Opinion
B228929
12-29-2011
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. INDIANA LUMBERMENS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Brendan Pegg and Brendan Pegg for Defendant and Appellant. Office of the County Counsel, Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, Brian Chu, Deputy County Counsel, Ruben Baeza, Jr., Assistant County Counsel and Liliana Campos, Associate County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. SJ3506)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Terry A. Bork, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Brendan Pegg and Brendan Pegg for Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the County Counsel, Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, Brian Chu, Deputy County Counsel, Ruben Baeza, Jr., Assistant County Counsel and Liliana Campos, Associate County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company (the surety), appeals from an order denying its motion to vacate a summary judgment on a bail bond forfeiture. The forfeiture was entered after defendant, Simeon Bakalski, failed to appear for a criminal matter. The surety claims the summary judgment motion should not have been granted. The surety reasons the trial court failed to enter summary judgment within the 90-day jurisdictional time limit in Penal Code section 1306, subdivision (c). As the surety is estopped from challenging the timeliness of the trial court's order entering summary judgment, we affirm the summary judgment.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Forfeiture, Extensions And Tolling
On September 10, 2007, 1 Call Bail Bonds posted a $250,000 bond for defendant's release. When defendant failed to appear as ordered on September 12, 2007, the bond was forfeited. Notice of the forfeiture was mailed to the surety on September 13, 2007. On March 17, 2008, the bail agent filed a section 1305.4 motion to extend time to seek relief from the forfeiture. On April 9, 2008, the trial court granted the motion to extend to July 9, 2008. On July 9, 2008, the bail agent filed a second motion to extend time to seek relief from the forfeiture. On August 4, 2008, the trial court granted the bail agent's second motion extending the time to seek relief from the forfeiture to October 3, 2008.
On October 3, 2008, the bail agent filed a motion to exonerate the bond, which was scheduled for hearing on October 29, 2008. The motion was brought pursuant to section 1305, subdivision (f). The surety argued defendant was in custody in Bulgaria and the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office had elected not to extradite him. On October 29, 2008, rather than exonerating the bond, the trial court ordered the time period tolled until November 19, 2008, pursuant to section 1305, subdivision (e)(1). The next scheduled event was a hearing on the motion to exonerate. On November 19, 2008, according to the clerk's minutes, the trial court entered another tolling order. The clerk's minutes state: "Time is tolled until 12-17-2008." The hearing on the motion to exonerate the forfeited bond was continued until December 17, 2008.
On December 17, 2008, Deputy District Attorney Diana Carbajal reminded the trial court there was a pending motion to vacate the bond forfeiture. Ms. Carbajal stated time was needed to verify defendant's identity and for paperwork to be submitted to the Department of Justice. She stated an additional six months was needed to complete the process. The trial court tolled the time period to exonerate bail pursuant to section 1305.4. The matter was continued to May 14, 2009.
On May 14, 2009, the bail agent advised the trial court that the parties had reached a stipulation continuing the hearing on the exoneration motion for six months. Also, on May 14, 2009, the bail agent filed a second motion to exonerate the forfeited bond. The second motion to exonerate alleges that the prosecution had not processed the paper work for extradition. However, the bail agent was willing to toll time to allow the process to be completed. If the trial court did not toll the period, the bail agent requested that the bond be exonerated pursuant to section 1305, subdivision (f). No declaration was filed by the bond agent. The trial court continued the matter to June 5, 2009.
On June 5, 2009, Deputy District Attorney Kaarin Axelsen advised the trial court that attempts were being made to extradite defendant from Bulgaria. Ms. Axelsen requested the trial court to put the matter over for six months. The trial court ordered the time tolled until September 4, 2009. On September 4, 2009, the clerk's minutes reflect that the motion to exonerate bail was denied because the prosecution had elected to extradite. But, the clerk's minutes also state the hearing on the motion to vacate the bond forfeiture was continued to March 4, 2010. The trial court tolled time until March 4, 2010.
B. The March 4, 2010 Hearing
The docket entry for March 4, 2010 indicates the matter was called for a hearing on a motion to vacate bond forfeiture. However, the reporter's transcript indicates differently. Deputy District Attorney Jonathan Bergler stated he thought the purpose of the hearing was to give the trial court a status update regarding extradition. Mr. Bergler explained the efforts to extradite. However, the trial court queried why the prosecution had done nothing in six months "except paperwork to get it started." Mr. Bergler explained the delay was caused by his having to learn the process and juggling other cases. Mr. Bergler further noted that the process included amending the extradition complaint to add flight charges. Ms. Carbajal added that the extradition request would have to be processed through the United States Government's Office of International Affairs. At one point, the trial court inquired if defendant was in custody in Bulgaria. Ms. Carbajal stated that defendant was not in custody. However, she did not have any reason to believe he had left Bulgaria. Counsel for the surety, Brendan Pegg, stated that it was his first appearance in the matter. Mr. Pegg indicated that he was not familiar with the history of the case but thought a "good faith standard" should be applied. No party filed a declaration.
