Opinion
Index No. 150027/2023 Motion Seq. No. 001
06-20-2023
NATASHA COATES, Petitioner, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DAVID BANKS Respondent.
Unpublished Opinion
MOTION DATE 01/23/2023
DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION
LYLE E. FRANK JUDGE
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31,32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41,42, 43 were read on this motion to/for VACATE - DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT/AWARD.
Petitioner brings this proceeding to reverse and annul termination of petitioner's employment, effective September 1, 2022, by Respondent New York City Department of Education ("DOE"). Petitioner alleges that her termination was arbitrary and capricious and in violation of lawful procedure. The DOE opposes the instant petition on the grounds that it acted reasonably and in good faith when it terminated petitioner. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is granted.
The Court would like to thank Craig Supcoff for his assistance in this matter.
Background
Petitioner began her employment with the DOE in September 2013, as a substitute teacher. In September 2018, the DOE appointed petitioner to a full-time, early childhood PreK position at P.S.5, under Principal Lena Gates. On or about October 18, 2021, petitioner was reassigned to a 3K class. Petitioner was out on leave for five days during October 2021. Further, the record establishes that petitioner had multiple absences from September 2021 through January 2022. Petitioner alleges these absences were due to an adverse reaction to COVID vaccination, complications from her back injury, as well as a hospitalization due to COVID in January 2022.
Notwithstanding the petitioner's absences, she covered 13 classes during her scheduled preparatory periods and on June 6, 2022, petitioner requested compensation via email from Principal Gates. Principal Gates then requested a copy via email of the logbook that showed coverages petitioner had provided, but neither party could locate the logbook. On June 23, 2022, Principal Gates issued petitioner a disciplinary letter which accused the petitioner of being insubordinate and unprofessional regarding her inquiry of the location of the subject logbook.
On June 27, 2022, shortly after this email exchange, Principal Gates informed Petitioner via email that she would be discontinuing petitioner's employment with the DOE. Further, on June 27, 2022, Principal Gates signed and issued petitioner an annual professional performance review ("APPR") which indicated petitioner was "unsatisfactory" in three areas and made a recommendation of discontinuance or probationary service. See NYSCEF Doc. 30.
On July 8, 2022, petitioner received in the mail a computer-generated letter dated July 3, 2022, informing petitioner of her denial of completion of tenure allegedly sent from District 16 Superintendent Yolanda Martin. Superintendent Yolanda Martin's name was on the letter, but the letter the petitioner received was mailed from the school's address rather than the mailing address of the Superintendent. Despite her name being on the July 3, 2022, letter, Yolanda Martin resigned from her position effective June 30, 2022.
Standard of Review
Article 78 review is permitted, where it is alleged a determination was made "in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion...." NY CPLR §7803(3). "Arbitrary" for the purpose of the statute is interpreted as "when it is without sound basis in reason and is taken without regard to the facts." Pell v Board of Ed. of Union Free School Dist. No. of the Towns of Scarsdale and Mamaroneck, Westchester Cty. 34N.Y.2d 222, 231 [1974].
A court can overturn an administrative action only if the record illuminates there was no rational basis for the decision. Id. "Rationality is what is reviewed under both the substantial evidence rule and the arbitrary and capricious standard." Id. If the court reviewing the determination finds that "[the determination] is supported by facts or reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the records and has a rational basis in the law, it must be confirmed." American Telephone &Telegraph v. State Tax Comm 'n 61 N.Y.2d 393, 400 [1984], It is well established that a probationary employee may be terminated for any reason or no reason at all, without notice or a hearing, so long as the termination was not made in "bad faith," that is, in violation of the Constitution, a statute, or decisional law. Reisler v New York City Dept. of Educ., 133 A.D.3d 546, 466 [1st Dept 2015], The onus is on the petitioner to establish bad faith through competent evidence and not speculation. Witherspoon v Horn, 19 A.D.3d 250, 251 [1st Dept 2005], Discussion
Petitioner argues that despite receiving "satisfactory" ratings throughout multiple educational grades over three different school years, none of her superiors ever observed her in the classroom throughout her probationary period. As a result, the school never provided feedback with pre-observation or post-observation conferences. Petitioner alleges that the DOE never provided any evidence-based feedback on her instruction that would put her on notice of possible termination.
Petitioner also argues that her termination letter violated lawful procedure under New York Education Law and was in retaliation for requesting additional compensation. On or about June 6, 2022, via email, petitioner requested compensation from Principal gates for the 13 prep periods she missed. Shortly after this exchange, Principal Gates issued petitioner her first disciplinary letter on June 23, 2022, and informed her on June 27, 2022, that Principal Gates would be recommending discontinuance of Petitioner's employment with the DOE.
In opposition, the DOE argues that petitioner fails to point to any competent evidence demonstrating the DOE terminated her in bad faith. DOE contends that petitioner was a probationary employee at time of her termination, and she may be terminated for any reason or no reason at all, so long as the termination was not made in bad faith. Petitioner, however, presents sufficient facts to suggest that her termination was in retaliation for seeking payment for petitioner's coverage periods.
This Court found the holding in Matter of Capece v Shultz, 117 A.D.3d 1045 [2d Dept 2014] to be instructive. In Matter of Capece, a teacher started to receive "unsatisfactory" ratings only after she asked the principal to make up her missed preparation periods, and it was at that point that the petitioner's performance evaluations began to decline. Id. at 1046. There the Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court's determination that the school discharged the petitioner in bad faith and reinstated the petitioner to her former position, with retroactive seniority, backpay, and benefits. Id.
The Court finds the facts in Matter of Capece to be analogous to the instant matter. The petitioner here similarly only received her first unsatisfactory review from the school after she requested compensation for the 13 prep periods she missed. This unsatisfactory rating is what ultimately led to the DOE terminating Petitioner's employment. Contrary to the DOE's assertions, the record before this Court is devoid of support that the DOE's termination was not in bad faith. Accordingly, it is hereby
ADJUDGED that the petition is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that the termination of petitioner's employment is vacated, and the petitioner be reinstated to her position of employment with the respondent New York City Department of Education, with restoration of applicable seniority and back pay.