Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-CV-66-WHA (WO)
03-03-2016
JEFFREY SCOTT CLEGG, #276457, Plaintiff, v. CASSANDRA CARLTON, Defendant.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
This cause of action is pending before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Jeffrey Scott Clegg ("Clegg"), an indigent state inmate presently incarcerated at the Bullock Correctional Facility ("Bullock").
On March 2, 2016, Clegg filed a motion for preliminary injunction in which he requests issuance of an order requiring correctional officials to transfer him from Bullock to the Limestone Correctional Facility as he believes "the defendant is retaliating against [him] through other prison officials." Doc. No. 13 at 1. In support of this request, Clegg alleges that Lt. Aundra Jackson has threatened him with bodily harm and lodged a disciplinary against him for an action which he contends does not constitute a rules infraction. Id. at 1-2.
Upon review of the motion for preliminary injunction, the court concludes that this motion is due to be denied.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction "is within the sound discretion of the district court...." Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002). This court may grant a preliminary injunction only if Clegg demonstrates each of the following prerequisites: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat irreparable injury will occur absent issuance of the injunction; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the potential damage the requested injunction may cause the non-moving parties; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Palmer, 287 F.3d at 1329; McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176 (11thCir. 1983); Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1983). "In this Circuit, '[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the "burden of persuasion"' as to the four requisites." McDonald's, 147 F.3d at 1306; All Care Nursing Service, Inc. v. Bethesda Memorial Hospital, Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989) (a preliminary injunction is issued only when "drastic relief" is necessary); Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975) (grant of preliminary injunction "is the exception rather than the rule," and movant must clearly carry the burden of persuasion). The moving party's failure to demonstrate a "substantial likelihood of success on the merits" may defeat the party's claim, regardless of the party's ability to establish any of the other elements. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that "the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper"). "'The chief function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the controversy can be fully and fairly adjudicated.' Northeastern Fl. Chapter of Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fl., 896 F.2d 1283, 1284 (11th Cir.1990)." Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001).
III. DISCUSSION
Turning to the first prerequisite for issuance of preliminary injunctive relief, the court finds that Clegg fails to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. Clegg likewise fails to establish a substantial threat that he will suffer the requisite irreparable injury absent issuance of the requested preliminary injunctions. The third factor, balancing potential harm to the parties, weighs more heavily in favor of the defendant as issuance of the injunction would adversely impact the ability of correctional officials to effectively manage the daily operation of state prison system by allowing inmates who simply feel unsafe or threatened to dictate their place of incarceration. Finally, the public interest element of the equation is, at best, a neutral factor at this juncture. Thus, Clegg has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating the existence of each prerequisite necessary to warrant issuance of preliminary injunctive relief.
The plaintiff is advised that if he seeks to challenge the constitutionality of actions taken by Lt. Aundra Jackson he may do so by filing a separate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action with this court. --------
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:
1. The motion for preliminary injunction filed by the plaintiff be DENIED.
2. This case be referred back to the undersigned for additional proceedings.
It is further
ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or before March 21, 2016. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which the objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11TH CIR. R. 3-1. See Stein v. Lanning Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
Done this 3rd day of March, 2016.
/s/Terry F. Moorer
TERRY F. MOORER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE