Opinion
HHDFA094046211S
08-16-2017
Robert Coffin v. Maureen Coffin
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ORDERS RE DEFENDANT'S POSTJUDGMENT MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT (#152) AND MOTION FOR COUNSEL FEES (#161)
Robert Nastri, Jr., Judge.
The defendant's August 5, 2016 postjudgment motion for modification of child support (#152) and January 11, 2017 motion for counsel fees (#161) came before the court on June 9, 2017. In her motion, the plaintiff seeks a modification to the current child support order retroactive to August 10, 2016, the date of service, " based upon the substantial increase in plaintiff father's income, plaintiff father's ability to access trusts for the minor child for the benefit of the child, and a substantial change in circumstances in that the minor child is enrolled in public school and plaintiff is no longer incurring private school expenses." Defendant's Post-Trial Brief, p. 11 . She also is seeking legal fees in the amount of $14,430.
Both the plaintiff and defendant testified and were represented by counsel. The parties submitted simultaneous briefs in support of their positions on July 14, 2017.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties entered into an Agreement and Stipulation for Judgment (the agreement) to dissolve their marriage on November 18, 2010 (#150). The agreement was incorporated into the judgment of the court, Adelman, J., on the same date (#149).
The parties have one minor child, David Coffin, born October 2006.
Under the terms of the agreement, and thus the judgment, the plaintiff is required to pay child support of $500 per week, Agreement, ¶ 9, p. 6, the first $5,000 of David's extracurricular activity expenses, 75 percent of any extracurricular activity expenses above $5,000, Agreement, ¶ 9(b), p. 7, 100 percent of David's college education costs, Agreement, ¶ 10(a), p. 8, 100 percent of David's educational expenses for private elementary, junior high school and high school, Agreement, ¶ 10(b), p. 10, the first $5,800 of David's unreimbursed health care expenses, and 75 percent of any health care expenses above $5,800. Agreement, ¶ 12, p. 11 .
The undisputed testimony at trial was that the plaintiff has paid all of David's extracurricular and unreimbursed medical expenses without limit.
The parties' knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived alimony. Agreement, ¶ 11, p. 11 .
The agreement called for the plaintiff to pay the defendant's COBRA coverage for three years and labeled the payments as nonmodifiable alimony in the event the plaintiff could reap a state or tax benefit from that characterization. Agreement, ¶ 12, p. 12 .
The agreement also provided that " [t]here shall be no presumption that an increase in the plaintiff husband's earned income shall warrant an increase in his child support obligation. That inquiry shall depend on the then existing facts as applied to the standard set forth in Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, (2010), unless said case law is otherwise modified by statute, rule change or case law." Agreement, ¶ 9(c), p. 7-8 .
The case law has not been modified.
Although the separation agreement called for David to attend private elementary, junior high school and high school, when David was entering the fourth grade the parties decided--based on the recommendation of David's therapist--that a more structured public school environment best served his educational needs. David will be entering the sixth grade in public school in the fall of 2017.
The parties are satisfied with David's educational environment and intend to keep him enrolled in public school for the foreseeable future.
At the time the parties entered the agreement, the plaintiff had net weekly income of $6,709. Plaintiff's November 18, 2010 Financial Affidavit (#144) . In his most recent financial affidavit, the plaintiff disclosed net weekly income of $19,198. Plaintiff's June 9, 2017 Financial Affidavit (#171) .
The plaintiff's child support obligation of $500 per week was 7.45 percent of his net weekly income.
The defendant had net weekly income of $577 at the time of the divorce, all of it from the plaintiff's voluntary payments. Defendant's November 18, 2010 Financial Affidavit (#146) . She recently began to work in an office environment and disclosed $635 in net weekly income, including $425 in wages and $309 from social security. Defendant's June 8, 2017 Financial Affidavit (#172) .
