Given the absence of a valid excuse for Roy's undisputed tardiness, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision denying his motion. See Cobbett v. United States, 43 F.3d 395, 396 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding no good cause and concluding that appeal was time barred when criminal defendant knew he had the right to appeal but failed to do so in a timely manner). We therefore affirm the ruling of the district court in appeal No. 14-2465.

See Voytik v. United States, 778 F.2d 1306, 1309-10 (8th Cir. 1985) ("vague allegations of [counsel's] impropriety and coercion" did not warrant evidentiary hearing). Moreover, "the transcript of the [guilty plea] hearing shows beyond doubt" that Robinson's plea was not coerced and he was aware that he was waiving certain rights, including his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.Cobbett v. United States, 43 F.3d 395, 396 (8th Cir. 1994). We note that at the plea hearing the government stated that "Mr. Robinson . . . agreed to waive any appeal of the suppression hearing and the [court's] findings."

And the record demonstrates that the defendant was fully informed of his appellate rights, meaning he was not prejudiced. Filing 42 at 23:26 to 24:30; filing 43; see Cobbett v. United States, 43 F.3d 395, 396 (8th Cir. 1994). CONCLUSION

"In general, where a criminal defendant cannot show good cause for his failure to appeal, even meritorious claims will be barred in post-conviction proceedings." Cobbett v. United States, 43 F.3d 395, 396 (8th Cir. 1994). The record shows that Hargett was advised of his right to appeal by both his lawyer and the Court.

Failure to explain the right to appeal properly can create a viable ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Cobbett v. United States, 43 F.3d 395, 396 (8th Cir. 1994). Movant, however, cannot demonstrate prejudice if the record shows that he had actual knowledge of his appeal rights.