The trial court responded to the surety's claims of undue delay as follows: "Then, I'm just going to forfeit the bail, period, and then we can stop right there. So you missed—you left out a few points. [¶] One point is that somebody from the bail bond company came in and asked so they could try to find him, and it took a long time for the investigators to find him. And then when he was found, then you came back in last May – and I'm not saying 'you.' but somebody from the office—came in May saying "he's in Bulgaria.' That's when we started everything, apparently, after that. [¶] So it hasn't been a year-and-a-half. It's been basically, less than a year that he was – They found out that he was in Bulgaria and then this procedure has taken place. [¶] But, basically, what it comes down to, the bail bondsman dropped the ball in letting him go. [¶] In any event, I'm not going to put blame on anybody, but it has been a year-and-a-half. It does irritate me that it's taken this long for anything to be done and there is no light at the end of the tunnel. I mean, nobody knows what is going to happen when it gets to the [Office of International Affairs], and if they are going to kick it back." The trial court continued the matter, without objection from the surety, to June 2, 2010.
C. The June 2, 2010 Hearing And Summary Judgment
On June 2, 2010, Deputy District Attorney Jonathan Fairglow advised the trial court that counsel for the surety was not present regarding the motion to exonerate the bond. Mr. Fairglow also explained that the June 2, 2010 hearing was to give an update on the extradition process which was still in progress. When the trial court noted that the surety was not present, the motion to exonerate the bond was ordered off calendar. On June 23, 2010, the trial court entered summary judgment on the forfeited bond. Notice of entry of summary judgment was mailed to the surety on the same date.
D. The Motion To Vacate Summary Judgment And Exonerate Bond
On July 16, 2010, the surety filed a motion to vacate the summary judgment and for exoneration of the bail bond. The surety asserted the summary judgment was not timely entered within 90-days of when the trial court could "first do so" as required by section 1306. The surety reminded the trial court that the bail agent had requested and obtained two extensions under section 1305.4. In addition, the surety also indicated that the bail agent had brought a motion to vacate the forfeiture pursuant to section 1305, subdivision (f) because defendant was in custody in Bulgaria. Rather than exonerating the bond, defendant's custody status resulted in tolling the forfeiture period five times with the bail agent's agreement up to and including March 4, 2010. However, the surety asserted that, on March 4, 2010, it did not request any additional tolling period. And, according to the surety, the trial court did not toll the period any further. Rather, the trial court set a hearing on June 2, 2010 solely for the prosecutor to report on the progress being made to extradite defendant.
According to the surety, when the trial court called the matter on June 2, 2010, the prosecutor confirmed the purpose of the hearing was to update the trial court on the extradition process. The surety indicated the trial court noted on June 2, 2010 that "the moving party" was not present and placed the motion to exonerate the bond off calendar. But, the surety argued there was no moving party as of that date. The surety's papers contain a brief July 15, 2010 declaration which attaches: the forfeiture notice; the June 23, 2010 summary judgment; the clerk's minutes; and the March 4, 2010 reporter's transcript.
E. Opposition To The Motion To Vacate
On October 8, 2010, the County of Los Angeles filed opposition to the motion to vacate summary judgment and exoneration of bail bond. The county argued the summary judgment was timely. This was because the trial court tolled the time on March 4 to June 2, 2010 due to temporary disability within the meaning of section 1305, subdivision (e). The county further argued that the motion to exonerate the bond under section 1305, subdivision (f) was continued in an ongoing effort to determine defendant's location in Bulgaria. This also constituted a temporary disability warranting tolling under section 1305, subdivision (e) in order to determine defendant's status.
The county disagreed with the surety that as of March 4, 2010 there was no pending motion before the trial court. The county noted that the surety had filed its first motion to exonerate on October 3, 2008. The surety filed a second motion on May 14, 2009. The trial court's electronic docket reflects that the motion to exonerate the bond was continued to June 2, 2010. When the surety failed to appear at the June 2, 2010 hearing, the pending motion was ordered off calendar. This led to the timely entry of the summary judgment on June 23, 2010. Contrary to the surety's claims otherwise, the purpose of the March 4, 2010 hearing was clearly for a status report. This report would allow the trial court to determine whether there was a permanent or temporary disability within the meaning of section 1305, subdivisions (d) and (e). The county's papers are not supported by a declaration.