The plaintiff leads a life of wealth and privilege that is beyond the ken of the average person. When David is with his father, he shares in that lifestyle. His father's wealth will afford David opportunities not available to most children. He will visit places and experience aspects of life unavailable to most of his peers. The defendant's home environment is more modest, albeit still above the means of the average person.
The court notes the plaintiff has assets valued at $3,424,480 and liabilities of $936,348. Plaintiff's June 7, 2017 Financial Affidavit (#171) . The defendant disclosed assets valued at $416,210 and liabilities of $98,740. Defendant's June 8, 2017 Financial Affidavit (#172) .
The discrepancy between the two households would be psychologically and emotionally jarring for even the most well-adjusted child.
The court credits the defendant's testimony that David views his father as rich and his mother as poor, an assessment the court only partially embraces.
In order to obtain a modification of the child support award, the defendant must demonstrate a " substantial change in the circumstances of either party." General Statutes § 46b-86(a). See also Olson v. Mohammadu, 310 Conn. 665, 671-72, 81 A.3d 215 (2013).
The parties' decision to enroll David in public school is a substantial change in circumstances. The money the parties contemplated the plaintiff would spend on David's private schooling through high school is no longer being used for that purpose.
In the present case, the court does not find any reasons for deviating from the presumptive amount of child support pursuant to the guidelines because even the substantial disparity in parental income is not applicable in this case. In Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 995 A.2d 1 (2010), the Supreme Court stated that the trial " court next referred to 'the extraordinary disparity in parental income . . .' The court apparently was relying on the sixth criteria, in which income disparity is one of several '[s]pecial circumstances' that permit a departure from the guidelines. Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-3(b)(6). Income disparity may be considered, however, only when the custodial parent has the higher income and deviation from the presumptive support amount 'would enhance the lower income [noncustodial] parent's ability to foster a relationship with the child . . .' Id., § 46b-215a-3(b)(6)(B)(i). This consideration is unambiguously intended to protect the noncustodial parent in circumstances where the income of the custodial parent far exceeds the income of the parent obligated to pay child support, which is not the case here. Thus, the court's consideration of income disparity under the sixth deviation criteria was improper." Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 101. In the present case, the defendant is the custodial parent and her income does not exceed the income of the noncustodial parent. In fact, it is just the opposite. Thus, the deviation for income disparity is not applicable.
Maturo was decided in 2010, pursuant to the child support guidelines that were effective August 1, 2005. The latest version of the guidelines, effective July 1, 2015, has the same language as the 2005 version of the guidelines discussed in Maturo, with the only difference being the numbering of the applicable section which was § 46b-215a-3(b)(6)(B)(i) in the 2005 version and is § 46b-215a-5c(b)(6)(B)(i) in the current version.
In any event, the court declines to deviate from the guidelines for any reason inasmuch as David's needs--including his emotional and psychological needs--can be met by an amount of child support in accord with the guidelines. Dowling v. Szymczak, 309 Conn. 390, 400, 72 A.3d 1 (2013). The application of the guidelines is equitable and appropriate.
In Maturo, the court stated that it " recognize[d] that children in high income families are accustomed to a more affluent lifestyle that should be maintained to the extent reasonably possible. Indeed, § 46b-84 mandates that the court consider factors such as the occupation, station, earning capacity and amount and sources of income of the parents as well as the age, health, station, educational status, expectation, estate and needs of the child. Section 46b-215b(a), however, provides that the guideline principles must be considered in 'all determinations of child support amounts . . .' Accordingly, the trial court should not have unfettered discretion in high income cases to make lavish child support awards that appear to be unrelated both to the needs of the children, even after considering their station, and to the principles articulated in the guidelines . . ." Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 104. The court " conclude[d] that, when a family's combined net weekly income exceeds $4,000, the court should treat the percentage set forth in the schedule at the highest income level as the presumptive ceiling on the child support obligation, subject to rebuttal by application of the deviation criteria enumerated in the guidelines, as well as the statutory factors described in § 46b-84(d)." Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 106.
