Customers and Co-Workers
Defendant Auto Mall has not challenged the first two requirements of Clay Printing. Plaintiff was an employee covered by Title VII, and, when fired, she suffered an adverse employment action taken by an employer who is subject to the provisions of the Act. Defendant argues, however, that plaintiff has not met the "but for" component of the applicable test. According to defendant, plaintiff was fired because of complaints made by customers and co-workers. On the record here, this Court would agree.
Evidence of record indicates that during 1996 customers of Auto Mall lodged a number of complaints about their treatment by plaintiff Cohan. In May of 1996, customer K.L. Craig and her husband came to defendant's dealership to pick up a vehicle which they had previously ordered. On that occasion, they met with plaintiff Cohan. In Mrs. Craig's letter of May 22, 1996, she complained in some detail about the manner in which she had been treated by Cohan. Inter alia, Mrs. Craig stated:
We could have overlooked Ms. Cohen's [sic] insensitivity and arrogance but were outraged by her apparent falsification of the facts. . . .
We will never consider buying another car from your dealership due to the treatment that we received from Ms. Cohen [sic]. My concern, however, is for your customers who did not bother to check on the authenticity of her statements!
Customer T.E. Hill purchased a 1996 Monte Carlo from defendant. Referring to plaintiff Cohan, he submitted a complaint stating: "The girl in finance was very rude and unconcerned with the fact that I wanted to discuss finance terms." According to customer J. C. Pensis who had purchased a 1996 Chevrolet S-Pickup, the registration handled by Cohan was not done properly.
Both the Hill complaint and the Pensis complaint were submitted on Chevrolet Motor Division forms requesting comments concerning customer satisfaction.
Customer V.A. Brewer complained when Cohan did not give him the proper roof rack for his van. He stated that he was "betrayed and misled" when the wrong size and a smaller rack than ordered was installed. It was accordingly necessary for him to trade in his van for another one. He was particularly concerned because Cohan "never apologized or admitted her mistake." Patricia Ladd, who was hired by defendant as a salesperson and later promoted to Finance Manager, stated that she received far more complaints about Cohan than about anyone else at the dealership. A number of repeat customers had specifically requested that Cohan not handle their transactions. Complaints about Cohan were received by Ladd both about the way Cohan handled financing and about the way she handled after market sales.
Plaintiff Cohan also had a poor relationship with many of her co-workers. Jerry Ogles (a sales manager), Steven Schaper (the business manager), Gina Carter (a female finance manager) and Grow all complained to Stanford about plaintiff Cohan. Ogles and Carter objected to Cohan's yelling and screaming at them, and Carter was upset also by Cohan's bad language and cursing. According to Grow, Cohan could be very angry and abrasive both to him and to other co-workers. Ladd stated that Cohan often treated fellow employees in a harsh and abrasive manner. Dena Rotolone was the Comptroller of defendant Auto Mall in 1996. In her affidavit, she stated that Cohan had on occasion failed to follow Fitzgerald's instructions and was often arrogant, aggressive and nasty to both staff and customers. Kevin Moler, another manager, testified that Cohan mistreated customers and fellow employees and viewed herself as being superior to other employees, whether they were supervisory personnel or not.
In the face of this compelling evidence of complaints by both customers and co-workers, plaintiff Cohan has done little more than disagree with their assessments. Plaintiff has testified that she has never been arrogant to a customer in her life, and she asserts that there was no basis for the complaints made by co-workers. However, the subjective, self-appraisal of her conduct by a plaintiff in a suit of this sort is irrelevant. What matters is "the perception of the decision maker." Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1061, 1067 (4th Cir. 1980); Pfeifer v. Lever Bros. Co., 693 F. Supp. 358, 364 (D. MD. 1987), aff'd 850 F.2d 689 (4th Cir 1988). Moreover, plaintiff has presented no evidence that complaints from customers were not in fact received by her employer. Whether or not the complaints were accurate, defendant assuredly had every right to be concerned that customers might not be willing to continue to do business with Auto Mall because of the manner in which one of its employees had treated them. Evidence of record indicates that defendant acted similarly whether the employee criticized was a male or a female. Grow, a male, non-Jewish salesperson who also worked in after market sales, was likewise fired in December of 1996 because of customer complaints and conflicts with fellow employees.
There is no merit to plaintiff's argument that the firing of Grow was pretextual. The undisputed evidence establishes that Grow's employment was terminated on December 21, 1996 because of a number of customer complaints and conflicts with fellow employees.
Customer service was a key aspect of defendant's business, and Auto Mall acted as it did because of reports received from customers indicating that they were dissatisfied by the rudeness and misconduct of one of its employees. This Court should not act as a "super-personnel department" and undertake to determine whether an employer's perceptions of an employee's qualifications are erroneous, without regard to the employer's "ability to assess the full dimension of its employees' qualifications and its ability to view its employees in a work environment. . . ." Evans v. Technologies Applications Services Co., 875 F. Supp. 1115, 1120 (D. Md. 1995).
On the record here, this Court concludes that there was a legitimate business reason for the discharge of plaintiff. Defendant Auto Mall terminated the employment of Cohan because of complaints received from customers and co-workers.
(b) Claim of Sex Discrimination
Plaintiff argues that the reasons given by defendant for the termination of her employment were pretextual and that she was fired because she was a woman. In seeking to prove that defendant acted with the intent to discriminate against her because of her sex, plaintiff primarily relies on certain statements and conduct of Fitzgerald and Stanford which occurred some months before the termination of her employment.
For statements relating to an employer's employment preferences to constitute proof of discriminatory intent, there must be a showing of a sufficient nexus between the remarks in question and the adverse employment action taken. See Clay Printing, 955 F.2d at 942; Collier v. Service America Corp., 934 F. Supp. 168, 171 (D. Md. 1996). When a plaintiff seeks to prove discrimination without resort to the McDonnell Douglas format in a case like this one where Title VII coverage and unfavorable action are not disputed, "the dispositive and only issue is a difficult, but narrow motivational one: whether the employee `was [discharged] because of [her sex and religion].'" Lovelace v. Sherwin Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 239 (4th Cir. 1982) (quotingLobe v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1017 (1st Cir. 1979)); Wilhelm v. Blue Bell, Inc., 773 F.2d 1429, 1432 (1985). As this Court has recognized, the Fourth Circuit has placed an "extremely high" barrier for a showing of the necessary nexus. Collier, 934 F. Supp. at 171. "Discriminatory remarks . . . therefore cannot be stray or isolated statements." O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 549 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
In support of her contention that she was fired because she was a woman, plaintiff places heavy reliance on the affidavit of Vance Jones, who was employed as a Finance Manager at Auto Mall from January of 1996 through October of 1996. Jones had a conversation with Stanford in the late summer of 1996 when he and Stanford learned that Grow had been fired because of allegations of sexual harassment made against him by a female co-worker. According to Jones, Stanford told him that it was harder working with women than with men, that men worked best together and that any time women are hired they stir up trouble. Stanford further stated that, once the situation calmed down, he was "going to get rid of them all." In the autumn of 1996, there was a discussion which Jones had with Fitzgerald and other male managers at a meeting when the firing and possible rehiring of Grow was discussed. Fitzgerald said that Vance had convinced him that "we shouldn't have our backs to the wall over trumped up charges of sexual harassment" and that we should "hire Stan back." When asked for their opinion, the other attendees at this meeting stated in a jocular manner, "men, men, men, men," in a collectively increasing volume until they were quieted down by Stanford. Grow was rehired shortly thereafter.
Accepting these comments and statements as true, this Court concludes that they do not constitute direct evidence of defendant's stated purpose to terminate plaintiff's employment because of her sex, nor are they circumstantial evidence of sufficient probative force to reflect a genuine issue of material fact. Goldberg, 836 F.2d at 848. To avoid summary judgment, plaintiff must show a sufficient nexus between the alleged discriminatory statements and her discharge. This she has failed to do.