F. Reply To The Opposition
In reply, the surety asserted the purpose of the March 4, 2010 hearing was for a status report on extradition. The surety contended the trial court did not order the period tolled as there was no statutory basis for tolling the forfeiture period as of March 4, 2010. Nothing in the reporter's transcript shows a request to toll the forfeiture period nor was there an order tolling the period. And, there was no discussion of a disability within the meaning of section 1305 in the reporter's transcript. The surety pointed out that the reporter's transcript showed there was no basis for tolling because the prosecutor advised the trial court that defendant was no longer in custody on March 4, 2010. And, the prosecution's efforts to extradite defendant did not provide a ground for tolling the forfeiture period. A brief declaration attached to the reply authenticated several legislative bill summaries.
G. The Ruling
On October 27, 2010, the trial court denied the motion to vacate the summary judgment and exonerate the bond. This timely appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Contentions
The surety argues: the June 23, 2010 summary judgment was untimely because the March 4, 2010 hearing established the first date upon which it could be entered; section 1306, subdivision (c) required the trial court to enter summary judgment on or before June 2, 2010; and this was the 90th day after the trial court could enter the summary judgment. The county asserts that the summary judgment was timely because the bail agent sought and obtained two extensions of time under section 1305.4 and seven tolling periods pursuant to section 1305, subdivision (e). This includes an extension of time from March 4 until June 2, 2010. The county asserts the surety is estopped from challenging the order for want of jurisdiction because: the surety acquiesced to the last extension of time on March 4, 2010; the bail agent's motion remained on calendar; and the bail agent's motion expressly requested time "to allow the People to complete" the extradition process.
B. Jurisdictional And Bond Forfeiture Principles
Our Supreme Court explained the applicable jurisdictional principles as follows: "The term 'jurisdiction,' used 'continuously in a variety of situations, has so many different meanings that no single statement can be entirely satisfactory as a definition.' [Citation.] Essentially, jurisdictional errors are of two types. 'Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense means an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties.' [Citation.] When a court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, an ensuing judgment is void, and 'thus vulnerable to direct or collateral attack at any time.' [Citation.] [¶] However, 'in its ordinary usage the phrase "lack of jurisdiction" is not limited to these fundamental situations.' [Citation.] It may also 'be applied to a case where, though the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has no "jurisdiction'' (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites.' [Citation.] '"[W]hen a statute authorizes [a] prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction."' [Citation.] When a court has fundamental jurisdiction, but acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its act or judgment is merely voidable. [Citations.] That is, its act or judgment is valid until it is set aside, and a party may be precluded from setting it aside by 'principles of estoppel, disfavor of collateral attack or res judicata.' [Citation.] Errors which are merely in excess of jurisdiction should be challenged directly, for example by motion to vacate the judgment, or on appeal, and are generally not subject to collateral attack once the judgment is final unless 'unusual circumstances were present which prevented an earlier and more appropriate attack.' [Citations.]" (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660-661; see also People v. Bankers Ins. Co. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1382-1383.)
Our Supreme Court has explained, "'[A trial] court has jurisdiction over a bail bond from the point that it is issued until the point it is either satisfied, exonerated, or time expires to enter summary judgment after forfeiture.'" (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 663; see also People v. Amwest Surety Ins. Co. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 547, 552.) The purpose of bail and forfeiture statutes is to insure the attendance of the accused and his or her obedience to court orders and judgments. (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 657; People v. Wilcox (1960) 53 Cal.2d. 651, 656-657.) The goal of the statutes is not to raise revenue for the state or punishment to the surety. (People v. Wilcox, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 657; People v. Seneca Ins. Co. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1081.) Section 1305 must be construed favorably to the surety and on behalf of those persons pledging their property to secure defendant's release from custody. (People v. Lexington National Ins. Co. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1201; People v. Far West Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 791, 795.)
Section 1305, subdivision (a) requires the trial court to declare a bail forfeiture when the defendant fails to appear. Section 1305, subdivision (b) requires the clerk of the court to mail notice of forfeiture to the surety when the bond exceeds $400. A surety then has 185 days (180 plus five for mailing) to obtain relief from the forfeiture. (§ 1305, subds. (c), (d) & (e).) Relief may be obtained on certain grounds such as defendant's appearance in court or if the accused is surrendered by the bail agent. (§ 1305, subd. (c); People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 658.)