The minimum presumptive child support amount under the guidelines is $482 per week. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-2c(e) and Connecticut Child Support Guidelines. Schedule of Basic Child Support Obligations (2015), p. 17 . The minimum presumptive support is based on the parents having a combined net weekly income of $4,000. Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (2015), preamble, § (b)(5), p. iii .
The maximum presumptive child support amount is $2,387, based on the parties' combined net weekly income of $19,833, multiplied by the " applicable percentage shown at the $4,000 net income level" or 12.04 percent. Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (2015), preamble, § (b)(5), p. iii .
The defendant introduced--over the plaintiff's objection--evidence of the total value of the trusts under which the plaintiff is a beneficiary. (Defendant's Exhibits A-G.) Here, the value of the trusts is irrelevant to the court's determination of the appropriate child support amount. See Taylor v. Taylor, 117 Conn.App. 229, 236-37, 978 A.2d 538, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 915, 983 A.2d 852 (2009); Tremaine v. Tremaine, 235 Conn. 45, 66-67, 663 A.2d 387 (1995).
The plaintiff's net weekly income represents 96.8 percent of the parties' combined net weekly income. As a result, the plaintiff is responsible to pay, 96.8 percent of both the minimum presumptive child support amount, or $467, and of the maximum presumptive child support amount, or $2,310.
The actual amount at the lower end is $466.58 but the court rounded the amount to $467 in accordance with guidelines. " All. money amounts entered on the worksheet may be rounded to the nearest dollar by dropping amounts under fifty cents and increasing amounts from fifty to ninety-nine cents to the next whole dollar." Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-6 and Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (2015), p. 26.
The court has carefully considered the criteria for the modification of a child support order set forth in General Statutes § 46b-86(a) and the instruction on the application of that statute provided by the Supreme Court in Maturo . The court has also taken into account the factors enumerated in General Statutes § 46b-84(d).
The court's award of child support will foster David's relationship with his mother by slightly ameliorating the vast discrepancy in the resources available to him in each of his parent's homes.
The court expressly rejects the defendant's argument that: " The parties' son's lifestyle should be as comparable as possible in both homes . . . Moreover, given the child's own wealth and social status, mother and father should be able to provide equally, for their son in terms of grooming, clothes, hobbies, vacations, school gifts, birthdays, etc." Defendant's Post-Trial Brief, p. 15 .
The defendant undoubtedly is referring to the plaintiff's testimony that David will have access to substantial trust assets when he reaches twenty-one years of age and will inherit all of his father's and aunt's considerable assets upon their deaths.
The court also declines to adopt the plaintiff's argument that the defendant's motion for a modification of child support is an attempt " to seek additional support for her own benefit and the benefit of the child under the guise of child support." Plaintiff's Post-Hearing Memorandum of Law, pp. 17-18 .
The court is cognizant of the fact that the defendant devoted seven paragraphs and over two pages of her post-trial memorandum of law to her personal debt and financial woes, some of which are the result of questionable spending decisions. Defendant's Post-Trial Brief, ¶ ¶ 18-24, pp. 9-11 .
The court's child support order is neither unreasonable, excessive nor parsimonious. In awarding child support below the maximum presumptive child support amount, the court took into account all of the other expenses the plaintiff pays for David, either pursuant to the agreement or gratuitously.
ORDERS
The plaintiff shall pay child support in the amount of $1,343 per week, retroactive to August 10, 2016.
The defendant's percentage of net income devoted to child support will decrease from 7.45 percent to 7 percent, consistent with the Supreme Court's direction in Dowling . " We therefore have determined that " child support payments . . . should presumptively not exceed the [maximum] percent [set forth in the schedule] when the combined net weekly income of the family exceeds $4000, and, in most cases, should reflect less than that amount." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Szymczak, supra, 309 Conn. 401.
No attorneys fees are awarded to either party.