Opinion
June 25, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.).
Issues of fact exist as to whether plaintiff's employer made her aware of its express written policy limiting its right of discharge and as to whether she detrimentally relied on that policy in accepting the employment, and, therefore, whether she falls within the exception to the rule that an at-will employee does not have a cause of action for breach of employment contract ( see, Matter of De Petris v. Union Settlement Assn., 86 N.Y.2d 406, 410). Accordingly, the court erred in dismissing plaintiff's first cause of action.
Since the jury deadlocked on the issue of whether plaintiff was terminated without cause, the court also erred in dismissing her eighth cause of action for severance pay (CPLR 4113 [b]).
However, the trial court properly determined that since the subject information was communicated to those with a common interest in plaintiff's employer's operations, defendant Rainier enjoyed a qualified privilege, and that plaintiff failed to submit evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether he acted with the requisite malice to overcome the privilege ( see, Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 437-439). The causes of action for tortious interference with contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress were also properly dismissed since plaintiff failed to submit sufficient evidence to establish that the means employed to terminate her were wrongful ( see, Guard-Life Corp. v. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183, 191-192) or that defendants' conduct was "'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency'" ( Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 557).
Concur — Milonas, J.P., Rosenberger, Kupferman, Williams and Mazzarelli, JJ.