Opinion
2:23-cv-00016-BHH-MGB
02-27-2023
Dontrell Montez Cochran, Plaintiff, v. Berkeley County Sheriff's Department, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Dontrell Montez Cochran (“Plaintiff”), a state pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action challenging certain actions taken by law enforcement during his recent arrest. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The instant case is based on an incident that occurred on November 23, 2022, when Plaintiff was “illegally searched due to a traffic stop for failure to stop for blue light[s].” (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff claims that when he stepped out of his vehicle to “approach the officers,” they released a dog, causing Plaintiff to “flee afraid for [his] life.”(Id.) Upon running from the officers, Plaintiff was apparently “attacked” by the dog “with two officers standing over him with their weapons pointed on [him].” (Id.) Although unclear, it seems Plaintiff may have “blacked out” at some point during this altercation. (Id.) The officers eventually called off the dog and arrested Plaintiff, who was then treated at Trident Medical Center and transported to Hill-Finklea Detention Center. (Id.) Based on the above, Plaintiff claims that he has experienced “loss of wages, pain and suffering, physical and emotional trauma, [and] difficulty standing/walking/sleeping/resting/dreaming.” (Id. at 4.) He is requesting $5 to $10 million in damages. (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, he “had a bad experience when [he] was younger with dogs,” which prompted him to run from the officers on November 23rd. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.)
Upon reviewing the initial filings in this matter, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and was therefore subject to summary dismissal. (Dkt. No. 4 at 2.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned granted him twenty-one days, plus three days for mail time, to file an amended complaint that cured the identified pleading deficiencies. (Id. at 3-4.) In addition to the amended complaint, the undersigned also directed Plaintiff to file a completed set of proposed service documents for the defendants named in the amended pleading as required under General Order In Re: Procedures in Civil Actions Filed by Prisoner Pro Se Litigants, No. 3:07-mc-5014-JFA (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2007). (Id. at 4.) The undersigned explicitly warned Plaintiff that if he did not follow the instructions above within the time permitted by the order, his case would be summarily dismissed. (Id. at 6.) To date, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or any proposed service documents, and the time to do so has lapsed.
Plaintiff did not provide a completed set of proposed service documents when he filed his initial Complaint.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
Despite the undersigned's express warning, Plaintiff failed to file an amended pleading or any proposed service documents. The undersigned therefore finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal under Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., for failure to prosecute and comply with an order of this Court. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). Moreover, for the reasons discussed below, the undersigned further finds that Plaintiff's Complaint remains subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
At the outset, the only cause of action listed in Plaintiff's Complaint is “reckless disregard” (Dkt. No. 1 at 2), which does not reflect a cognizable federal cause of action. However, while federal district courts need not serve as mind readers for Pro se plaintiffs or “construct full-blown claims” on their behalf, Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278, certain context clues suggest that Plaintiff may be attempting to allege deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 2, asserting that Plaintiff “was letting medical know everything,” but “nothing happened.”) To the extent Plaintiff is in fact alleging inadequate medical treatment-or any constitutional violations for that matter-such claims would fall under the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (explaining that § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States”).
To state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (noting that “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to name a defendant amenable to suit under § 1983. Indeed, it is well-established that South Carolina's Sheriff's Departments do not qualify as “persons” for purposes of § 1983, regardless of whether Plaintiff refers to the physical buildings or the staff and collection of officials they house. See e.g., Garcia v. Richland Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 3:21-cv-1359-JMC-SVH, 2021 WL 1947303, at *2 (D.S.C. May 14, 2021) (“Groups of individuals in a building, such as a sheriff's department, do not qualify as a ‘person' who can act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.”); see also Sheppard v. Orangeburg Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 5:20-cv-2362-MGL-SVH, 2020 WL 4756526, at *2 (D.S.C. July 28, 2020) (explaining that “inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds,” are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983), adopted, 2020 WL 4754673 (D.S.C. Aug. 17, 2020). Accordingly, as the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff, any such claims against the Berkeley County Sheriff's Department- the only Defendant named in this case-are subject to summary dismissal. (See Dkt. No. 4 at 2.)
Nevertheless, even if Plaintiff had named a state official in his Complaint, the Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against states and state agencies. See Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). Notably, Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to “arms of the State” and state employees acting in their official capacities. Doe v. Coastal Carolina Univ., 359 F.Supp.3d 367, 378 (D.S.C. 2019). Consequently, officers within the Berkeley County Sheriff's Department-as arms of the state-would be immune from Plaintiff's damages claims in their official capacities. See, e.g., Capps v. Oconee Cnty. Sheriff's Off., No. 8:18-cv-1434-AMQ-KFM, 2018 WL 10035800, at *3 (D.S.C. June 22, 2018) (explaining that “Sheriff's Departments in South Carolina are state agencies, not municipal departments” and a Sheriff's deputies are therefore “state employees” for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity), adopted, 2019 WL 3521740 (D.S.C. Aug. 2, 2019); Hamilton v. Hampton Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, No. 9:13-cv-1929 DCN, 2013 WL 4538240, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2013) (same).
Finally, it is worth noting that to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to challenge the legality of his traffic stop and/or arrest on November 23, 2022, any such claims are likely barred under the Younger abstention doctrine. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court explained that absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are not authorized to interfere with a state's pending criminal proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). “What lies behind Younger is the premise that state courts are capable of adequately protecting constitutional rights.” Victoria v. Bodiford, No. 8:21-cv-1836-JMC, 2021 WL 3726707, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2021). Thus, federal district courts should abstain from hearing constitutional challenges, no matter how meritorious, if the federal claims have been or could be presented in an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Victoria, 2021 WL 3726707, at *2 (“If Petitioner has the opportunity to raise his constitutional arguments within the state court proceedings and appeal adverse determinations within the state court system, this court is bound by Younger to abstain from granting Petitioner the relief he requests.”). Because Plaintiff's criminal proceedings appear to be ongoing, he plainly has the ability to raise any claims regarding the legality of the traffic stop and/or arrest before the state court handling those proceedings.Consequently, as the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff, further consideration of his claims would be inappropriate at this time. (See Dkt. No. 4 at 3.)
The undersigned takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's underlying state court proceedings, Case Nos. 2022A0810202235, -2236, -2237, -2238, and -2239. See https://publicindex.sccourts.org/berkeley/publicindex/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2023); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (same).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's action is subject to summary dismissal for failure to comply with an order of this Court pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED without prejudice and without further leave to amend or bring this case into proper form, as Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).