The 185-day time frame is commonly called the appearance period. (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 658; People v. Bankers Ins. Co., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1382.) Section 1305.4 allows the trial court to extend the appearance period by a motion establishing good cause. Section 1305.4 provides for the extension of the appearance period as follows: "Notwithstanding Section 1305, the surety insurer, the bail agent, the surety, or the depositor may file a motion, based upon good cause, for an order extending the 180-day period provided in that section. The motion shall include a declaration or affidavit that states the reasons showing good cause to extend that period. The court, upon a hearing and a showing of good cause, may order the period extended to a time not exceeding 180 days from its order. A motion may be filed and calendared as provided in subdivision (i) of Section 1305." The extension motion must also be filed within the 185-day period and may be heard within 30 days of the expiration of the appearance period. (§ 1305, subd. (i); People v. Aegis Security Ins. Co. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1074-1075.) The 30-day period may also be extended for good cause. (§ 1305, subd. (i).) The motion to extend may be brought by the surety or the bail agent. (Ibid.) Section 1305, subdivision (e)(1) also provides that the period may be tolled by defendant's temporary disability defined as "detention by military or civil authorities" in a foreign country.
When the appearance period expires, section 1306 requires the trial court to enter summary judgment within 90 days. Section 1306 provides in part: "(a) When any bond is forfeited and the period of time specified in Section 1305 has elapsed without the forfeiture having been set aside, the court which has declared the forfeiture, regardless of the amount of the bail, shall enter a summary judgment against each bondsman named in the bond in the amount for which the bondsman is bound. . . . [¶] (c) If, because of the failure of any court to promptly perform the duties enjoined upon it pursuant to this section, summary judgment is not entered within 90 days after the date upon which it may first be entered, the right to do so expires and the bail is exonerated." Our Supreme Court has held: "After the appearance period expires, the trial court has 90 days to enter summary judgment on the bond. (§ 1306, subds. (a), (c).)" (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 658.) If summary judgment is not entered after expiration of the 90-day period after the period upon which it may be first entered, the right to do so expires. (§ 1306, subd. (c); People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661.) A summary judgment entered after the 90-day period is void and the bond is exonerated as a matter of law. (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661; County of Los Angeles v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 10, 16; People v. Topa Ins. Co. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 296, 303.) In seeking to set aside the forfeiture, the surety had the burden of proving by competent evidence that the case fell within the statutory requirements of sections 1305 and 1306. (People v. Accredited Surety & Cas. Co. (2004) 132 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1139; People v. American Surety Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 719, 725.)
C. Application Of The Bond Forfeiture Principles
This case is controlled by County of Los Angeles v. Ranger Ins. Co., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pages 12-15. This case and Ranger Insurance Co. share the following similarities: a dispute as to whether there was a tolling period due to a pending motion to vacate or exonerate the bond; a surety's claim the trial court lacked jurisdiction for insufficient evidence to warrant a disability tolling within the guidelines of section 1305; a bail agent's motion requesting the trial court to toll the statutory time to have the forfeiture of its bond vacated; and a county assertion the surety was estopped from claiming there was no jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 15-19.) The court in Ranger Ins. Co. declined to resolve issues of whether the trial court had intended to toll the period or continued the hearing. Instead, it was assumed that the trial court tolled the period. (Id. at pp. 17-18.)
The matter was then resolved on the basis of estoppel principles. (County of Los Angeles v. Ranger Ins. Co., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 17-18.) The court in Ranger Ins. Co. explained the applicable estoppel principles as follows: "'[W]hen, as here, the court has jurisdiction of the subject, a party who seeks or consents to action beyond the court's power as defined by statute or decisional rule may be estopped to complain of the ensuing action in excess of jurisdiction. [Citations.] Whether he shall be estopped depends on the importance of the irregularity [,] not only to the parties but to the functioning of the courts[,] and in some instances on other considerations of public policy. A litigant who has stipulated to a procedure in excess of jurisdiction may be estopped to question it when "To hold otherwise would permit the parties to trifle with the courts." [Citations.]'" (Id. at p. 18 quoting In re Griffin (1967) 67 Cal.2d 343, 348.)
