Stalnaker 607 S.E.2d 765 769Supervalue Operations v. Ctr.Design 524 S.E.2d 666Batzer Constr., Inc. v. Boyer 129 P.3d 773 779 City of Fairmont 468 S.E.2d at 715id.see Energy Dev. Corp. v. Moss 591 S.E.2d 135 140 Seeii. MistakeBrannon v. Riffle 475 S.E.2d 97 100-01Webb v. Webb 301 S.E.2d 570 575 Webb 301 S.E.2d at 576Eye v.Nichols 70 S.E.2d 264Taylor v. Godfrey 59 S.E. 631Pennypacker v. Laidley 11 S.E. 39Harner v. Price 17 W. Va. 523see McGinnis v. Clayton 312 S.E.2d 765 770See Ryan v. Ryan 640 S.E.2d 64 68 See Poindexter v. Equitable Life Assur.Soc. of U.S. 34 S.E.2d 340 343McGinnis v. Clayton 312 S.E.2d 765 779 b. Breach of a Duty Imposed by the Contractc. Damages Resulting From the Breach 56-6-27see also CMC Enter., Inc. v. Ken Lowe Mgmt. Co. 525 S.E.2d 295 299 56-6-27See CMC Enter. 525 S.E.2d at 296That the rate ofprejudgment and post-judgment interest shall notbe less than seven percent per annum. 56-6-312.

The issue of whether the underlying insurance policy even afforded coverage for Plaintiff's claims must be resolved, and Defendant argues that nothing about the claim file and activity log has bearing on whether there is coverage under the policy. Defendant argues that the contract provisions here are unambiguous (and in its favor), such that the terms of the contract should be applied instead of construed by the Court. With such an approach, Defendant argues, discovery on the issue is unnecessary and irrelevant. See CME Enterprise, Inc. v. Ken Lowe Management Co., 525 S.E.2d 295, 298 ( W.Va. 1999).

"[A] written contract may be modified or its terms altered by a subsequent valid oral agreement" and the trier of fact may appropriately determine whether there was a parol modification to a contract. CMC Enterprise, Inc. v. Ken Lowe Management Co., 206 W. Va. 414, 417, 525 S.E.2d 295, 299 (1999). Based on the parties' extensive communication and course of dealing, reasonable minds could differ as to whether Smith & Loveless was on notice that it needed to complete the project by a date certain, an issue ultimately affecting Breckenridge's entire breach of contract claim.

I can consider subsequent evidence to demonstrate that the parties entered into a new contract, upon consideration, which abrogates prior written contracts or that the parties engaged in a course of conduct which constituted a modification. See 7B Michie's Jurisprudence Evidence § 130, at 281 (1998); see also CMC Enter., Inc. v. Ken Lowe Mgmt. Co., 525 S.E.2d 295, 298 (W.Va. 1999); Thomas v. Gray Lumber Co., 486 S.E.2d 142, 148 (W.Va. 1997); State ex rel. Coral Pools, Inc. v. Knapp, 131 S.E.2d 81, 86 (W.Va. 1963) (holding that a prior written contract may be modified or supplemented by a subsequent valid oral contract). "It is a well-established, fundamental principle of contract law that a valid, unambiguous written contract may be modified or superceded by a subsequent contract based on a valuable consideration."

Furthermore, this Court previously has acknowledged that " West Virginia Code § 56-6-27 ... is the general authority for awarding prejudgment interest in a contract action." CMC Enter., Inc. v. Ken Lowe Mgmt. Co. , 206 W. Va. 414, 418, 525 S.E.2d 295, 299 (1999) (per curiam). See alsoFirst Nat'l Bank of Bluefield v. Clark , 191 W. Va. 623, 625, 447 S.E.2d 558, 560 (1994) (per curiam) ("General authority for awarding prejudgment interest in a contract action in West Virginia is contained in W. Va. Code § 56-6-27.").

Furthermore, this Court previously has acknowledged that "West Virginia Code § 56-6-27 . . . is the general authority for awarding prejudgment interest in a contract action." CMC Enter., Inc. v. Ken Lowe Mgmt. Co., 206 W. Va. 414, 418, 525 S.E.2d 295, 299 (1999) (per curiam). See also First Nat'l Bank of Bluefield v. Clark, 191 W. Va. 623, 625, 447 S.E.2d 558, 560 (1994) (per curiam) ("General authority for awarding prejudgment interest in a contract action in West Virginia is contained in W. Va. Code § 56-6-27.").

W.Va.Code, 56–6–27 [1923] provides that “[t]he jury, in any action founded on contract, may allow interest on the principal due ...”, and W.Va.Code, 56–6–31 [1981] provides that “[e]xcept where it is otherwise provided by law, every judgment or decree for payment of money entered by any court of this State shall bear interest from the date thereof ...: Provided, that if the judgment or decree, or any part thereof, is for special or liquidated damages, the amount of such liquidated changes shall bear interest from the date the right to bring the same shall have accrued....” Since this action was “founded on contract,” we consider Code, 56–6–27 [1923] to apply to the matter of prejudgment interest, and not Code, 56–6–31 [1981], which by its own terms only applies where the rule concerning interest is not otherwise provided by law. 171 W.Va. at 488, 300 S.E.2d at 300 (footnote added); see also CMC Enterprise, Inc. v. Ken Lowe Mgmt. Co., 206 W.Va. 414, 418, 525 S.E.2d 295, 299 (1999) (explaining that West Virginia Code § 56–6–27 is the general authority for awarding prejudgment interest in contract actions); City Nat'l Bank of Charleston v. Wells, 181 W.Va. 763, 778, 384 S.E.2d 374, 389 (1989) (observing that W.Va.Code 56–6–31 does not specifically apply to contract actions). When this Court decided Stuckey,West Virginia Code § 56–6–31 did not include the language “whether in an action sounding in tort, contract or otherwise.”

It is well established that "factual findings made by the trial [court] are given great deference by this Court and will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous." CMC Enterprise, Inc. v. Ken Lowe Management Co., 206 W. Va. 414, 418, 525 S.E.2d 295, 299 (1999). In this case, the circuit court's May 14, 2009, order sets forth detailed and lengthy factual findings justifying its decision to apply the $500,000 cap.

Turning to the issue of whether punitive damages were justified in the instant case, it has long been held that "factual findings made by the trial court are given great deference by this Court and will not be over-turned unless they are clearly erroneous." CMC Enterprise, Inc. v. Ken Lowe Management Co., 206 W. Va. 414, 418, 525 S.E.2d 295, 299 (1999). In this case, the circuit court's February 25, 2008, thorough and lengthy order provided a mountain of factual findings detailing DuPont's wanton, reckless, and willful conduct justifying the underlying punitive damages award.