On the record here, the Court concludes that the isolated comments in question, whether considered separately or together, do not constitute competent evidence of a discriminatory intent on the part of defendant Auto Mall to discharge plaintiff Cohan because of her sex. Fourth Circuit decisions indicate that a court should closely scrutinize whether alleged remarks can reasonably be interpreted as evidence of discriminatory intent since the barrier placed by the Fourth Circuit is "extremely high." Collier, 934 F. Supp. at 171. The comments and statements in question are strikingly similar to those which both the Fourth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have held as a matter of law do not constitute evidence of discriminatory intent in age discrimination cases. See, e.g., O'Connor, 56 F.3d at 549 ("[i]t's about time we get some young blood in this company"); Birbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 511-12 (4th Cir. 1994) ("there comes a time when we have to make way for younger people"); Clay Printing, 955 F.2d at 942 (we need to "attract newer, younger people" and need "young blood"); Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 1989) (we need "younger blood"). The comments and statements relied upon were made at a time when Stanford and Fitzgerald were, with some justification, concerned about Grow's firing because of a charge of sexual harassment which they believed was trumped-up. The "men, men, men," chant was obviously jocular in nature and was promptly halted by order of Stanford. What was said in the summer and early autumn of 1996 occurred some four months before plaintiff Cohan was fired. The comments and statements were therefore too remote to constitute competent evidence of a discriminatory intent on the part of defendant in December to discharge Cohan because of her sex. That Auto Mall had no intention to "get rid of them all" is indicated by the fact that many women remained as employees after plaintiff was fired.
The conclusion reached by the Court in this case is also supported by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Fortier v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 161 F.3d 1106 (7th Cir. 1998). In that case, the district court had granted summary judgment in favor of the employer in a suit brought by a discharged male employee alleging gender and age discrimination in violation of Title VII and the ADEA. In affirming the district court's ruling, the Seventh Circuit determined that remarks by plaintiff's's supervisor that a female was preferred for the position in question did not constitute direct evidence of gender discrimination because the earlier comments were not tied to the later termination decision. Id. at 1112. Comments relied upon by the plaintiff in that case in support of his age discrimination claim were likewise found not to be probative of discriminatory intent in connection with the employment decision at issue because they were made some five months before plaintiff's discharge. Id at 1113.
As evidence of sex discrimination, plaintiff also relies on a laundry list of mainly trivial events which she contends are proof that she was treated differently from males. She claims, inter alia, that she was not allowed to leave the premises to eat lunch, that she was not allowed to leave early when she injured her arm, that she was told to shut up during meetings, that Ogles made female managers report personally to him but not male managers, that male employees who were fired were later rehired and that Stanford did not allow her to have dinner with her boyfriend. She complains of actions taken by Stanford, Bitner, Ogles, Sonn and Moler, five different males employed by Auto Mall. Whether considered separately or in the aggregate, the occurrences in question do not constitute direct evidence of defendant's intent to discriminate against Cohan by discharging her on the basis of her sex. If anything, the evidence in question supports defendant's contention that plaintiff could not get along with her supervisors and co-workers and that the conflicts which arose could properly be considered as grounds for her discharge.
Grow applied for reinstatement, and, some six months after his December 1996 discharge, he was rehired in a position involving different responsibilities and limited contact with customers. Gina Carter, who was also fired in December of 1996, was also later rehired. Since plaintiff never asked Auto Mall for reinstatement, she cannot complain of disparate treatment resulting from defendant's failure to rehire her.
Cohan herself did not believe that defendant was guilty of sexually harassing conduct. She assisted in the investigation of a charge of sexual harassment brought against Auto Mall by co-employee Shelly Kavanaugh, who resigned on March 21, 1996. In an affidavit submitted to the EEOC in connection with Kavanaugh's charge of discrimination, Cohan stated:
According to plaintiff, this was an "unwittingly false affidavit."
Fitzgerald Auto Mall, Inc. has adopted a "no harassment" policy to which it adheres. . . . As a female employee, I can say on personal knowledge that there is not a sexually hostile work environment at Fitzgerald Auto Mall, Inc.
When Cohan was hired by Auto Mall in 1994, Fitzgerald knew that she was a Jewish female. When she resigned in the Spring of 1995, Fitzgerald, rather than accepting her resignation as final, persuaded her to return to work. That he originally offered plaintiff employment and later rehired her with knowledge that she was a Jewish female is significant evidence of a lack of any discriminatory animus. As observed by the Fourth Circuit inProud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991):
Therefore, in cases where the hirer and the firer are the same individual and the termination of employment occurs within a relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse action taken by the employer.
For all these reasons, the Court concludes that plaintiff's claim of sex discrimination must fail.
(c) Claim of Religious Discrimination
Of even less weight is evidence of record relied upon by plaintiff in support of her claim of religious discrimination. The statements and conduct referenced by plaintiff either do not establish a discriminatory animus on the part of defendant Auto Mall or do not have a sufficient nexus to the adverse employment action to amount to competent proof.
