28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) reads in part: "The petition for removal . . . shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of the initial pleading . ."Walsh v. American Airlines, 264 F. Supp. 514 (E.D.Ky., 1967); Roseberry v. Fredell, 174 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.Ky., 1959); Cline v. Belt, 43 F. Supp. 538 (E.D.Ky., 1942). Thus, in Walsh the petition failed to show the state in which the corporate defendant had its principal place of business.

For the court to permit the defendant to amend its petition for removal would be a reversal of a rule of long standing and repeatedly held in this district. In the case of Cline v. Belt (E.D.Ky. 1942), 43 F. Supp. 538, decided by this court February 26, 1942, the court recited the rule to be that a strict construction of the language employed in a petition for removal in an action in a state court to a federal court is required and the language should be clear and unequivocal. It would be academic for me to burden this opinion with the numerous authorities cited in Cline v. Belt. That opinion quoted from decisions of many courts, trial, appellate and Supreme.

Browne v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, D.C. 1959, 168 F. Supp. 796. This court had the same question before it in the case of Cline v. Belt, D.C., 43 F. Supp. 538. The opinion in that case is referred to and adopted as a part of this memorandum."

Here summons was served on defendants on August 22, 1958, and their amendment was filed on October 20, 1958 some two months later and thus after the twenty day statutory time set out in Sec. 1446. Therefore, the amendment cannot be allowed. Gratz v. Murchison, D.C., 130 F. Supp. 709; White v. Sullivan, D.C., 107 F. Supp. 959; Cline v. Belt, D.C., 43 F. Supp. 538. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1653 provides that "defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts."

Under this section and its predecessors, which also imposed a strict time limit on removal of causes from state to federal courts, it consistently has been held that a petition for removal may not be amended to supply jurisdictional averments that had been lacking, after the time in which removal could be effected had terminated. Frisbie v. Chesapeake Ohio Ry. Co., C.C., 59 F. 369; Brigham v. C.C. Thompson Lumber Co., C.C., 55 F. 881; Santa Clara County v. Goldy Machine Co., C.C., 159 F. 750; Dinet v. City of Delavan, C.C., 117 F. 978; Cline v. Belt, D.C., 43 F. Supp. 538; Heckleman v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., D.C., 45 F. Supp. 984. None of the authorities cited by the defendant contravenes this rule.

[i]t is the rule in this Court that after the expiration of the period allowed for the removal procedure in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), amendments to the removal petition cannot be made to supply an allegation of jurisdiction not before the Court, but the petition may be amended to cure a defective pleading. See Walsh v. American Airlines, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Ky. 1967); Roseberry v. Fredell, 174 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Ky. 1959); Cline v. Belt, 43 F. Supp. 538 (E.D. Ky. 1942). 433 F. Supp. 707, 709 (E.D. Ky. 1977)

Amendments should do nothing more than set forth in proper form something imperfectly stated in the original notice of removal. Jackson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 707, 709 (E.D. Ky. 1977); Cline v. Belt, 43 F. Supp. 538, 540 (E.D. Ky. 1942). In this case, Defendants do not seek to amend a defective notice of removal.

It is the rule in this Court that after the expiration of the period allowed for the removal procedure in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), amendments to the removal petition cannot be made to supply an allegation of jurisdiction not before the Court, but the petition may be amended to cure a defective pleading. See Walsh v. American Airlines, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 514 (E.D.Ky. 1967); Roseberry v. Fredell, 174 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.Ky. 1959); Cline v. Belt, 43 F. Supp. 538 (E.D.Ky. 1942). In each of these cases cited from this district, the removal petitions did not include the allegation that the corporation involved was a citizen of a particular state.

However, an overwhelming number of cases have narrowly interpreted Section 1653 to where "the amendment is one to cure technical defects or to amplify the allegations of the petition." Cline v. Belt, 43 F. Supp. 538, 540 (E.D.Ky. 1942). See also William Kalivas Construction v. Vent Control of Kansas City, supra, at 1010; Young v. Railway Express, supra, at 953; Evans-Hailey v. Crane Co., supra, at 198-202; Carlton Properties v. Crescent City Leasing, supra, at 371; F. L. Drug Corp. v. American Central, supra, at 720; Bradford v. Mitchell Brothers, 217 F. Supp. 525, 528 (N.D.Cal. 1963); Eubanks v. Krispy Kreme Donut, supra, at 482-83; Crawford v. Fargo Manufacturing, 341 F. Supp. 762, 763 (M.D.Fla. 1972); Harlem River Produce v. Aetna Casualty, 257 F. Supp. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Park v. Hopkins, 179 F. Supp. 671, 672 (S.D.Ind. 1960); Barrow Development v. Fulton Insurance, supra, at 317.

2. Defendant Robert Bresette, an individual is a citizen and resident of the State of California. 3. Plaintiff Ila Janice Matteson, an individual is a citizen and resident of the State of Missouri. We can not find any allegation of citizenship of any party in any pleading, petition, or motion indicating their status as of the time of the commencement of the action in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. That such diversity must be alleged to have existed both at the time of the commencement of the action as well as at the time of removal was made clear in Cline v. Belt, 43 F. Supp. 538 (E.D.Ky. 1942) in which a motion to permit amendment of the removal petition was denied and the case was remanded for this very defect in the removal petition. In Accord; Roseberry v. Fredell, 174 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.Ky. 1959); Washington — E. Wash. Joint A. v. Roberts Schaefer Co., 180 F. Supp. 15 (W.D.Pa. 1960); Smith v. Dealers Transit, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 605 (E.D.Tenn.