The court in County of Los Angeles v. Ranger Ins. Co., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pages 18-19 then rejected the surety's claims for relief based on the bail agent's actions. It was pointed out that the surety, through its bail agent, had appeared in court, sought and received a favorable tolling. (Ibid.) That is, the bail agent obtained a tolling of the statutory time period in which to have the forfeiture vacated. The Court of Appeal then held: "Having been handed the favor, [the surety] now seeks to bite the hand from which the favor was obtained by contending the trial court was without authority to toll the running of the 185-day period because [the bail agent] had not presented the trial court with sufficient information to warrant such a tolling. Can there be any doubt that if [the surety] had, within the 30-day extension of the 185-day period, presented the court with facts proving a temporary disability of [the defendant in that case] (or presented the court with [the defendant in that case], [the surety] would have expected the trial court to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail? We will not permit [the surety] to 'trifle with the courts.' The upshot of [the surety's/bail agent's] request for, and receipt of, a tolling will be that [the surety] will find no relief in this court. Unlike the public policy against banishing criminal defendants, there is no public policy against the forfeiture of bail bonds." (Ibid., accord People v. National Auto. and Cas. Ins. Co. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 120, 126-127.)
The surety contends the forfeiture period expired on March 4, 2010. But prior to March 4, 2010, the bail agent filed two motions to exonerate the bond pursuant to section 1305, subdivision (f) on the ground defendant was in custody in Bulgaria. The motions were filed on October 3, 2008 and May 14, 2009. On December 17, 2008, the prosecutor reminded the trial court of the "pending" section 1305 motion to exonerate the bond. The trial court did not grant the motion to exonerate on December 17, 2008. Rather, the trial court tolled the time period with the bail agent's agreement pursuant to section 1305.4 until May 14, 2009. On May 14, 2009, the bail agent filed a second motion to exonerate the bond. The bail agent represented to the trial court that the parties had stipulated to extending the time an additional six months to resolve the extradition issue. The matter was continued to June 5, 2009. On June 5, 2009, the trial court ordered the time tolled until September 4, 2009 after the prosecution requested an additional six months. The September 4, 2009 case summary indicates the trial court refused to exonerate the bond but continued the hearing on the motion to vacate the bond forfeiture to March 4, 2010.
At the March 4, 2010 hearing, the surety claimed the prosecution lacked good faith. In response to the surety, the trial court indicated that it could enter judgment on the bond at that time. But, the trial court then reminded the surety that its agent had requested relief from the trial court numerous times since the forfeiture was declared. Without objection from the surety, on March 4, the trial court continued the matter to June 2, 2010.
Notably, on March 4, 2010, in putting the matter over to June 2, 2010, the trial court made no disposition of the pending second motion to exonerate the bond which had been filed by the bail agent on May 14, 2009. No doubt, the surety would have taken advantage of the situation had some sort of disability been established by the evidence prior to June 2, 2010, based on the pending motion. And, while the disability issue was pending, the trial court was obligated to ascertain whether the surety was entitled to whatever relief may have been appropriate under the circumstances of the case. (§ 1305, subd. (e); People v. Lexington National Ins. Corp. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1490-1491; People v. Resolute Ins. Co. (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 249, 255.) Thus, even if the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by extending the period a seventh time, the surety is estopped from challenging the order. (People v. National Auto. and Cas. Ins. Co., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 125-127; County of Los Angeles v. Ranger Ins. Co., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 18-19.)
We disagree with the surety that the trial court had no basis to consider the disability issue after March 4, 2010, because defendant was no longer in custody in Bulgaria. There was no admissible evidence presented concerning defendant's custody status. The sole information regarding defendant's custody status was Ms. Carbajal's unsworn statement. This is not competent evidence that the defendant was no longer in custody. (Evid. Code § 140; County of Alameda v. Moore (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1426 disapproved on a different point in Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1361, fn. 15; Van de Kamp v. Bank of America (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 819, 843; see also People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 524.)
In addition, the surety is incorrect that the trial court was required to immediately grant summary judgment even though there was the second pending motion to exonerate. As the appellate court in People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 45, 51 explained: "The statutory scheme cannot be manipulated in [such a] manner, to require forfeiture when it is not strictly called for in order to avoid forfeiture when, on a later occasion, it is called for. Moreover, a construction which requires forfeiture even though it is not strictly called for by the statute is not a construction 'in favor' of the surety." Here, forfeiture was not strictly called for on March 4, 2010 because the unresolved second motion to exonerate left the forfeiture issue open. And, the surety presented no evidence defendant was not in custody as of March 4, 2010. Thus, the surety has failed to establish the absence of a basis to toll the statute. The surety's analysis rests upon the theory the trial court lacked jurisdiction on March 4, 2010 to toll the period until June 2, 2010. Because the surety is estopped from raising this issue, the summary judgment must be affirmed.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The County of Los Angeles is awarded its costs on appeal from Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
We concur:
MOSK, J.
TURNER, P. J.
KRIEGLER, J.