Laurie Wolfe was employed by Auto Mall as a salesperson from March of 1995 through July of 1995. She was present at a staff meeting in April of 1995 at which Fitzgerald announced his own religious affiliation, namely that he is a Catholic. According to Wolfe, Fitzgerald told the assembled staff that they had to believe in God and in Jesus Christ in order to work at Auto Mall.
Plaintiff wore a Star of David necklace charm, and she has testified that Stanford on three separate occasions told her to put the charm inside her shirt. In October of 1995, plaintiff heard a customer say that he would not allow "a kike" to do his paperwork. When this was reported to Stanford, he told Cohan not to do the paperwork for that customer and asked her to hide her Star of David necklace under her shirt so that no one would see it. The second incident occurred shortly thereafter when Stanford again told her to put her charm inside her shirt. On each occasion, plaintiff refused to comply with Stanford's request, and no disciplinary action was taken against her because of such refusals.
Plaintiff did not know the date of the third such occurrence.
On another occasion, Donald Toms, a known leader of the KKK in Frederick County, came to the dealership to purchase a vehicle. According to plaintiff, she was told by Moler and Stanford that she should not talk to Toms about the sale of after market products because he was the head of the KKK and because she was Jewish. Plaintiff complied. On a later occasion, when Toms visited the dealership, plaintiff disregarded Stanford's advice and sold after market products to Toms without incident.
The Court concludes that the evidence in question does not constitute direct evidence of a discriminatory intent on the part of defendant Auto Mall to discharge plaintiff because of her religious beliefs. None of the incidents are temporally related to the discharge itself. Fitzgerald's comments concerning his own religious affiliation were made some 20 months before plaintiff was fired. The Star of David and Toms incidents occurred more than a year before the termination of plaintiff's employment.
Moreover, the fact that defendant Auto Mall did not want plaintiff to service customers who had or might reasonably be thought to have a bias against persons of the Jewish religion does not constitute evidence of defendant's discriminatory animus. Defendant Auto Mall wished to do business with any and all customers whatever ignoble personal beliefs they may have held.
Based on general knowledge in the community of the discriminatory beliefs embraced by the KKK, Stanford reasonably assumed that Toms, a known leader of the KKK, would not want to do business with a person of the Jewish faith. In Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor, Board of Commissioners and Chief of Police of the Town of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281 (D. Md. 1988), the KKK filed a suit in this Court against officials of a town in Western Maryland which had denied its application for a permit to conduct a parade. Voting to deny the permit, the Board of Commissioners of the town had relied in part on the fact that the KKK was an organization which appeared to be "anti-Semitic and [to] discriminate against other religions." Id. at 283. The parties in that case had stipulated that insurance companies would not sell parade insurance to the KKK due to its perceived reputation. Id. at 284. Since it was well known in Western Maryland that the KKK is made up only of white Christians (See id. at 286) and endorses anti-religious discriminatory policies, supervisory personnel of Auto Mall could reasonably have believed that a leader of the organization would not want to do business with a member of the Jewish faith. Such belief did not constitute direct evidence that Auto Mall itself made employment decisions based on an intention to discriminate against members of the Jewish religion.
Accordingly, defendant is also entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim of religious discrimination asserted in Count II of the amended complaint.
(d) Mixed-motive Analysis
Plaintiff has also argued that her claim is entitled to mixed-motive treatment pursuant to Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). To prevail in a mixed-motive case, a plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's motive to discriminate was a substantial factor in the adverse personnel action taken against her. Etefia v. East Baltimore Community Corp., 2 F. Supp.2d 751, 762 (D. MD. 1998).
For the reasons discussed hereinabove, plaintiff has not satisfied this burden. Plaintiff has not produced "direct evidence that [the] decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision."Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The comments and conduct relied upon were not contemporaneous with Cohan's discharge and were not causally related to the adverse employment action taken. That plaintiff was a woman and a member of the Jewish faith has not been shown to have been a substantial factor in defendant's decision to fire her.
For these reasons, plaintiff is likewise not entitled to prevail if her claim is subjected to a mixed-motive analysis.
VI Conclusion
For all the reasons stated herein, this Court has concluded that a reasonable jury could not on the record here determine that but for defendant's discriminatory motive plaintiff would not have been discharged. The evidence submitted by plaintiff raises no more than a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 556. Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
An appropriate Order will be entered by the Court.